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1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the mid 90s (European Commission, 1995) and, in particular, with the definition of 
the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 (European Council, 2000), innovation policy has been 
definitely set at the core of the regional, national and EU strategies aimed to increase the 
competitiveness and the growth of the European economic systems. Given that, at the 
prospected deadline (2010), the EU had not reached the target of becoming the “most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, the support to 
innovation still remains a focal issue in the European economic policy-making at all the 
territorial levels it is made: European, national and regional. The new Europe 2020 
Strategy (European Commission, 2010) reinforces the support to a “smart growth” based 
on knowledge and innovation. In particular, within the “Innovation Union” flagship 
initiative, different kinds of innovation policies are expected to improve the framework 
conditions for the innovation process to take place. The access to finance for research and 
innovation, the cooperation among the actors of the knowledge “triangle” (research, 
innovation and education) are some of the most notable examples. As for the objectives, 
the setting-up of the R&D intensity target of 3% by 2020 has been followed up by the 
search (in particular, within the EU DG Research and Innovation) of a broader set of 
headline indicators that can guide policy actions (e.g. the share of fast growing -or young- 
and innovative firms in the economy) (High-Level Panel on the Measurement of 
Innovation, 2010).  
The severe economic crisis that invested Europe in 2007, and its latest 
repercussion on the debt crisis of the Member States of the EU, puts this policy strategy 
at a stake and implies the need for a very efficient and effective use of the scarce public 
resources available. With this respect, the need emerges to increase the accuracy with 
which innovation policies are evaluated. Indeed, not only the evaluation of innovation 
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programmes is relevant in terms of assessment purpose. Evaluation is also a policy-
learning tool (e.g. Arnold, 2004) that can offer lessons to future policy schemes, shedding 
light on the determinants of the success or failure of the public interventions.  
The assessment of the innovation policy effects is the issue at stake in this Thesis. 
In a system-kind of perspective innovation policy is meant as the set of public 
interventions that can be implemented to support the innovation process of different 
organisations and, in a broader perspective, the innovation performances of the systems 
these are part of. Despite this large definition, however, in the present Thesis particular 
emphasis will be devoted to the evaluation of the policy support to firms’ innovation 
activities.   
To be sure, the evaluation of innovation policy is nowadays a large research field, 
which crosses the borders of different scientific disciplines in the academia (e.g. 
economics, statistics and econometrics, sociology, political sciences, environmental 
studies, etc…) and also reaches the realm of practitioners’ analysis. The evaluation of 
innovation policy can be inspired by a formative and/or a summative purpose: the former 
is oriented towards discourse, monitoring, programmes improvements and stakeholders’ 
feedbacks; the latter is more oriented towards the judgment of facts and “hard” evidences. 
When evaluating an innovation policy intervention different impacts can be considered 
too: scientific, technological, economic, social and environmental (Edler et al., 2010). 
Several methodologies can be employed, including qualitative, semi-qualitative and 
quantitative techniques (Piric and Reeve, 1997). Furthermore, different types of 
evaluation are focused on different stages of the publicly supported projects: ex-ante 
evaluations occur prior the project is launched; ongoing/in itinere assessments 
concentrate on the results obtained during the implementation of the projects; ex-post 
evaluations take place once the projects are concluded and the results can be tracked 
(Capron and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997). Although all the approaches have 
their own rationales and advantages (along with disadvantages), this Thesis focuses on a 
specific type of ex-post impact assessment, adopting a quantitative approach in its 
empirical applications. More precisely, focusing on the (techno-)economic impact of the 
public intervention, the Thesis investigates the additionality effects of the innovation 
policy. In other terms, it is concerned with the extent to which the policy “supplements” 
the innovation activities, performances and behaviours of the beneficiaries. This focus is 
motivated by the capacity of the additionality evaluation to capture the net effects directly 
generated by the public intervention, comparing the actual situation after the 
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implementation of the policy with an hypothetical counterfactual condition in which the 
policy has not been implemented (or it is implemented with a lower support).  
The attention on the additionality of the public support to innovation activities 
dates back to the standard neoclassical theory rooted in the marginalist equilibrium 
tradition (Colander, 2000). Within this approach, innovation policy is aimed at 
overcoming the underinvestment in innovation activities generated by the presence of 
market failures, such as externalities, uncertainty, indivisibilities and increasing returns 
(Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). In this perspective, the public intervention is justified by its 
capacity to stimulate an additional private investment in innovation activities in order to 
reach the social optimum. This idea underpins the evaluation of what has been called the 
"input additionality''. This is focused on the amount of innovation inputs, as the R&D 
investment, that would not have been allocated without the policy. While the analysis of 
the input additionality is the most popular, also because of its straightforward consistency 
with standard neoclassical approach, the present Thesis enriches it by considering that the 
additionality of the innovation policy is actually manifold and should extend to other two 
dimensions. The first one, still originated in the neoclassical approach, is called “output 
additionality” and concerns the amount of innovation outputs or outcomes that would not 
have been reached without the public support. The second one, the “behavioural 
additionality”, is focused on the strategic and behavioural changes directly induced by the 
policy.  
 Drawing on a recent strand in the literature, developed upon the contribution by 
Buisseret et al. (1995), particular attention is devoted to this latter dimension. Although 
the precise definition of behavioural additionality is still somehow fluid, its analysis 
represents an essential complement to that of the input and the output dimensions. Indeed, 
looking at the behavioural changes induced by the policy, it is possible to provide an 
evaluation that takes into account the effects occurring within the “black box” of the 
beneficiaries and, thus, better understand how additional inputs are used and additional 
outputs obtained. In particular, in assessing the behavioural additionality the focus is on 
both the internal organisation of the beneficiaries’ innovation process and on their 
relations with external sources of knowledge.   
 As will be illustrated within the Thesis, the multi-dimensional analysis of the 
additionality and, in particular, the focus on the behavioural dimension represents the 
most important added value of the research. This allows for an evaluation which is firmly 
anchored in an evolutionary theoretical background and in the literature on innovation 
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systems, according to which policy intervention is not simply aimed at overcoming the 
underinvestment in (and underproduction of) innovation. More precisely, whereas 
according to the standard neoclassical approach public support has to promote individual 
innovation events -by reallocating in an efficient way resources to firms-, according to the 
evolutionary approach and the innovation system perspective policy should enhance 
innovation capabilities and promote framework conditions in which innovation systems 
can better self-organise themselves (Metcalfe, 2005). In this sense, the analysis of the 
behavioural additionality is particularly useful, as it sheds light on the impact of the 
policy on beneficiaries’ learning process, accumulation of new or diverse capabilities and 
relationships with external actors and sources of knowledge (e.g. Georghiou and 
Clarysse, 2006; Hall and Maffioli, 2008; Breschi et al., 2009). 
 In addition to a multi-dimensional analysis of the additionality effects of the 
innovation policy, the present Thesis provides other original contributions to the existing 
literature. At first, in terms of level of analysis. More precisely, the Thesis, in its 
empirical applications devotes particular attention to the level of public intervention. 
Focusing on Italy and Spain, the Thesis investigates the effects of the multi-level systems 
of policy and analyse the relation between the impacts generated by the regional and the 
national public support schemes. Furthermore, the Thesis also directly analyses the 
effects of the regional innovation policy, focusing on the R&D subsidy implemented in 
the Emilia-Romagna NUTS 2 region of Italy. Another main originality of the Thesis lies 
in the methodological approach implemented, which also allows for the analysis of issues 
that have been scarcely investigated in previous contributions. The likely presence of the 
selection bias in the econometric estimation of the additionality (i.e. the average treatment 
effect on the treated) is controlled for, by employing a set of propensity score matching 
estimations. Moreover, two methodological developments are proposed. First, a tentative 
investigation of the relation between the average impact of the policy and the dispersion 
of the effect across the beneficiaries. Second, an application of the generalised propensity 
score to investigate the effects generated by an increasing amount of subsidy, rather than 
by the participation in the policy as a such.  
 The Thesis is a collection of three essays. Although these address specific issues 
and topics, they are also characterised by interconnected research objectives that will lead 
to general concluding remarks. The first paper (Chapter 2) provides an updated review of 
the theoretical and empirical contributions dealing with the additionality of the innovation 
policy, devoting particular attention to its behavioural dimension. The paper investigates, 
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at first, whether this dimension, which is not uniquely conceptualised in the literature, can 
be used to assess innovation policies consistently with the evolutionary theory and the 
related innovation system perspective. More precisely, the paper analyses the extent to 
which the concept of behavioural additionality can be used to evaluate the capacity of the 
policy to mitigate the system failures (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009). 
Moreover, the paper considers some key aspects that should be taken into account when 
evaluating the behavioural and strategic changes induced by the policy intervention. 
Particular emphasis is put also on the likely relations that might emerge between the 
behavioural and the other two dimensions of the additionality (i.e. input and output). As 
for the review of the empirical contributions, in addition to the presentation of the main 
behavioural additionality effects that innovation policy interventions can induce, the 
paper analyses two key issues. On the one hand, what are the econometric methods that 
are used to deal with the specific methodological problems characterising the evaluation 
of the innovation policy (e.g. selection bias). On the other hand, how the concept of 
behavioural additionality is operationalised in the left-hand side of the econometric 
specifications, i.e. which are the outcome variables used to proxy the behavioural changes 
induced by the policy. Some very recent empirical contributions employing alternative 
quantitative approaches, or not directly aimed at evaluating the behavioural additionality 
are also presented.  
The second paper (Chapter 3) proposes the first empirical application provided in 
the Thesis. Based on data stemming from the 4th wave of the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS4, 2002-2004), it aims at investigating the multi-dimensional additionality 
effects of the public support to firms’ innovation activities. To this purpose the paper is 
focused on the policy interventions, both regional and national, implemented in Italy and 
Spain. The review of the previous econometric studies supports the need for such an 
analysis. Prior works employ different methodologies based on different data and 
sometimes consider different specific policy programmes. Due to this, (even intra-
country) comparisons are hardly possible. What is more, none of these previous works 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the different types of additionality effects that 
innovation policy can stimulate. In addition to a multi-dimensional approach aimed at 
analysing the three additionality dimensions, the paper adopts a multi-level perspective. 
This latter finds its theoretical and empirical anchorage in recent contributions, which 
consider innovation as a phenomenon that is shaped by institutions and policy 
interventions initiated at different levels (e.g. Cooke, 2002; Kaiser, 2003). By adopting 
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this perspective, the paper analyses the relations between regional and national policies, 
investigating whether the two levels of public support overlap in the additionality effects 
they produce. This kind of analysis seems to be particularly appropriate in the case of the 
two countries considered in the paper. Indeed, both in Italy and Spain, national and 
regional policies are implemented according to different objectives and modalities (Cefis 
and Evangelista, 2007; Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Barbieri et al., 2010; 
Afcha-Chávez, 2011). The paper tries to address also another issue that is still relatively 
under-investigated in the literature. Whereas the majority of the contributions are focused 
on the average impact of the participation in the policy, it is not clear whether a high 
average level of additionality is associated to a high or low dispersion of the policy effect 
across the beneficiaries. With a tentative investigation, the paper analyses whether a 
given average impact is generated by the concentration or, instead, by the polarisation of 
the effects on the single beneficiaries. As for the econometric strategy, the analysis of the 
additionality is carried out with a set of propensity score matching estimations of the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). This methodological approach, developed 
upon the seminal contribution by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), allows for the reduction 
of the selection bias, by controlling for the selection on the observables. Different 
matching procedures developed in the literature (e.g. Becker and Ichino, 2004; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) are applied to 
support the robustness of the results. As for the tentative analysis of the relation between 
the average additionality impact and the dispersion of the policy effect, this is based on 
the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the rank of the ATTs, calculated for 
each additionality indicator, and the rank of the corresponding coefficients of variation.   
 The third paper included in the Thesis (Chapter 4) considers other aspects related 
to the additionality of the innovation policy and is characterised by another level of 
analysis. It is focused on the effects of a specific regional R&D subsidy, implemented in 
the Emilia-Romagna NUTS 2 region of Italy. Using data collected through an ad hoc 
survey and merged with balance sheets information, the paper addresses two main issues. 
At first, it tests whether the public support to R&D activities stimulates changes in firms’ 
behaviours that might reduce potential system failures occurring (also) at the level of the 
beneficiaries: problems in learning processes; problems due to missing or inappropriate 
connections; unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs that can lead to lock-ins. With respect to 
this latter type of failure, drawing on recent contributions (e.g. Bathelt et al., 2004; 
Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Boschma and ter Wal, 2007; Uyarra, 2010), the paper 
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investigates the capacity of the policy to open-up the regional innovation system to the 
diverse knowledge lying outside the regional borders. In addition to this, the paper 
focuses on a specific type of effect induced by the policy: the impact on the geographical 
range of the cooperation with research partners (i.e. universities and research institutes). 
In doing this, it departs from the standard analyses of the policy effects, as it investigate 
the impact generated by an additional amount of subsidy rather than by the participation 
in the policy as a such. Drawing on recent works (Belussi et al., 2010; D'Este and 
Iammarino, 2010; Laursen et al., 2011), the paper assumes that the more advanced and 
exploratory is the research that firms are looking for, the narrower is the choice of 
suitable partners in their proximity. However, in the case of a cooperation with a distant 
partner the lack of geographical proximity might increase the cost of the interaction. 
Moving from here, the paper investigates whether an increase in the amount of public 
support, allowing firms to face the higher cost of a distant cooperation, enhances the 
propensity to extend the range of the interactions also beyond the regional borders. In 
addressing these specific objectives, the paper makes use of a twofold econometric 
strategy. On the one hand, to estimate the different behavioural changes induced by the 
regional policy, a set of propensity score matching estimations is implemented. On the 
other hand, to investigate the impact of an increasing amount of subsidy on the 
cooperation with research organisations a more sophisticated approach is used: the 
generalized propensity score (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). For each level of subsidy, this 
estimates the effects induced by an additional amount of public support on three 
cooperation strategies: no cooperation, cooperation with a regional research organisation, 
cooperation with an extra-regional research partner.        
 At the end of the Thesis, a concluding section (Chapter 5) presents the results of 
the three papers and their main implications. Particular attention is devoted also to the 
definition of the future lines of research, which this Thesis has not addressed, due the lack 
of proper data and robust methodologies. These pertains to three relevant aspects which, 
by now, are still under-investigated in the literature. At first, the empirical analysis of the 
likely synergies existing among the three additionality dimensions. Second, the effect of 
the policy on the reduction of the barriers that hamper firms’ innovation performance. 
Third, the analysis of the distribution of the policy effects.     
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2 
Evaluating the additionality of innovation policy:  
what do we know about the behavioural dimension?  
A literature review * 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper aims at providing a literature review and a critical discussion of the additionality of 
innovation policy: that is, the net effects of the public support that would not have occurred in its 
absence. In particular, the paper focuses on the behavioural dimension of the additionality concept, 
i.e. the strategic and behavioural changes induced by the policy. In the first part, the paper argues 
that the behavioural dimension, though not yet clearly defined, provides a necessary complement 
to the input and output ones, in order to assess innovation policies consistently with the 
evolutionary theory and the related innovation system perspective. In the second part, the paper 
organises and reviews the recent econometric and quantitative works that have tried to measure the 
behavioural additionality of the policy in empirical studies. In so doing, it presents some of the 
main behavioural changes that have been found to be induced by innovation policy interventions, 
as well as some methodological issues, which characterise the investigation of the behavioural 
additionality. 
 
1 Introduction 
Innovation policy is nowadays at the core of the governmental strategies aimed at 
increasing the performances of the economic systems, supporting in particular their 
growth and competitiveness (e.g. Hall and Maffioli, 2008; European Commission, 2010). 
This relevance, particularly in a time of severe economic crisis and public resources 
scarcity, increases the importance of assessing whether and to what extent public monies 
generate significant results. To this aim, an increasing amount of work has been devoted 
to evaluate innovation policy with different purposes (formative vs. summative), 
considering different impacts (e.g. economic, social, environmental, scientific), stages of 
                                                            
* The paper included in the present Thesis is the result of the PhD candidate’s work only. An 
updated version has been accepted for publication (forthcoming 2012) in the World Review of 
Science, Technology and Sustainable Development. Only the paper submitted for publication has 
been co-authored by Davide Antonioli (Faculty of Economics, University of Ferrara). A 
declaration by the co-author, confirming this point, has been presented to the Secretariat of the 
Doctoral School.   
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the publicly funded innovation projects (ex-ante, ongoing/in itinere, ex-post) and 
employing different methodologies (i.e. qualitative, semi-qualitative and quantitative) 
(e.g. Capron and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997; Piric and Reeve, 1997; Edler et 
al., 2010).   
This paper contributes to the literature on the evaluation of innovation policy, by 
focusing on a specific type of ex-post assessment, mainly summative and focused on the 
(techno-)economic impacts: the analysis of the additionality of the public support. The 
main advantage of this type of investigation, when compared to the other evaluation 
approaches, is that of providing an analysis of the net effects generated by the public 
intervention. In general terms, the analysis of the additionality is aimed at comparing the 
actual situation emerging after the implementation of the policy with a hypothetical 
situation in which the policy has not been implemented. Drawing on the seminal 
contribution by Buisseret et al. (1995), the present work considers the additionality 
concept as a multi-dimensional notion and provides an updated review of the theoretical 
and empirical contributions dealing in particular with the behavioural additionality 
dimension (i.e. the behavioural and strategic changes induced by the policy), rather than 
with the input and output ones.  
This type of work, which at the best of our knowledge has not been provided yet, 
offers a twofold contribution to the existing literature, which is still characterised by a 
certain blurriness in the definition of the behavioural dimension of the additionality 
concept. First, the paper proposes a theoretical guidance to the behavioural additionality 
evaluation. As it will be argued in the following, this latter, being consistent with the 
evolutionary and system perspectives provides a necessary complement to the assessment 
of the input and output additionality dimensions, initially developed upon the standard 
neoclassical theorising. The analysis of the effects on the R&D investment and on the 
innovation outputs achievement (i.e. the focus of the input and output additionality 
dimensions, respectively) do not completely lose their importance when adopting an 
evolutionary approach and an innovation system perspective. However, these latter call 
for an evaluation that takes into account a broader range of effects that pertain to the 
beneficiaries’ competencies, capabilities and relationships with external actors. The 
second aim of the present paper is that of providing a review of the recent empirical 
works that analyse, with econometric and quantitative methods, the strategic and 
behavioural changes induced by the policy intervention. With this respect, the paper, 
dealing also with some relevant methodological issues, presents the main behavioural 
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additionality effects that can be generated by the public support to innovation. This focus 
is particularly important for future contributions, because quantitative approaches, so far, 
have been less extensively used to analyse the behavioural additionality than the input 
and output dimensions (Georghiou, 2004).   
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the input 
and output additionality dimensions originated from the standard neoclassical approach. 
Section 3 begins with an overview of the system failures rationale arising from the 
evolutionary theory and the related innovation system perspective; then the analysis 
emphasises that the behavioural dimension of the additionality concept, though 
sometimes too broadly defined, can be used to evaluate innovation policies according to 
these heterodox perspectives. At the end of the section some key aspects that should be 
considered when analysing the behavioural additionality are also presented. Particular 
attention is devoted to the analysis of possible synergies between the three dimensions of 
the additionality. Section 4 is focused on the empirical literature. After a brief outline of 
the main econometric problems in the analysis of the additionality of a policy 
intervention, the section presents the main results, characteristics and methods of the 
empirical contributions that employ quantitative approaches to investigate the behavioural 
additionality. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2  Additionality in a neoclassical perspective: the input and output dimensions 
2.1 The market failures framework 
The most relevant additionality dimensions in an innovation policy evaluation, as well as 
the objectives and means of the public intervention, depend on the theoretical 
background. Following a neoclassical perspective, the focus of the evaluation should be 
on whether the policy has been able to overcome the underinvestment in, and the 
underproduction of, innovation. In an additionality perspective the focus is on what have 
been called, respectively, input and output additionality.  
According to Colander (2000) six main attributes characterise the standard 
neoclassical tradition in economics: the attention on the allocation of resources in a given 
moment in time; some forms of utilitarianism as playing a central role in understanding 
the economy; the focus on marginal trade-offs; the farsighted rationality of economic 
actors; the methodological individualism centred on maximising actors; the presence of a 
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general equilibrium1. Within this general theoretical background, the seminal 
contributions by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) introduce the innovation policy 
foundations in a neoclassical perspective. Nelson (1959), stressing that basic research 
activities are characterised by externalities and uncertainty, claims for a direct 
intervention of the government in order to overcome the private underinvestment in 
research. According to Arrow (1962), due to non-perfect appropriability, uncertainty, 
indivisibility and increasing returns, there is a systematic difference between private and 
public returns to innovation. The underinvestment in innovation activities resulting from 
these market failures implies that innovation policy should be aimed at stimulating a 
certain amount of private investment in R&D in order to reach the social optimum.  
In addition to this, another implication emerges when considering the underlying 
linear relation between innovation inputs and outputs (e.g. Edquist, 1999; Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000), according to which the upstream phases of the innovation process are 
unidirectionally linked to the downstream ones. Within this perspective, an 
underinvestment in R&D, caused by the presence of market failures, leads to an 
underproduction of innovation. What emerges is that innovation policy is also eventually 
aimed at increasing the amount of innovation outputs produced by private actors. 
The neoclassical rationale has inspired three broad groups of policy interventions 
(e.g. Dasgupta, 1987, 1988; Swann, 2009): subsidies (or tax credits) to raise private 
incentive to innovate; institutions that create and enforce propriety rights, government 
expenditure or procurement to promote innovation activities not carried out by private 
actors.  
 
2.2 Input and output additionality dimensions   
With respect to the first type of intervention defined above, i.e. subsidies or tax credit, the 
main concern is on the input additionality of the policy: whether the resources provided to 
the firms are additional to those that would have been allocated also in absence of the 
intervention. In other terms, the focus is on the amount of innovative inputs (e.g. R&D 
investment) that would not have been allocated without the policy (Georghiou, 2002, 
2004; Clarysse et al., 2004). When the input additionality is the focus of the evaluation, 
the objective of the analysis is to understand whether the policy has generated additional 
                                                            
1 These features have evolved over time: the characteristics of the modern mainstream economics 
sometimes deviate from these six pillars. See Colander (2000) for a detail. 
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R&D expenditures or whether it has crowded-out the private investment in innovation; in 
its strict definition, input additionality emerges in cases in which the additional R&D 
investment activated by the policy is higher than the subsidy received2 (Cerulli, 2010). 
Despite the literature on the input additionality of public support schemes is 
mainly “empirically-oriented” (David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010), at least three 
contributions (Usher, 1994; David et al., 2000; Hall and Maffioli, 2008) present 
interesting theoretical insights, which are worth mentioning. Usher (1994) proposes a set 
of theoretical rules for a test of "ideal incrementality" (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998, p. 45). 
Accordingly, the funded project must be the least costly way to undertake the desired 
level of R&D investment, social benefits must exceed the subsidy (including transaction 
costs, deadweight losses and other leakages) and discounted benefits must exceed the 
discounted cost of intervention. David et al. (2000) investigate the effects of the public 
intervention on the interplay between the marginal rate of return (MRR) on investment in 
R&D and the marginal cost of capital (MCC), which reflects the opportunity cost of 
investing in R&D. In the simple case of a direct subsidy, for instance, the shift of the 
upward sloping MCC curve results in a higher R&D investment, particularly in the case 
of internal financial constraint. Another theoretical analysis of the input additionality can 
be found in Hall and Maffioli (2008). In their model, firms face a downward sloping 
demand for R&D and a supply cost of R&D that is flat until the innovative projects are 
internally funded, then jumps up to the cost of external funds and increases the more 
external funds are needed. The implication of the model is that crowding-out is a 
possibility for firms that rely on internal funds, but it is unlikely for those that are 
financially constrained. 
Although the concept of input additionality is quite straightforward, it presents 
some limitations and criticalities. Bach and Matt (2005) refer to three cavalier 
assumptions upon which the estimation of the input additionality is based: the clear link 
between innovation inputs and outputs; the presence of divisibility and constant returns to 
scale of the innovation activity; the fact that the nature of the outputs generated by public 
funds and private funds is the same. However, the main argument against the input 
additionality evaluation is related to the fact that this is simply concerned with the effects 
                                                            
2 This perspective can face a practical limitation when the researcher does not have information on 
the precise amount of the subsidy received by the beneficiaries. In this case, when only a binary 
treatment status is available, it is possible at most to estimate the amount of resources that would 
not have been allocated without the policy. 
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of the policy on the allocation of resources. In other terms, input additionality does not 
consider at all the impacts on the organisational aspects, the behaviour of the 
beneficiaries and the improvement of knowledge and capabilities, which are in fact at the 
core of the behavioural additionality evaluation.  
As mentioned at the beginning of the section, due to the linear innovation model 
characterising the neoclassical approach (e.g. Edquist, 1999; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000), market failures are expected to generate also an underproduction of innovation. 
Hence, policy intervention is eventually aimed at increasing the amount of innovation 
outputs produced by private actors. In this sense, a second dimension of the additionality 
concept emerges: the output additionality. This is focused on the proportion of outputs 
that would not have been achieved without the policy intervention (Georghiou, 2002, 
2004; Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). The fact that output additionality is consistent with 
the market failures framework is, in a sense, stated also by Lipsey and Carlaw (1998), 
who refer to the “narrow test of incrementality” (p. 45) as the test that has to be 
performed according to the neoclassical perspective. This is concerned with the extent to 
which some technology is actually developed or installed due to the intervention under 
consideration. 
A first problem in the evaluation of the output additionality is related to the 
definition of what innovation outputs actually are. Indeed, innovation activities can have 
a number of different results (e.g. Hsu and Hsueh, 2009). As it could be difficult to 
estimate a direct causal relation between the policy intervention and long-term or macro 
effects -due to the problems in isolating these impacts from the general economic 
background “noise”-, Buisseret et al. (1995) claim for an analysis which is focused on the 
microeconomic effects of the policy intervention. These latter, which are more directly  
measurable, can be the outputs of the supported projects (e.g. reports, papers, patents, 
prototypes, business plans) and their outcomes (e.g. improved business performances as 
resulting from the introduction of new products, processes, services) (Georghiou, 2002). 
In addition to this issue, another important limitation emerges. Output 
additionality relies on the strict assumption of a clear linear link between inputs, allocated 
with the support of the policy funding, and outputs. This link is much more complex, 
unpredictable and needs to be investigated in depth, looking also at the internal behaviour 
of the supported organisations (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). In fact, as it will be 
shown below, this aspect is crucial in the behavioural additionality evaluation.  
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3 Additionality in the evolutionary and system perspectives. The behavioural 
dimension 
Following an evolutionary perspective to innovation, policy has to reach other objectives 
and is expected to achieve also other additionality effects. In order to make this point 
explicit, it is useful to introduce the innovation policy foundations emerging from the 
evolutionary theory and the related innovation system perspective3. 
 
3.1  Evolutionary and system foundations: the system failures framework 
It is out of the scope of this work to present in detail the main contributions arising from 
the vast evolutionary theory (see, among the others, the comprehensive review by 
Fagerberg, 2003). However, some key aspects can be outlined briefly here, with the aim 
of providing an introduction to the system failures rationale for the innovation policy. 
First, in the evolutionary approach, economic actors are seen as heterogeneous and 
routine-based “behavioural innovators” that behave differently according to their specific 
competencies and to their particular strategic, cognitive and organisational aspects 
(Metcalfe, 1995). The root of this idea can be found in the seminal work by Nelson and 
Winter (1982). Criticizing the idea of perfect rationality, they argue that firms base their 
decisions on the, so-called, bounded rationality; firms behave following rules (i.e. 
routines), which are heritable, selectable and which represent the organisational memory 
of the economic agents. Another key element that characterise the evolutionary approach 
is the analogy with biology (e.g. Dosi and Nelson, 1994): neo-Schumpeterian 
evolutionary theory devotes particular attention to the mechanism that determine the 
selection process of genotypic elements (e.g. technologies, organisational routines), and 
the mechanism that determines the mutation in the population of the same genotypes. The 
relation between these two mechanisms is dynamic, two-way and characterised by 
positive and negative feedbacks (Metcalfe, 1994). The resulting process of innovation, 
which in an evolutionary perspective is characterised by trials and errors and radical 
uncertainty (e.g. Metcalfe, 1995) is represented at the micro-level by a chain model 
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Accordingly, different phases, both internal and external to 
                                                            
3 In the system perspective, innovation is characterised as an evolutionary process (Edquist, 
2005). Malerba  (2009)  points  out  that  the  system  perspective is  complementary to the 
evolutionary approach, linking the relevance of learning, competencies and heterogeneity of 
actors to the importance of the relations and interactions among them. 
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the firms, are complementary and interconnected through positive and negative 
feedbacks.  
 Stemming from the evolutionary micro-foundations, the innovation system 
perspective (e.g. Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) has further enriched the 
analysis of the innovation process, devoting particular attention to the institutional setting 
and the framework conditions that support firms’ innovation activities. Accordingly, 
firms do not innovate in isolation, but interacting and collaborating with other actors, 
both public and private. More precisely, the constituents of an innovation system are, on 
the one hand, the components (i.e. organisations and institutions) and, on the other hand, 
the interactions among these (Edquist, 2005).  
The emergence of the evolutionary approach and the innovation system 
perspective has led to rethink the role of the policy intervention, providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the policy rationale. Whereas according to the neoclassical 
framework public support has to promote individual innovation events by allocating in an 
efficient way resources to firms, according to the evolutionary and system perspectives 
policy should enhance innovation capabilities and promote framework conditions in 
which innovation systems can better self-organise themselves (Metcalfe, 2005). In this 
perspective, innovation policy is not simply justified by an under-supply -and 
underproduction- of knowledge and innovation, but by the presence of “areas of 
systematically weak performances” (i.e. system failures) (Smith, 2000, p. 94).  
 Two macro-categories of failures can be identified in the literature. The first one 
pertains to failures in the creation of knowledge and in the evolutionary process of 
innovation. At first, the innovation performance of a system can be hampered by 
problems in learning processes and in the accumulation of capabilities (Malerba, 2009). 
These can be due to an insufficient level of human capital and R&D -here considered also 
as a mean to enhance the capacity to absorb external knowledge (e.g. Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989)-, or to the lack of technical and market knowledge among the population 
of firms. Furthermore, systems can fail in case of unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs 
between exploration and exploitation or variety and selection. In a situation in which low 
exploration is associated to high exploitation, firms tend to concentrate on what they 
know best, disregarding new alternatives. In this case, existing core capabilities (i.e. the 
knowledge set that distinguishes and provides the firms with a competitive advantage) 
essentially act as rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Hence, there emerges a limited 
capacity to adapt to technological changes, particularly if these are radical and 
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discontinuous (Smith, 2000; Malerba, 2009). The trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation is linked to the more general tension between variety and selection that 
characterises the evolutionary process of innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Metcalfe, 
1994). The main risk is that tough selection is associated to low variety. This can result in 
lock-in positions into inferior technologies, which can be extremely difficult to be 
reversed due to the path-dependence generated by network externalities and by the fact 
that technologies are embedded in the overall social and economic environment (Smith, 
2000).  
 Moving to the second category of failures, which pertains to the structure and the 
configuration of the system as a whole, it is possible, at first, to define the institutional 
failures (Smith, 2000). These pertain to the weak functioning of both formal institutions 
(e.g. regulations, standards, laws, etc...) and informal institutions (e.g. social norms and 
values, cultural aspects, trust, willingness to cooperate, etc...)4 (Smith, 2000; Woolthuis et 
al., 2005). As the innovation system perspective is based upon the idea that a number of 
components are crucial actors in the innovation process, system can fail also because of 
missing or inappropriate components. The lack of (appropriate) components is none other 
than the unavailability of knowledgeable individuals and minds within both firms and 
research organisations (Metcalfe, 2005). When components are inappropriate or missing, 
systems may be trapped in vicious cycles of low interactions and learning, instead of 
developing dynamic complementarities (Malerba, 2009). As noted by Edquist (2005), 
interactions and relations among components represent a crucial constituent of innovation 
systems. Hence, systems may fail also because of missing or inappropriate connections 
(Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009). On the one hand, weak interactions limit interactive 
learning, the possibility to create a shared vision of future technological developments 
and the coordination of efforts among formally independent actors (Carlsson and 
Jacobsson, 1997). However, system failures may emerge also because of too strong 
networks, which can generate inertia, myopia, internal orientation, thus enhancing the risk 
of being locked into existing trajectories (Woolthius et al. 2005). Finally, drawing on 
Smith (2000) it should be taken into consideration that other failures may emerge in case 
of problems related to infrastructural investment and provision; these are generated by 
specific technical features characterising the investment in infrastructures (e.g. long term 
                                                            
4 It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete and comprehensive analysis of the 
definition of institution. See, for a more complete discussion, Hodgson (2006). 
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horizons of the operations, large scale, indivisibilities, inability to produce adequate 
returns within ROI appraisal techniques).  
 
3.2    Defining behavioural additionality 
The main advantage of the behavioural additionality evaluation pertains to the possibility 
to analyse profound effects on the beneficiaries’ behaviours that cannot be captured by 
the input and output additionality assessments. As it will be clarified below, the 
behavioural additionality evaluation allows for assessing the presence of changes in the 
beneficiaries’ innovation process that are extremely relevant according to the system 
failures rationale. Nevertheless, the advantage coming from this theoretical anchorage is 
not fully exploited: in absence of clear-cut definition of behavioural additionality, its link 
with the evolutionary approach and the innovation system perspective is not always made 
explicit in the literature.   
For instance, a first and simplistic way of dealing with the behavioural 
additionality is that of extending the linear and strict nature of the input additionality 
(Gök and Edler, 2010). This is done by analysing the effects on the scale and the scope of 
the funded R&D projects (e.g. Luukkonen, 2000) or considering also the acceleration of 
the beneficiaries’ innovation activities (e.g. Falk, 2007). The evaluation in these cases is 
concerned, respectively, with whether the funded project has: increased the scale of the 
R&D activity of the beneficiaries in the chosen area; expanded the coverage of their R&D 
activity to a wider range of applications and markets; brought forward in time their R&D 
activity (Georghiou, 2002, 2004; Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). As noted by Gök and 
Edler (2010), this simple version of the behavioural additionality mainly pertains to 
effects that are limited in time, occur only during the funded project and in its immediate 
vicinity. What is more, the use of the behavioural additionality to extend the input 
dimension is not fully consistent with the evolutionary and system perspectives, as it still 
fails to take into account the impact of the policy on beneficiaries’ competencies, 
capabilities and interactions with external actors.  
However, the concept of behavioural additionality can be used far beyond the 
extension of the input dimension and can be employed to assess more profound changes 
in the behaviours of the agents supported by the policy intervention. In other terms, 
looking at the behavioural changes induced by the policy it is possible to consider the 
way in which the public intervention re-shapes the characteristics of the beneficiaries’ 
23 
 
innovation process. For example, with respect to R&D, this is clear in the seminal 
contribution by Buisseret et al. (1995, p.590) that coined the concept of behavioural 
additionality as “the change in a company’s way of undertaking R&D which can be 
attributed to policy actions”. More in general, Georghiou (2004, p.7) defines behavioural 
additionality as “the difference in firm’s behaviour resulting from the intervention”. By 
focusing on the behaviours of the beneficiaries it is possible to overcome a limitation 
which  is  implicit  in  the  evaluations  based  on  the  measurement  of  the  input  and 
output additionality: the fact that economic actors are considered as “black-boxes”. In this 
sense, one of the aim of the behavioural additionality evaluation is that of opening these 
“black-boxes” (Clarysse et  al.,  2006; Hall  and  Maffioli, 2008) to  look  at  the micro-
effects occurring within the beneficiaries’ innovation process.  
It is evident that this kind of definition is quite flexible and can encompass a 
number of relevant behavioural changes induced by the policy. These can pertain to the 
acquisition and improvement of knowledge, capabilities, organisational routines and 
strategies (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006; Breschi et al., 2009). Furthermore, as noted by 
Geroghiou (2004) and Georghiou and Clarysse (2006), focusing on the behavioural 
changes related to the acquisition of competences in new or extended technologies and 
market areas, it is also possible to assess whether a given policy intervention has been 
able to reduce lock-ins. Similarly, Bach and Matt (2005) stress the importance of 
focusing on the ability of the policy to create cognitive capacity additionality, which 
pertains to the creation of novelty and capacity to adapt to future situations that cannot be 
envisaged. Another important set of effects that can be analysed using the concept of 
behavioural additionality is that related to the networking, interactions and connections 
between beneficiaries and other economic actors. Drawing on the evaluation framework 
proposed by Hall and Maffioli (2008), behavioural additionality evaluation, in addition to 
effects that occur in the internal organisation, can capture also changes that pertain to 
external relations. In this sense, it is possible to  assess whether the policy has helped to 
build networks or coordinate systemic innovations (Georghiou, 2004;  Georghiou and  
Clarysse,  2006), creating new partnerships -which involve not only firms but also 
research organisations- and favouring the persistence of these interactions (Fier et al., 
2006). Breschi et al. (2009) stress the great importance of assessing the effects of the 
policy on partnerships and networking. According to the authors, large part of the 
behavioural additionality is realised through interactions, as these can provide access to 
external knowledge, while valorising internal competencies and expanding learning 
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capabilities. This emphasis is in line with the emerging relevance of the open innovation 
paradigm as opposed to the closed innovation models, which are characterised by the 
internal and vertical integration of R&D activities. In the open innovation modes firms 
acquire competencies from external sources and use inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to increase their innovation (and business) performances (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; 
OECD, 2008). 
However, as the concept of behavioural additionality is quite flexible, evaluators 
may take into consideration a range of behavioural changes that can be even too wide. As 
noted by Gök and Edler (2010), the concept can be used also to evaluate effects that are 
not strictly or directly related to innovation activities, but to the more general conduct of 
the beneficiaries. This is quite evident looking at the list, provided by Georghiou (2004) 
and Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) of six possible effects that can be taken into 
consideration in the behavioural additionality evaluation. These pertain to: (i) knowledge 
acquisition (e.g. R&D organisation and networking), (ii) human resources (e.g. hiring of 
researchers and acquisition of management skills), (iii) capital investment strategy (e.g. 
acquisition of equipment and location of companies’ facilities), (iv) market positioning5 
(e.g. introduction to new market or customers and acquisition of leadership positions), (v) 
strategies for manufacturing or service provision (e.g. changes in the production or 
service delivery methods), (vi) corporate responsibility and environmental sustainability. 
With respect to this list, it seems relevant to mention a possible problem. The inclusion of 
a broad range of behavioural and strategic changes, which can be not directly related to 
the innovation activities of the beneficiaries, leads to the potential risk of considering 
effects that are not immediate objectives of the innovation policy. This possibility is quite 
evident for evaluations focused on the effects pertaining to the capital investment 
strategy, to the strategies for manufacturing and service provision, to the corporate 
responsibility and environmental sustainability. 
The point here is then: what are the changes which are worth being assessed 
when evaluating the behavioural additionality? In other terms: what should be considered 
as a relevant behavioural change? Answering to these questions not only allows for a 
clear-cut definition of the behavioural additionality, but also for its anchorage to the  
evolutionary theory and the innovation system perspective. Indeed, to answer to these 
questions one should necessarily consider the policy objectives arising from the economic 
                                                            
5 This type of effect seems to be more related to the output dimension of the additionality. 
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rationale. In this sense, as the aim of the public interventions is to deal with the system 
failures, behavioural additionality evaluation should be focused on the changes that help 
to mitigate these failures.  
The use of the behavioural additionality to evaluate the capacity of the policy to 
mitigate the system failures is not a novelty in the literature. In opposition to the “ideal” 
and “narrow” incrementality tests, which are consistent with the neoclassical approach, 
Lipsey and Carlaw (1998, p. 45) claim for the use of the “weak test of incrementality” to 
evaluate the innovation policy within an evolutionary perspective. This test, with no 
attempt of optimality, should be focused on the evaluation of structural changes and the 
enhancement of beneficiaries’ capabilities (Georghiou, 2002, 2004; Georghiou and 
Clarysse, 2006). Bach and Matt (2005) state that the cognitive capacity additionality -
which I prefer to consider as a sort of further specification of the behavioural 
additionality- is able to assess the policy intervention in an evolutionary approach. More 
explicitly, Georghiou (2002) states that, to an extent, the behavioural additionality can be 
used to assess whether the policy has been able to deal with the system failures. However, 
according to him, the fact that the natural operational level of the additionality test is the 
firm implies a limitation. On the one hand, there are failures that do not pertain at all to 
firms, but occur only at the system level; on the other hand, there are failures that occur 
both at the level of the firm and of the system. This limitation can be partially reassessed, 
as in a system perspective it is necessary and possible to consider the behavioural changes 
induced by the policy on all the systemic organisations targeted by the public 
intervention, not only the firms but also the other beneficiaries (e.g. research institutes, 
innovation centres, universities, etc.). Nevertheless, even with this broader definition of 
the unit of analysis, the use of the behavioural additionality to assess the ability of the 
policy to deal with the system failures is not so unproblematic. First, some system failures 
still occur both at the organisation and system levels, as the failures pertaining to learning 
processes and accumulation of capabilities, to missing or inappropriate connections and 
to unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs. With respect to these failures, behavioural 
additionality evaluation can be employed but, as this is focused on the effects on the 
beneficiaries, it is possible at the most to evaluate the sum of the single additionality 
effects. However, this latter, due to synergies and interactions, might differ from the 
effect on the whole system. A second problem emerges for the failures pertaining to weak 
institutional performances, missing components and infrastructural investment. In this 
case, it seems that the behavioural additionality cannot be properly employed, as it is very 
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complicated to assess whether the policy has been able to solve these failures by looking 
at the behavioural and strategic changes of the beneficiaries. The operational level of the 
evaluation, in other terms, cannot be the supported organisation but needs to be the 
system.  
When considering this limitation a question emerges: can the behavioural 
additionality still be considered a useful instrument to evaluate innovation policy 
according to the evolutionary and system perspectives? The answer is yes. Behavioural 
additionality can be used to capture the capacity of the policy to induce relevant changes 
related to the upgrading of competencies, the acquisition of new or diverse knowledge 
and the interactions with external actors. These behavioural changes induced by the 
policy can be seen as a way to reduce the system failures that occur (also) at the level of 
the supported organisations. What cannot be achieved with the behavioural additionality 
evaluation is the complete assessment of the policy capacity to deal with all the different 
system failures. With this respect, the analysis of the behavioural additionality is only one 
of the evaluation tools that can be employed. Indeed, the analysis of the policy effects on 
the single beneficiaries needs to be  integrated by analysis of the impacts on the system as 
a whole (Bellandi and Caloffi, 2010). In general terms, as noted by Arnold (2004), when 
the aim is to assess the overall capacity of the policy to deal with all the different system 
failures, the evaluation should be carried out with different methods and taking into 
account different levels of analysis, from the micro to the system one.  
However, another important aspect has to be taken into account when providing a 
behavioural additionality evaluation which is consistent with the evolutionary and system 
perspectives. In a surrounding changing and evolving environment, characterised by a 
number of micro-complexities (Malerba, 2009), the behavioural additionality evaluation 
cannot aim at providing an optimality assessment of the policy intervention, simply 
because a stable and optimal equilibrium to be used as ideal benchmark does not exist 
(Chaminade and Edquist, 2006). This implies, as stressed by Georghiou (2004) and 
Georghiou and Clarysse (2006), that some behavioural changes in the long-run might 
even result to have induced beneficiaries to move towards the wrong direction. This 
implication is not confined to the behavioural additionality only. In general terms, when 
adopting an evolutionary approach, all the kinds of evaluation cannot be aimed at 
assessing the capacity of the policy to solve, in an optimal and stable way, the system 
failures (Arnold, 2004). 
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3.3  Other issues at stake in the behavioural additionality evaluation 
So far, this section has been mainly focused on the definition of the behavioural 
dimension of the additionality concept, stressing in particular its consistency with the 
system failures framework emerging from the evolutionary theory and the innovation 
system perspective. However, other key aspects are worth being considered to increase 
the quality and the comprehensiveness of the behavioural additionality evaluation.   
The first point concerns the difficulty in isolating the effect of the policy. As 
stressed by Buisseret et al. (1995) and Georghiou (2002), the funded project should not be 
seen in isolation but within a portfolio of other innovation activities: a wider programme 
that is likely to be started before the funded project, continues even after the end of the 
public support and integrates also privately financed activities. This limits the possibility 
to isolate the effect of the single funded projects, but not the usefulness of the behavioural 
additionality evaluation as a such, whose contribution still remains valid when analysing 
the effect of the policy on the overall innovation strategy of the beneficiaries (Buisseret et 
al., 1995). A similar conclusion can be reached considering the displacement 
phenomenon (Davenport et al., 1998). Given the investment portfolio perspective and 
assuming that applicants tend to present the projects that are more likely to be funded (i.e. 
more promising and well planned), then it might be that beneficiaries are funded for a 
given project, but use the money to finance other activities, maybe of higher risk but just 
as strategically important.   
Another aspect that should be taken into account, when evaluating the 
behavioural additionality, concerns the fact that in some cases the policy intervention can 
affect even non funded companies and organisations. First of all, even the application 
phase of a support scheme6 can induce behavioural changes in the potential beneficiaries. 
These might be stimulated to present projects and set the stage for activities to be carried 
out according to the policy requirements (Georghiou, 2004). The result is the presence of 
some additionality effects also on non beneficiaries that have presented projects then 
rejected in the selection process. A similar outcome can emerge considering the spillovers 
taking place between funded organisations and non beneficiaries. Though not directly 
referring to the behavioural additionality, the review provided by Klette et al. (2000) 
points out that non beneficiaries may be affected by the policy due to the spillover effects, 
especially if the technological and cognitive distance with the supported organisations is 
                                                            
6 Georghiou (2004) refers in particular to grants. 
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not too high. Indeed, spillovers effects are quite likely to occur. On the one hand, in many 
cases policy-makers implement public support schemes that aim at enhancing cooperation 
and networking among organisations. On the other hand, funded organisations embracing 
open innovation modes (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; OECD,  2008)  can collaborate with 
non beneficiaries.  Unfortunately, when the behavioural additionality evaluation is carried 
out with econometric methods, the presence of additionality effects on the non 
beneficiaries implies some drawbacks in the creation of a suitable counterfactual group of 
non supported units7.  
A final aspect is related to the fact that behavioural additionality cannot be 
expected to be a homogeneous phenomenon. Georghiou (2004) proposes to differentiate 
the evaluation according to the different types (e.g. in terms of size and knowledge-
intensity) of beneficiaries, as the additionality effects on these are supposed to be 
different. This reasoning is supported by some empirical evidences. Hsu et al. (2009), 
with respect to R&D programmes in Taiwan, point out the existence of some different 
patterns of behavioural additionality in different sectors and innovation categories. 
Different behavioural additionality effects in different types of beneficiaries, especially in 
terms of size, emerge also from the analysis of the Austrian FFF R&D support scheme 
provided by Falk (2007). Apart from the empirical evidences, it is relevant to stress that 
heterogeneous patterns of behavioural additionality are also theoretically justified. As the 
economic actors are heterogeneous and behave differently according to their particular 
strategic, cognitive and organisational aspects (Metcalfe, 1995), it is quite unlikely that 
their response to the policy support is similar8.  
 
                                                            
7 For instance, the presence of spillover effects implies that the stable unit-treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA) might not hold (see Section 3.1 of the third Chapter included in the Thesis). 
Unfortunately, this assumption, which is at the basis of the impact assessment econometric 
methods, cannot be directly tested with the available methodologies.  
8 To deal with the heterogeneity of the behavioural additionality effects one could: exploit ad hoc 
information on the idiosyncratic level of additionality for each beneficiary, as in Falk (2007) or 
Hsu et al. (2009); estimate the average impact of the policy in different groups of beneficiaries; 
employ a quantile treatment effect method (e.g. Battistin and Fort, 2008; Angrist and Pischke, 
2008) to investigate the distribution of the policy effects on the population of beneficiaries. In the 
present Thesis, the lack of proper and precise data has impeded the use of these methodological 
approaches. However, the heterogeneity of the policy impact has been partially analysed with a 
tentative investigation of the relation between the average additionality impact and the dispersion 
of the effect across the beneficiaries (see the third Chapter of this Thesis).  
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3.4 Behavioural additionality in-between input and output ones: a multi-dimensional 
evaluation  
The last point considered in this part of the paper concerns the fact that the 
behavioural additionality evaluation can be included in a multi-dimensional investigation 
that analyses also the input and output additionality effects. As stated by Bach and Matt 
(2005), only analysing together the different additionality dimensions it is possible to 
have a complete and better understanding of the policy impact. One might argue that this 
joint analysis is incorrect from a theoretical point of view, given the contrast between the 
neoclassical approach, from which the input and output additionality dimensions arise, 
and the evolutionary theory, which claim for the analysis of the behavioural changes 
induced by the policy. This argument is only partially acceptable. On the one hand, the 
contrast between the theoretical approaches is evident and strong. On the other hand, 
whereas from a neoclassical standpoint the impact on the beneficiaries’ innovation 
behaviour is simply not worthy of consideration, when adopting the evolutionary and 
system perspectives, the input and output additionality dimensions cannot be considered 
as totally pointless. Indeed, the aim of the evolutionary theory and of the related 
innovation system perspective is essentially that of analysing the complexity of the whole 
process of innovation. In this sense, the information on the input and output additionality 
effects can complement the fundamental investigation of the behavioural changes induced 
by the policy, shedding light on whether the public support has affected the attitude 
towards the R&D investment (also considered as a way to enhance the innovation 
capabilities) and the capacity to reach higher innovation performances (both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms).  
In addition to this, it is also useful to consider the synergic relationships that 
might exist between the three additionality dimensions. A first one can emerge between 
input and output additionality. In line with the standard linear view of the innovation 
process, the more the policy stimulates the investment in R&D, the more this is expected 
to result in a higher level of innovation output (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; 
Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Cerulli and Potì, 2010). Departing from this linear 
perspective, at first, an inverse relation between output and input additionality cannot be 
excluded: the more the policy has favoured the achievement of innovation outputs and 
economic outcomes, the more these could result in higher resources and incentives to 
invest in R&D. Nevertheless, it is possible also to consider relations involving the 
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behavioural additionality. The first one is related to the effect of the behavioural changes 
on the output additionality. According to Davenport et al. (1998), sustained changes in 
the R&D management induced by the public support can be seen as a sort of latent ability 
of the policy to influence the possibility to achieve more outputs. Another type of 
behavioural change induced by the policy can positively affect the output dimension of 
the additionality. In particular, innovation outputs can be increased by the adoption of 
open innovation modes (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006) enhanced by the public intervention. In 
this sense, Magro et al. (2010) point to the positive effect that the increased cooperation 
of the beneficiaries can have on the capacity to achieve higher innovation performances. 
Indeed, public support schemes leading to a higher collaborative attitude improve 
beneficiaries’ innovation process, by enhancing interorganisational learning, as well as 
the access to complementary knowledge, technological and financial assets (Fier et al., 
2006; Autio et al. 2008; Clarysse et al., 2009).  Also an inverse relation between output 
and behavioural additionality, although not directly investigated by previous 
contributions, cannot be excluded. In particular, a positive relation can emerge in case the 
policy has stimulated the beneficiaries to introduce patented innovations. Indeed, 
considering the knowledge protection/sharing dilemma (e.g. Olander et al., 2009), 
patenting implies a lower risk of knowledge leakages and, thus, might result in a higher 
cooperation with external actors. A similar outcome can emerge because of the positive 
effect that patenting, through the related process of environment scanning aimed at 
identifying other pieces of codified knowledge, exerts on absorptive capacity (e.g. Franco 
et al., 2011). Moving to the relation between input and behavioural additionality, some 
contributions are worth of mentioning. Autio et al. (2008) consider the positive effect that 
a policy-induced increase in the R&D investment, enhancing technological search, can 
have on learning outcomes. Similarly, according to Clarysse et al. (2009), a higher 
engagement in R&D induced by the policy is positively related to learning and 
improvements in the management of the innovation process9. However, the relation 
between these two dimensions is quite complex and the other causality direction, going 
from the behavioural to the input additionality, cannot be excluded. One can think at two 
examples. The first is a case in which the policy intervention has favoured the 
collaboration with external partners. In this circumstance, beneficiaries may need to 
                                                            
9 Autio et al. (2008) use a slightly different terminology. Instead of input and behavioural 
additionality they refer to first-order additionality and learning outcomes. Clarysse et al. (2009), 
due to a data constraint, cannot provide a causality test. 
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invest more in R&D in order to increase their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levintal, 
1989; Franco et al., 2011). Another example is a situation in which beneficiaries, due to 
the competencies’ enhancement induced by the participation in policy, are more willing 
and able to invest in R&D. All in all, considering the non-linear nature of the innovation 
process, the potentially complex interdependencies and interactions between its different 
internal and external phases (e.g. Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Edquist, 1999), one should 
bear in mind the complex set of relations which involves also the three dimensions of the 
additionality. When considering together these relations, virtuous circles and synergies 
might emerge. Of course, this hypothesis should be further investigated and properly 
tested, by making use of methods (e.g. system of simultaneous equations) which take into 
account the simultaneity and the mutual causation characterising the three additionality 
dimensions.   
 
4 The quantitative evaluation of the behavioural additionality    
4.1   General empirical issues 
Coming to the empirical aspects related to the evaluation of the additionality and of its 
behavioural dimension in particular, at first it is necessary to provide a brief introduction 
to the general empirical issues in the (ex-post) assessment of innovation policy 10. These 
are essentially related to the problems that characterise the estimation of the causal 
relation between the policy support and the impacts of interest.  
The general methodological framework is the following. The policy intervention 
is considered as a treatment (t), the firms11 are the units of analysis and the additionality 
indicator (e.g. R&D expenditure in case of input additionality) is the outcome variable. 
Accordingly, the net effect (i.e. the additionality of the policy) can be defined as the 
difference between the actual outcome reached by treated units and the outcome that 
would have been reached even without the treatment, i.e. the counterfactual. However, 
this latter cannot be observed for the treated individuals once the treatment has been 
implemented. For this reason, the fundamental problem faced in the process of assessing 
causality can be considered as a missing data problem. Drawing on  Holland  (1986,  
p.947),  to solve the fundamental problem of causal inference it is necessary to replace the 
                                                            
10 See, for more details, Section 3.1 of the third Chapter of the present Thesis. 
11 Or other organisations that could be targeted by the policy. 
32 
 
“impossible-to-observe causal effect of t on a specific unit with the possible-to-estimate 
average causal effect of t over a population of units”.  
In addition to this first problem, another serious issue emerges when trying to 
estimate a causal relation between the policy intervention and its effects. As innovation 
policies are unlikely to be randomly assigned to a population of potential beneficiaries, it 
would be incorrect to estimate the impact of the intervention by comparing the outcome 
of the group of  treated individuals and that of the group of non participant units. In fact, 
in such a situation the estimation would be affected by a selection bias. On the one hand, 
this might be due by the self-selection of certain types of units into the treatment. On the 
other hand, selection bias may also arise because the assignment is ruled by specific 
strategies followed by the policy-maker. Indeed, the public support might be granted 
according to ‘picking the winner’ or ‘aiding the poor’ strategies. In the first case, a 
potential upward bias emerges in estimating the effect of the policy, if appropriate 
econometric techniques are not employed. On the contrary, a potential downward bias 
emerges if the government strategy is of the second kind (Cerulli, 2010). 
Following the debate in the literature on the ex-post impact assessment (e.g. 
Heckman, 2005a, 2005b; Sobel, 2005; Heckman, 2008; Heckman and Vytacil, 2007) two 
broad classes of methods that allow for dealing with the selection bias can be identified: 
structural and matching models12. The first class of methods is constructed on the basis of 
explicit assumptions derived from the theory, thus allowing for a more insightful 
interpretation from an economic point of view. Structural models are more  “explicit 
about how counterfactuals are generated and how interventions are assigned (the rules of 
assigning ‘treatment’)” (Heckman, 2005b, p.6). On the contrary matching methods, 
originated in the statistical literature, are more “data-driven”: matching estimators are 
essentially aimed at pairing treated units with similar non treated ones, so that the 
difference in the outcome of the two groups is only due to the policy intervention13.  
                                                            
12 See, among the others, Cerulli (2010) for a more complete review of the different methods that 
can be employed in the ex-post evaluation of the innovation policy interventions.  
13 On this point, it is worth stressing the important role, in the empirical literature, of the 
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This latter, instead of pairing treated 
and non treated units on the basis of each single observable characteristic, reduces the dimension 
of conditioning by matching treated units with non treated ones that have a similar probability of 
being treated (given a set of observable characteristics). For a more detailed presentation of the 
matching approach and, in particular, of the propensity score matching, see Section 3.1 of the third 
Chapter included in the present Thesis.  
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This brief introduction to the issues characterising the ex-post impact evaluation 
constitutes a functional step to frame the following review of the empirical contributions 
focused on the behavioural additionality of the innovation policy.  
 
4.2 Operationalising the behavioural additionality: a review of the empirical literature 
In addition to the problems raised in the ex-post evaluation literature, which call for the 
use of appropriate econometric methods, behavioural additionality assessment needs to 
cope with a non homogeneous transition from the conceptual theorising to the empirical 
specification. A relevant problem in the operationalisation of the behavioural 
additionality evaluation lies in the left-hand side (LHS) of the econometric specification, 
i.e. the definition of the outcome variables. More precisely, a common way of capturing 
the behavioural changes induced by the policy is still missing. For these reasons, in 
addition to the main results arising from the different contributions, the remaining part of 
the paper will also report the methodologies that can employed in analysing the 
behavioural additionality and the types of behavioural change that are taken into 
consideration.  
The following review, whose main insights are presented in Tab. A1 in the 
Appendix, is divided in two parts. The first is focused on those works which directly 
evaluate, with econometric methods, the behavioural and strategic changes induced by the 
policy (Falk, 2006; Fier et al., 2006; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Hall and 
Maffioli, 2008; Magro et al., 2010; Marino and Parrotta, 2010; Afcha-Chávez, 2011). The 
second set of contributions is characterised by the use of alternative approaches to the 
study of the behavioural additionality (e.g. network analysis), or by a focus on its 
determinants and relations with other additionality dimensions (Falk, 2007; Autio et al., 
2008; Breschi et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2009; Clarysse et al., 2009).      
As for the direct evaluations employing econometric methods, two sub-categories 
can be further distinguished. The first group is made of contributions (Fier et al., 2006; 
Hall and Maffioli, 2008; Magro et al., 2010; Marino and Parrotta, 2010) employing (only) 
matching models, while the second group of analyses make use (also) of other 
econometric techniques14 (Falk, 2006; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Afcha-
Chávez, 2011).  
                                                            
14 Both Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) and Afcha-Chávez (2011) jointly use a structural 
model and a matching approach.    
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Fier et al. (2006) base the empirical analysis on data stemming from the German 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and from an ad hoc survey. Their analysis aims at 
assessing whether public funding induces a change in firms’ propensity to cooperate with 
both other companies and research organisations. Furthermore, they investigate whether 
the change in the cooperation strategy is persistent and lasts even after the end of the 
public support. To this purpose, Fier et al. (2006) apply at first a matching procedure to 
estimate the impact of the policy on the firms’ cooperation attitude and then a bivariate 
probit to verify the impact of the policy on the continuation of the collaborations. The 
general results point to a positive effect on the creation of new collaborations between 
firms and scientific institutes. However, when compared to the collaborations already 
existing at the beginning of the public support, newly established cooperation agreements 
with scientific organisations are less likely to continue. 
 The second study here considered is the one by Magro et al. (2010), who focus 
their analysis on a regional policy programme implemented in the Basque Country of 
Spain. The authors aim to verify whether the public funding increases firms’ propensity 
to engage in collaborative innovation activities, raises firms’ capacity  to participate in 
international R&D programmes, leads to a systematic and persistent R&D behaviour in 
the supported companies. The results, emerging from a matching technique, point to a 
positive effect of the intervention on the three aspects of the behavioural additionality 
analysed.  
Marino and Parrotta (2010) focus their analysis on Danish firms to evaluate the 
impact of the policy on the endowment of human resources devoted to formal innovation 
activities. The increase in the share of R&D workers is used as a proxy for the change in 
the management of innovation strategies. Whereas previously reviewed contributions 
analyse the effect of the participation in the policy by using a binary treatment variable, 
Marino and Parrotta (2010) adopt a continuous treatment approach, i.e. the genearlised 
propensity score method (Hirano and Imbens, 2004)15, which can be seen as an extension 
of the “traditional” propensity score matching. The emerging evidence points to a positive 
effect of the amount of subsidy on the share of R&D workers. This effect is found to be 
significant up to a certain threshold of public funding (i.e. 1.8 million of DKK). 
The contribution by Hall and Maffioli (2008), is a survey of evaluations 
conducted in several countries in Latin America. All the three additionality dimensions 
                                                            
15 An application of the generalised propensity score is provided in the fourth Chapter of this 
Thesis. 
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are considered: input, output and behavioural. As for this latter, the analyses are carried 
out with a matching approach. The findings reveal the capacity of the policies 
implemented in Chile and Panama to stimulate the cooperation of supported firms with 
external sources of knowledge and finance. 
As for the studies that do not (exclusively) adopt a matching approach, here 
below are reported those by Falk (2006), Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) and Afcha-
Chávez (2011). These two latter are, at our best knowledge, the only ones that (try to) 
employ a structural model to test for the behavioural additionality. 
The first work (Falk, 2006), considers the Austrian federal R&D support scheme 
(FFF). The econometric analysis is carried out by exploiting the panel structure of the 
data, which allows for the implementation of both a fixed effects model with time-
invariant variables and a dynamic panel model (partial adjustment model). The 
behavioural additionality evaluation is aimed at estimating the effect of the policy scheme 
on the endowment of R&D personnel. This is expected to facilitate “an increased 
awareness of R&D opportunities, the establishment of informational network” and to 
“improve the firm’s absorptive capacity with respect to new knowledge” (Falk, 2006, 
p.67). As for the results, the FFF scheme is found to have a positive, even if quite 
marginal, impact on the demand of skilled R&D personnel.  
The work by Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), focused on Spain, analyses the 
impact of the policy on the cooperation attitude of the funded firms, as many other 
contributions here reviewed. The econometric approach is based, at first, on the 
specification of a structural model: the decision to participate in the policy programme is 
modelled as well as the equations of partner selection (i.e. on the one hand customers and 
suppliers and, on the other hand, public research organisations). However, to deal with 
the endogeneity of the policy intervention, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), adopt 
also a matching approach. The results point to a positive effect of the policy on the 
cooperation agreements between funded firms and public research organisations and, to a 
lesser extent, on the interactions between supported companies and other business 
partners. 
A similar econometric exercise is carried out by Afcha-Chávez (2011), who 
investigates the effect of the Spanish national and regional policies on the cooperation 
strategy of supported firms. As in Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), Afcha-Chávez 
(2011) tries at first to adopt a structural model, but then moves to a matching approach 
due to the endogeneity of the policy support. The emerging evidence points to a positive 
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impact of the regional and national policies on the likelihood to establish cooperation 
with a university or a technological centre. However, both the levels of interventions are 
found to be ineffective in stimulating collaborations with customers or suppliers.  
The last set of works here reported is the less homogeneous in terms of 
behavioural changes considered, methodologies applied and objectives. These latter do 
not specifically pertain to the policy causal effect, but to a broader range of aspects 
related to the behavioural additionality. 
Focusing on the Austrian FFF R&D support scheme, Falk (2007) employs a 
series of ordered probit regressions to investigate the drivers of additionality. Two types 
of determinants are considered. On the one hand, firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, sector, 
age, obstacles to innovation); on the other hand, the number of support schemes in which 
the firm has been enrolled. Different forms of additionality are taken into account. As for 
the behavioural dimension, the considered effects pertain to the scale, the acceleration 
and the scope (in terms of more cooperation, more risk, more basic research and more 
applied research) of the supported innovation activities. The main findings reveal that 
large firms are more prone to realise various forms of additionality. Furthermore, multiple 
policy interventions are found to be a necessary condition to stimulate firms to engage in 
cooperation and to undertake risky basic research. 
Hsu et al. (2009), in their contribution focused on Taiwan, propose an interesting 
device to reduce the potential high number of strategic and behavioural changes to be 
taken into account when analysing the behavioural additionality. With a factor analysis, 
from 19 items, they identify four sub-dimensions of the behavioural additionality: project 
enlargement behaviour, strategy formulation behaviour, cost-effectiveness behaviour and 
commercialisation behaviour. Furthermore, Hsu et al. (2009) investigate, with a Scheffe’s 
multivariate comparison and with a cluster analysis, the additionality differences within 
sectors and for different types of innovation categories, as well as the presence of 
different patterns of additionality. 
In the analysis provided by Autio et al. (2008), the behavioural changes enhanced 
by Finnish collaborative R&D programmes are proxied with four types of learning: direct 
technological learning, technological distinctiveness, market learning and 
internationalisation learning. Among the other interesting issues, the authors analyse one 
aspect which has been pointed out in the theoretical part of the present work: the possible 
relation between input and behavioural additionality. The emerging evidence points to a 
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positive and significant impact of the input additionality on the direct technological 
learning and the internationalisation learning. 
Another contribution that analyses the relation between input and behavioural 
additionality is the one of Clarysse et al. (2009). Even if the cross-sectional nature of the 
data does not allow them to provide a rigorous causality test, the results obtained with a 
Heckman model, support the hypothesis according to which input and behavioural 
additionality are strongly related. 
The last work presented here, by Breschi et al. (2009), applies an alternative 
approach to investigate the existence of behavioural changes somehow enhanced by the 
policy intervention: the social network analysis. The authors consider the impact of the 
Information Society Research, Technological Development and Demonstration (IST-
RTD) programmes included the Sixth Research Framework Programme. The analysis 
shows the positive influence of the public support on the: attraction of key actors to the 
European IST knowledge networks; creation and strengthening of relations among 
partners; effective diffusion of new knowledge. This type of analysis offers a systemic 
perspective and an insightful representation of the linkages between different actors. The 
methodology employed, i.e. the social network analysis, taking the system rather than the 
beneficiary as the unit of investigation, emerges as a tool that may complement the more 
“traditional” econometric investigations of the additionality.  
 
5 Concluding remarks  
The paper has been focused on the additionality evaluation of innovation policies. 
Particular attention has been devoted to the behavioural dimension of the additionality, 
which is focused on the behavioural and strategic changes induced by the public 
intervention. The first part of the paper has stressed the capacity of the behavioural 
additionality to provide a fundamental complement to the standard input and output 
dimensions. Consistently with the evolutionary theory and the related innovation system 
perspective, by evaluating the behavioural additionality it is possible to focus on the 
effects that occur within the “black box” of the beneficiaries. More precisely, the impacts 
on beneficiaries’ competencies, capabilities and relations with external sources of 
knowledge. However, as the concept of behavioural additionality is quite flexible, its 
definition risks to be too broad. As in Georghiou (2004) or Georghiou and Clarysse 
(2006) this might lead to consider a set of effects which are not directly related to the 
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objectives of the innovation policy. To reduce the potential vagueness of the behavioural 
additionality definition, the paper has suggested to focus on those changes in the 
beneficiaries’ behaviours that can help to mitigate the system failures that occur (also) at 
the level of the beneficiaries (i.e. problems in learning processes and in the accumulation 
of capabilities, missing  or  inappropriate  connections,  unbalanced evolutionary trade-
offs). The first part of the paper has also stressed some other crucial aspects: the problems 
in isolating the effect of single funded project and the consequent need to focus on the 
overall strategy of the beneficiaries, the possible presence of indirect effects on the non 
funded organisations, the heterogeneous nature of the additionality effects. A main open 
question for future research has been raised at the end of the first part of the paper. This 
pertains to the relations that can exist among the three dimensions of the additionality. In 
particular, input, output and behavioural additionality should not be seen as separate 
results of the policy intervention, but as parts of a framework of synergies, in which each 
dimension can affect the others. A first step towards a clearer understanding of this point 
is to review the strands of literature, not necessarily related to the evaluation of 
innovation policy, that can shed some light on the relations among the R&D investment, 
the outputs/outcomes of the innovation process and the changes in firm’s behaviours and 
strategies. 
The review of the empirical contributions has been introduced by a short 
presentation of the main problems in the ex-post impact evaluation, which calls for the 
use of proper econometric methods when assessing the behavioural additionality of a 
policy intervention. The review of the empirical literature on the behavioural additionality 
has shown a specific criticality in the crucial passage between theory and empirics has 
been stressed.  Due to the flexibility of the behavioural additionality concept, it is not 
possible to determine an univocal way of capturing the behavioural changes induced by 
the public intervention. All the surveyed empirical works assess the presence of specific 
behavioural changes, with many contributions being focused on the effect of the policy 
on the cooperation with external actors. Nevertheless, the insights emerging from the 
review of the empirical literature largely support the need to evaluate the behavioural 
changes induced by the policy intervention. Indeed, almost all the works report the 
presence of relevant policy effects that cannot be captured with the simple input and 
output additionality assessments. In particular, these impacts pertain to the increased 
cooperation with external actors, both firms and research organisations, and to the 
upgrading of internal innovation capabilities.  As for the empirical aspects concerning the 
39 
 
evaluation of the behavioural additionality, three suggestions for future research can be 
advanced in these concluding remarks. The first one concerns a strategy to define proper 
outcome variables capable of capturing relevant behavioural changes. To improve the 
comprehensiveness and, at the same time, the parsimony of the analysis, an idea could be 
that of collecting information on the various indicators of behavioural change and then 
applying multivariate statistical techniques, such as the factor analysis, which reduce the 
initial vector of potential outcome variables in a smaller one. Another point pertains to 
the necessity to complement the investigations of the effects on the beneficiaries with 
methods that take the innovation system as the unit of analysis. This would provide a 
more effective picture of the ability of the policy to mitigate the system failures. The use 
of the social network analysis represents a promising development in this direction. 
Finally, a third suggestion for future researches concerns the empirical method to analyse 
the framework of synergies that might exist among the three additionality dimensions. A 
first step in this direction is to check whether a system of simultaneous equations can be 
applied to this purpose. 
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16 For sake of simplicity it is only reported the sign or NS in case the effect is found to be non significant. 
17 This work is a meta-analysis of evaluation studies. 
Appendix 
 
Tab.A1 Operationalisation, methods and results in behavioural additionality studies  
Authors Methodology Policy intervention variable Outcome variables/ Behavioural additionality 
indicators (effects of the direct evaluations16) 
Econometric evaluations of the behavioural additionality 
Matching methods    
Fier, Aschhoff and Löhlein (2006)  Matching estimation with 
Mahalanobis metric / Bivariate probit 
Subsidy dummy / dummy indicating 
whether the cooperation was 
established by the policy 
Collaborations with other firms (NS), with 
scientific organisations (+), both with other firms 
and scientific organisations (NS). Persistence of 
established cooperation with scientific organisation 
(-) and other firms (NS)  
Magro, Aranguren and Navarro (2010) Propensity score matching Subsidy dummy Internationalisation of R&D activities (+), 
systematisation of R&D activities (+), long-lasting  
collaborative agreements (+) 
Marino and Parrotta (2010) Generalised propensity score Amount of subsidy (continuous 
treatment)  
Share of R&D personnel to proxy change in the 
management of innovation strategies (+, up to 1.8 
mil DKK) 
Hall and Maffioli (2008)17 
 
Propensity score matching Subsidy dummy Access to external sources of knowledge (+) and 
financing (+), training and organisational activities 
(NS). 
Other econometric techniques    
Falk (2006)  Fixed effect model with time 
invariant variables / Dynamic panel 
specification  
Log R&D subsidies / Δlog subsidies 
(t), Δlog R&D subsidies (t-1) 
R&D personnel to proxy R&D opportunities and 
absorptive capacity (+) 
Busom and  Fernández-Ribas (2008) Structural model (and matching) Binary participation status (subsidy 
dummy) 
Cooperation with: suppliers and customers (+); 
public research organisations (+) 
Afcha-Chávez (2011) Structural model (and matching) Binary participation status (subsidy 
dummy), distinguishing regional and 
national policies  
Cooperation with: university and technological 
centres (+, both the levels of policy); suppliers and 
customers (NS, both levels of policy)  
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Alternative quantitative analyses of the behavioural additionality 
Falk (2007)  Ordered probit regressions Policy dummies for support coming 
from one, two or three programmes 
respectively 
Changes in the scale, scope (in terms of more 
cooperation, more risk, more basic research and 
more applied research) and acceleration of funded 
projects 
Hsu, Horng and Hsueh (2009) Factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
Scheffe’s comparison to test 
differences in additionalities 
Not directly used (the analysis is 
based on government sponsored R&D 
project) 
Project enlargement, strategy formulation, cost-
effectiveness, and commercialisation behaviours 
Autio, Kanninen and Gustafsson (2008) Factor analysis, OLS regressions Dummy for participation in policy 
programmes  
Direct technological learning, technological 
distinctiveness, market learning and 
internationalisation learning 
Clarysse, Wright and Mustar (2009) Heckman selection model Subsidy dummy (used in the selection 
equation) 
Single factor capturing the extent to which: 
innovation management process is more 
formalised; innovation management capabilities are 
increased; the research path is changed. 
Breschi, Cassi, Malerba and Vonortas 
(2008) 
Social Network Analysis  Not directly used (the analysis is 
focused on the networks of the 
participants in the policy programme) 
Creation of knowledge linkages and connectivity, 
nurturing of key actors and knowledge leaders. 
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3 
Multi-level innovation policy in two EU countries. 
An additionality evaluation of the Italian and Spanish  
public interventions*  
 
 
Abstract  
The paper aims at proposing and applying a new multi-level and multi-dimensional 
evaluation of the additionality effects of innovation policy. The impacts of  national and 
regional support schemes are jointly investigated (multi-level), by simultaneously 
analysing their input, output and behavioural additionality effects  (multi-dimension). By 
making use of the 4th wave of the Community Innovation Survey, an empirical 
application of this evaluation is provided for two EU countries, namely Italy and Spain, 
through a propensity score matching estimation of the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). The picture of the results is quite complex. In both countries, only national 
policies increase R&D investment. On the other hand, their regional and national 
interventions induce additional innovation performances and innovation behaviours of 
different nature. The proposed methodology is integrated with an original, although 
somehow tentative, analysis of the relation between the average additionality effects of 
the policies and the dispersion of their impacts. With the exception of Italian regional 
policies, the higher is the average additionality level, the lower is the polarisation of the 
policy effect.  
 
1 Introduction 
Two contrasting forces characterise innovation policy in EU countries. Whereas the 
support to innovation activities is a necessary condition to reach the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010), the ongoing economic crisis is 
pressuring governments to reduce their direct intervention in support of the economic 
systems, or at least to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of the policy actions. 
In this framework, the contribution to the policy-learning process coming from the 
evaluation of innovation policies is of particular importance, as it allows for a better 
shaping of future interventions.  
                                                            
* A preliminary version of this work has been included in the OPENLOC Working Papers Series, 
n.10/2011. 
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The present paper contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of 
innovation policy interventions, by focusing on two EU countries, namely Italy and 
Spain. Its first aim is to investigate the additionality effects of the public support to firms’ 
innovation activities. In doing this, the paper adopts a multi-dimensional approach to 
disentangle the different effects that the policy can have. On the one hand, the present 
work analyses the standard input and output additionality dimensions. These latter, 
initially originated from the standard neoclassical rationale (e.g. Arrow, 1962), are 
respectively concerned with whether the policy intervention affects firms’ investment in 
R&D and the capacity to achieve higher innovation outputs. On the other hand, an 
analysis of the behavioural additionality is also provided. This latter, introduced in the 
literature by Buisseret et al. (1995), is focused on the strategic and behavioural changes 
induced by the public intervention and is consistent with the system failures rationale 
(e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009), developed upon the evolutionary and 
system perspectives. In assessing the additionality of the innovation policy interventions, 
due to the relevant interplay between the regional and the national support schemes (e.g. 
Cooke, 2002; Kaiser, 2003; European Commission, 2001, 2010), this paper adopts a 
multi-level perspective. This aims to investigate the impacts of the regional and national 
policies and the consistency in the effects generated by the two levels of public support.  
The second aim of this work is to provide a tentative analysis of an issue which 
has been scarcely investigated in the literature on the evaluation of innovation policy. 
Indeed, whereas the majority of the empirical contributions deals with the average effect 
of the public intervention (i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT), it is quite 
unclear whether a higher average effect is associated to a higher or lower dispersion of 
the impact across the beneficiaries. The paper tries to make a step ahead in this direction, 
investigating whether the policy impact is evenly distributed or rather polarised. In this 
sense, the paper analyses the extent to which the average level of additionality is 
correlated to the concentration or the dispersion of the impact across the funded firms.  
The quantitative analysis provided in this work is based on microdata on 
manufacturing firms coming from the fourth wave (2002-2004) of the Community 
Innovation Survey. The cross-sectional nature of the data limits the possibility to 
overcome (completely) the potential endogeneity of the policy. On the one hand, lagged 
variables for the public support cannot be employed. On the other hand, in absence of 
panel data, it is not possible to control for the potential bias arising from unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, to 
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control for the likely presence of selection bias on the observables, the additionality 
evaluation is carried out with a set of propensity score matching estimations. As for the 
analysis of the relation between the average additionality effect and the dispersion of the 
policy impact, this is based upon the Spearman’s rank correlation between the ATTs, 
calculated for each additionality indicator considered, and the corresponding coefficients 
of variation. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. After this brief introduction, 
Section 2 deals with the theoretical and empirical background: it reviews the additionality 
concept, introduces the multi-level perspective in innovation policy-making and presents 
the main characteristics of previous empirical works that have analysed the impact of the 
Italian and Spanish innovation policies. Section 3 presents the econometric approach, the 
characteristics of the dataset and the variables used. Section 4 reports the results emerging 
from the analysis of the regional and national policies implemented in Italy and Spain. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical and empirical background 
2.1 The additionality of innovation policy 
To introduce the different dimensions of the additionality that are going to be analysed in 
the paper, it is useful to present the main theoretical foundations these originate from18. 
Within the standard neoclassical approach (Arrow, 1962), the policy is called to correct 
the underinvestment in innovation generated by the market failures: public intervention is 
essentially aimed at stimulating an additional investment in R&D to reach the social 
optimum. However, due to the assumed strict linear relation between inputs and outputs 
(e.g. Edquist, 1999; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), the same underinvestment in 
R&D is expected to generate an underproduction of innovation. Hence, policy 
interventions are eventually aimed also at increasing the amount of innovation outputs 
produced by private actors. A different, and more complete policy rationale, emerges 
from the evolutionary theory and the related innovation system perspective. Accordingly, 
the public support should deal with different failures that concern the creation of 
knowledge and the evolutionary process of innovation, as well as the structure and the 
configuration of the innovation system (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 
2009).  
                                                            
18 See the second Chapter of the present Thesis for a more detailed analysis.  
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  Two additionality dimensions are developed upon the neoclassical approach. The 
first one is the input dimension. This is concerned with the additional amount of 
resources and innovative inputs (e.g. R&D investment) that would not have been 
allocated without the policy (Georghiou, 2004; Clarysse et al. 2004; Cerulli, 2010). The 
second one is the output additionality, which is concerned with the amount of outputs that 
would not have been achieved without the public support (Georghiou and Clarysse, 
2006). These outputs can be immediate results of the innovation projects supported by the 
public intervention (e.g. new products or processes and patents) and their economic 
outcomes (e.g. improved business performances as resulting from the introduction of new 
products or processes) (Georghiou, 2002). 
Although quite straightforward, the evaluations of the input and output 
additionality are affected by a main limitation. In particular, considering the beneficiary 
as a “black-box”, they fail to take into account the complexity of the innovation process, 
as well as the organisational, behavioural and strategic impacts of the public support 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). To overcome this limit, and to make the evaluation of 
the innovation policy consistent with the evolutionary and system perspectives, a 
necessary complement comes from the analysis of the behavioural additionality. This is 
defined by Buisseret et al. (1995) as “the change in a company's way of undertaking R&D 
which can be attributed to policy actions" (p. 590). Behavioural additionality evaluation is 
concerned with whether the policy intervention induces relevant changes both in the 
internal organisation of the beneficiaries’ innovation process and in their relations with 
external sources of knowledge. More precisely, the focus can be on: the improvement of 
capabilities, the enhancement of beneficiaries' networking and interactions with other 
organisations; the acquisition of new and diverse knowledge that can mitigate lock-in 
positions into non-preferable technologies19 (e.g. Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006; Hall and 
Maffioli, 2008; Breschi et al., 2009).  
 
2.2 The multi-level system of policy  
In addition to a multi-dimensional analysis of the additionality effects, the paper also 
considers the innovation policy in a multi-level perspective. This latter finds its 
theoretical and empirical support in recent contributions dealing with the regional 
                                                            
19 Given the lack of proper data this third type of effect is not considered in the following analysis. 
For an investigation of the capacity of the policy to stimulate the acquisition of diverse 
competencies see the fourth Chapter of the Thesis. 
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innovation policy. In the early literature on regional innovation systems, the regional 
policy-maker has been considered to be in the best position to implement innovation 
strategies and to promote network-type instruments (Uyarra, 2010). Such an increasing 
attention on the regional level of policy has been justified by the idea that public 
intervention has to be “context-specific and sensitive to local path-dependency” (Amin, 
1999, p. 368). However, this viewpoint fails to take into account the necessary inter-
connections between the different levels of public support. As noted by Laranja et al. 
(2008), evolutionary processes of selection, generation of novelty and path-dependency 
occur at multiple geographical scales; hence, there is not a unique optimal level in which 
innovation policy should be designed and delivered. Furthermore, innovation is a 
phenomenon that is shaped by institutional aspects pertaining to different scales: from the 
regional to the supra-national one (Howells, 1999; Boschma, 2005b). Hence, public 
interventions should be seen as part of a multi-level system of policy or governance 
(Cooke, 2002; Kaiser, 2003), in which different support schemes are initiated at different 
levels.  
By adopting a multi-level perspective it is possible to investigate the fundamental 
interplay between policy actions initiated at different levels. This paper, focusing on the 
additionality of the public support to firms’ innovation activities, examines whether 
regional and national interventions overlap in the effects they produce. In other terms, 
whether the two levels of policy are capable of inducing firms to “move towards the same 
direction”, in terms of additionality effects. To carry out this analysis, the Italian and 
Spanish cases seem to be particularly interesting and appropriate. Indeed, both the 
countries are characterised by regional policies that are implemented following different 
targets and means with respect to the national ones. Italian policies initiated at the sub-
national levels, with respect to national interventions, are generally characterised by a 
lower public contribution, being largely targeted to SMEs and aimed to support less 
formalised innovation activities (Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Barbieri et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Spanish regional policies, when compared to the national interventions, are 
characterised by a smaller scale, scope and by a higher attention to less formalised 
innovation activities (Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Afcha-Chávez, 2011).  
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2.3 Empirical literature on the additionality of Italian and Spanish policies 
Several studies investigate the additionality of the Italian and Spanish policies aimed at 
supporting firms’ innovation activities.  
Although somehow indirectly, a first contribution that captures the effects of the 
Italian policies aimed at reducing the cost of R&D is the one by Parisi and Sembenelli 
(2003). Employing Mediocredito Centrale data for the period 1992-1997 and applying a 
censored panel-data regression model with random effects, their evidence points to a 
positive effect of the policy incentives on the R&D spending. 
More directly, Cefis and Evangelista (2007) estimate the impacts of different 
levels of policy (i.e. local or regional, national and European) supporting Italian firms’ 
innovation activities. Adopting a simple OLS control function approach on CIS3 (1998-
2000) data, their findings point to the presence of positive input additionality effects 
generated by the regional, the national policies and the European Framework Programme. 
Some output additionality impacts also emerges for the interventions included in the 
European Framework Programme and, to a lesser extent, for sub-national policies. To 
reduce potential endogeneity problems, Cefis and Evangelista (2007), merging CIS2 
(1994-1996) and CIS3, analyse the effect of a lagged policy support (considering together 
the different levels of intervention). There emerges a significant input additionality effect; 
however, this is not confirmed when using as outcome variables the variation rate of the 
additionality indicators considered20.  
A more recent contribution is the one by Cerulli and Potì (2008). Merging the 
Italian CIS3 with balance sheets data, they investigate the input additionality of the public 
support to firms’ innovation activities, not distinguishing though among the different 
levels of intervention. The results, obtained from OLS regressions, a set of propensity 
score estimations and a Heckman selection model, generally support the presence of input 
additionality (in terms of R&D expenditure, R&D intensity on the turnover and R&D per 
employee). Some more mixed evidences emerge when considering the output 
additionality, captured by effect on the turnover due to product innovations. Interestingly, 
                                                            
20 Variables capturing the cooperation attitude are also included. Cefis and Evangelista (2007) also 
provide a comparison with the impact of regional, national and European policies supporting 
Dutch firms’ innovation activities.  
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Cerulli and Potì (2008) further disaggregate their analysis by macro-region, sector21 and 
firm’s size. Their results point to a total crowding-out effect only in low knowledge-
intensive services sector, very small firms (10-19 employees) and auto-vehicle sector.   
Italian policy has been further investigated by works that analyse the impact of 
specific policy mechanisms and funding schemes.  
Some evidence on the effect of specific types of policy instrument comes from 
Carboni (2011), who employs a propensity score matching approach over Capitalia data 
for the period 2001-2003. Public support is found to have, in general terms, a positive 
effect on private R&D investment. Nevertheless, when distinguishing between tax 
incentives and direct grants, the results point to a much larger and more significant impact 
of the former type of intervention.    
As for the contributions aimed at assessing specific Italian funding schemes, a 
first work to mention is the one by Barbieri et al. (2010), who investigate the impact of 
the law 46/82. This consists of two parts, establishing the Fund for Applied Research 
(FSRA) (which converged in 2001 in the Fund for Research Support (FAR)) and the 
Fund for Technological Innovation (FIT). In brief, the former is aimed at supporting 
firms’ investment in applied research activities including the collaborations with research 
partners. The latter is focused on applied innovations and on the development phase of 
firms’ R&D activities. The analysis carried out by Barbieri et al. (2010) is based on a 
panel created upon three waves of the Capitalia (MedioCredito Centrale) surveys (1995-
1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003). The results, emerging from a difference-in-difference 
approach, point to an ambiguous evidence on the input additionality of the law 46/82. The 
only positive and significant effects are those emerging from the difference between the 
second and the first waves analysed. More precisely, it is noticeable a positive and 
significant impact of the first part of the law (FSRA/FAR) on the R&D expenditure and 
of the second part of the law (FIT) on the R&D personnel. To control for the concurring 
effects of other incentive schemes, Barbieri et al. (2010) employ a difference-in-
difference-in-difference method. The results point to a lack of effectiveness of the law 
when interacted with other policy schemes.  
Merito et al. (2010) investigate FAR’s predecessor, the Fund for Applied 
Research (FSRA), focusing on the last two years of its activity (i.e. 1999-2000). FSRA 
                                                            
21 Sectors considered are: high-tech, medium-high tech, medium-low tech manufacturing sectors; 
knowledge intensive and low-knowledge intensive services.  In addition to these, three specific 
manufacturing sectors are considered: i.e. auto-vehicle, mechanics, chemicals. 
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effectiveness is evaluated through a matching approach applied over Amadeus (Bureau 
van Dijk) data merged with information on firms’ patenting activity stemming from the 
Delphion dataset. The focus of the work is mainly on the output additionality effects of 
the FSRA, two (2002) and four years after the public support (2004). More precisely, the 
analysis aims at capturing the impact on the market success, labour productivity, 
patenting activity, labour force composition and employment growth. The only 
significant effects (i.e. a positive impact on the patent applications and a negative one on 
the composition of the workforce) are registered in the short-run (2002). However, the 
effect of the intervention seems to be dependent on the type of beneficiaries. When the 
analysis is limited to the SMEs, FSRA is found to be positively affecting the composition 
of the workforce, the patenting activity (both in the short- and medium-long run) and the 
employment growth (in the medium-long run).  
A more recent study dealing with the evaluation of the FAR is the one by Cerulli 
and Potì (2010), who employ a panel covering the period 2002-2004, created upon data 
collected by the Ministry of Research (MIUR) and the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). The comprehensive econometric analysis provided sheds, at first, 
some light on the input additionality effects. The evidence emerging from a structural 
model, in its reduced form regression equation, points to a positive effect on private R&D 
spending. Cerulli and Potì (2010) also analyse the heterogeneity of the effects, 
investigating the presence of input additionality in different subgroups of firms. Input 
additionality is found to characterise large and very large companies, low-tech, high and 
medium-high tech firms, as well as companies located in the North and the Centre of 
Italy. Another interesting insight from Cerulli and Potì (2010) is the analysis of the effect 
of the input additionality on the level of output additionality, captured by the number of 
patents. Through a matching technique, for each firm, an idiosyncratic level of 
additionality and the “own R&D expenditure” are estimated and used as predictors, 
together with the amount of subsidy, in a poisson regression. The coefficient of the 
idiosyncratic additionality term turns out to be positive and significant, meaning that the 
input additionality effect of the policy induces a higher innovation performance in terms 
of patent applications22.  
                                                            
22 Cerulli and Potì (2010) provide other interesting insights. First, an analysis of the differences in 
the effects resulting from various sub-types of intervention within the FAR. Second, an 
investigation of the structural differences, concerning also the different economic performances 
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As for the FIT, this is evaluated by De Blasio et al. (2011) with a regression 
discontinuity design approach, which exploits a cut-off in the programme due to the 
unexpected shortage of funding in March 2002. The evidence, based on data from the 
Ministry of Economic Development and the Cerved dataset of financial statements, points 
to a substantial lack of effectiveness: subsidised firms do not invest more in either 
tangible or intangible assets.  
A relevant complement to the findings emerging from the contributions reviewed 
above arises from works that are explicitly focused on specific types of beneficiaries.  
As for SMEs, some evidence on the effectiveness of the policy interventions on 
the investment in innovation can be found in Hall et al. (2009). Employing a CDM 
model23 (Crépon et al., 1998) on three waves of the Mediocredito Centrale (Capitalia) 
data (referring to the periods 1995–1997, 1998–2000, 2001–2003), they investigate the 
impact of innovation on productivity. The results emerging from the first part of their 
analysis point to a positive effect of receiving a subsidy on SMEs’ investment in R&D.   
Another relevant contribution is the one by Colombo et al. (2011). Focusing on 
new technology-based firms (NTBFs), they investigate the output additionality of R&D 
subsidies. The authors estimate the effect of the public funding on the increase in the total 
factor productivity (TFP), by employing data coming from the RITA (Research on 
Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies) dataset. The results, emerging from a 
GMM-system estimator, which accounts for the endogeneity of the policy support and 
whose consistency is increased by exogenous instruments, point to the positive effect of 
selective supportive schemes, while the impact of automatic ones is not significant. 
In addition to the works reviewed above, at the best of our knowledge, the 
contribution by Bronzini and Iachini (2011) is the only one that analyses a specific Italian 
regional innovation policy, namely the Emilia-Romagna regional R&D subsidy24. 
Bronzini and Iachini (2011) assess the input additionality of the subsidy using balance 
sheets data and employing a regression discontinuity design approach. This is based on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(i.e. productivity, profitability and turnover’s growth rate), between firms performing crowding-
out and firms performing additionality.  
23 This consists of three building blocks. The first concerns with the decision on whether to engage 
in (and the amount of resources devoted to) R&D. The second one consists of a two-equation 
knowledge production function (one for process and one for product innovation) in which R&D is 
one of the inputs. The third consists of a simple extended production function in which process 
and product innovation are considered as inputs (Hall et al., 2009). 
24 See the fourth Chapter of this Thesis for an investigation focused on the same regional subsidy. 
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the cut-off generated by a threshold score in the projects’ evaluation process. In general 
terms, the public support is not found to have significant effects; however, when the 
analysis is carried out by firm’s size, there emerges a positive impact on the private 
investment of small companies.  
Moving to the empirical contributions aimed at evaluating innovation policies in 
Spain, a first work to be mentioned is the early contribution by Busom (2000). She 
investigates the input additionality of a programme implemented by the Centre for 
Technological and Industrial Development (CDTI), an agency of the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry. Through OLS regressions, the mean fitted values of the R&D expenditure and 
the R&D personnel for participants and non participants are obtained. By comparing 
these values, Busom (2000) concludes that the policy positively affects both the 
additionality indicators considered.  
A more recent empirical contribution is the one by González and Pazó (2008), 
who investigate the input additionality of Spanish policies in the period 1990-1999, 
without distinguishing among the different levels of intervention. They employ a 
matching technique over panel data coming from the Spanish Survey on Firm Strategy. 
The evidence points to the absence of crowding-out between public and private spending. 
Furthermore, public funding is found to be a necessary condition for some types of firms 
(small and operating in low technology sectors) to engage in R&D activities.  
Exploiting the same dataset for the period 1998-2005, Garcia-Quevedo and 
Afcha-Chávez (2009) analyse the input additionality of the Spanish national and regional 
policy interventions. Support schemes initiated at the national level positively affect the 
intensity of R&D investment; however, a similar result is not found for the regional 
interventions, for which the policy impact is not significant.  
The last four contributions here reviewed (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; 
Fernández-Ribas and Shapira, 2009; Magro et al., 2010; Afcha-Chávez, 2011) introduce 
some new insights in the literature, as they are focused also on the behavioural 
additionality of innovation policy. The work by Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) is 
focused on the cooperation dimension of the behavioural additionality. To evaluate the 
impact of the national funding, the work employs data coming from the Spanish 
Innovation Survey (period 1996-1998). At first, the authors adopt a structural model, in 
which the decision to participate in the policy is modelled, as well as the equations of 
partners selection. However, after having estimated a reduced form equation of their 
structural model, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) turn to a matching approach to deal 
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with the endogeneity of the policy support. The results of the empirical analyses show 
that the policy support has a positive impact on the cooperation between funded firms and 
public research organisations and, to a lesser extent, on the interactions between 
supported companies and private partners.  
Afcha-Chávez (2011) considers the impact of national and regional policies on 
firms’ cooperation with business and research partners. The analysis is carried out on the 
basis of data coming from the Spanish Survey on Firm Strategy (period 1998-2005). As 
in Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), Afcha-Chávez (2011) tries to employ a structural 
approach, but then moves to a propensity score matching estimation given the 
endogeneity of the public support. The results point to a positive impact of both regional 
and national policies on the propensity to cooperate with universities or technological 
centres. Nevertheless, both regional and national programmes have no significant effects 
on the cooperation with business partners (i.e. customers and suppliers).  
On a similar vein, Fernández-Ribas and Shapira (2009) analyse the effect of 
national and regional innovation policies on firms’ cooperation, but focusing on the 
interactions with foreign partners. Results, emerging from propensity score matching 
estimations implemented over data arising from the Spanish version of the Third 
Community Innovation Survey (1998-2000), point to a generally positive impact of the 
public support schemes investigated. 
The last work here reviewed is the one by Magro et al. (2010). At the best of our 
knowledge, this is the only contribution focused on a specific Spanish regional policy. 
The authors analyse a R&D programme implemented in the Basque Country and 
investigate whether public funding raises the propensity to collaborate, increases the 
participation in international R&D programmes and leads to a systematic R&D behaviour 
within the firms. The evidence, emerging from a matching estimation, point to a positive 
effect on all the three aspects of the behavioural additionality. 
The large amount of evidence provided does not lead to an unambiguous 
conclusion on the additionality profiles of the public interventions implemented in Italy 
and Spain. What is more, proper comparisons -even among the studies that are focused on 
the same country/programme- are not allowed, due to the differences in the effects and 
time-spans considered, as well as in the data and methodologies employed. Some 
tentative insights can only be drawn about the input additionality of the overall systems of 
policy of the two countries. The evidence points to the general presence of positive 
effects (Parisi and Sembenelli, 2003; Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Cerulli and Potì, 2008; 
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González and Pazó, 2008; Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Hall et al. 2009), 
even if with some differences. In Italy the evaluations of the specific types of instruments 
(i.e. direct grants and tax incentives) and funding schemes (i.e. FAR/FSRA and FIT) lead 
to mixed results (Barbieri et al., 2010; Cerulli and Potì, 2010; De Blasio et al., 2011; 
Carboni, 2011). In Spain regional policies are found to be ineffective in stimulating 
private investment in R&D (Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009). 
As for the other additionality dimensions, instead, a comparison between Italian 
and Spanish public interventions is hardly possible. Some evidence on the output 
additionality, although mixed, is available for the Italian policies only (Cefis and 
Evangelista, 2007; Cerulli and Potì, 2008, 2010; Merito et al. 2010; Colombo et al., 
2011). As for the behavioural additionality, the only available investigations are mainly 
focused on the capacity of Spanish policy programmes to stimulate funded firms’ 
interactions with other companies and research organisations (Busom and Fernández-
Ribas, 2008; Fernández-Ribas and Shapira, 2009; Magro et al., 2010; Afcha-Chávez, 
2011).   
All in all, the picture emerging from the review of the previous empirical 
contributions identifies two main limitations that the present paper aims to address. At 
first, as said, a hardly possible comparability of the results, both within and between the 
countries. For this reason it seems necessary to systematise the analysis, considering 
together the three additionality dimensions and using the same methodology and data. 
Only in this way it will be possible to compare the effectiveness of the regional and the 
national interventions implemented in Italy and Spain. Second, almost all the 
contributions (with the partial exception of Cerulli and Potì, 2010) analyse the average 
effect of the participation in the policy, without considering whether this latter is 
generated by the concentration or by the polarisation of the effects on the single 
beneficiaries. This is another aspect that the present paper aims to address. 
 
3 Empirical application  
3.1 Econometric strategy 
In evaluating the additionality of innovation policies the focus is basically on the net 
effect of the public intervention. More precisely, in econometric terms, the objective is to 
estimate the impact that is directly caused by a treatment, which in this case is the 
participation in the policy and the consequent public funding. This impact can be seen as 
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the difference between the outcome (e.g. the R&D investment in the case of the input 
additionality) observable after the treatment and the outcome that would have been 
observed without the treatment, i.e. the counterfactual. Denoting by Yi1 the outcome in 
case of treatment and by Yi0 the outcome in case of non treatment, the effect on a single 
unit (i.e. the firm) is ∆i= Yi1 – Yi0.  As noted by Holland (1986), the possibility to use this 
kind of approach is limited by the fundamental problem of causal inference: it is not 
possible to observe both the outcome in presence and in absence of the treatment on the 
same unit. The statistical solution to this problem is based on the concept of average 
causal effect, and the parameter of interest becomes the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT):  
),1|()1|()1|()1|( 0101  DYEDYEDYYDEATT  (1) 
where D denotes the binary treatment status.  
In our case, E(Y1| D=1) can be estimated by the mean outcome of treated firms. 
However, E(Y0|D=1) (i.e. the potential outcome in absence of treatment) cannot be 
observed: for treated firms, it is not possible to detect the outcome that would have been 
reached in absence of the public funding. In a situation in which firms were randomly 
assigned to the public support, E(Y0|D=1) could be estimated by E(Y0|D=0), because on 
average participants and non participants would not differ, so that E(Y0|D=1)=E(Y0|D=0). 
Nevertheless, random assignments are very unlikely in innovation policy, as in most of 
the economic policies. On the one hand, some beneficiaries can self-select themselves. 
On the other hand, policy-makers can deliberately select recipients with certain 
characteristics, with either a "picking the winner" or a "aiding the poor" strategy (Cerulli, 
2010). The result is that treated and non treated firms can be systematically different; 
thus, estimating the counterfactual with the mean outcome of the non participants is a 
source of bias, namely the selection bias. This can be generated, by the omission of 
observable and/or unobservable variables that determine both the treatment status and the 
outcome  (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In the following, to control for the selection on 
the observables a matching approach is used. This is essentially aimed at pairing treated 
firms with “twin” non treated ones, so that the difference in the outcome is only due to 
the treatment.  
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At the basis of matching estimation there is the conditional independence 
assumption25:   
.|, 10 XDYY          (2)  
Accordingly, outcomes are assumed to be independent of programme participation 
conditional on a set of observables characteristics X. Conditioning on X is like assuming 
that the assignment is randomised and that unobservables are not relevant for the 
participation (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). In order to have a consistent matching 
procedure another assumption is needed: the so-called “stable unit-treatment value 
assumption” or SUTVA (Rubin, 1986). SUTVA implies that the outcome for firm i must 
be independent to the treatment given to firm j26. In addition to these assumptions, for a 
correct matching estimation of the ATT, the common support condition is also 
necessary27: 
.1)|1Pr(0  XD         (3)  
Indeed, if (3) is not satisfied there are only treated or non treated firms for certain values 
of X, thus making the matching impossible.  
Given (2), SUTVA and (3) it is possible to overcome the inability to observe the 
potential outcome in absence of treatment for participant firms. The unobservable term 
E(Y0|D=1, X), can be recovered from E(Y0| D=0, X) and the ATT can be formalised as 
follows:   
)].,0|(),1|([ 011| XDYEXDYEEATT DX       (4) 
Intuitively, matching methods are based on the idea that the effect of the treatment is 
estimated through the average difference between the outcome of the treated units and the 
outcome of the non treated ones that have the same set of observable characteristics X. In 
principle, in order to have an unbiased estimation of the treatment effect, each treated 
firm should be matched with a non treated one that has exactly the same vector of X. 
                                                            
25 A weaker version of (2), i.e. XDY |0  , can suffice (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). 
26 This is a strong assumption in the evaluation of innovation policy due to the likely interactions 
among firms. See the Section 3.3 of the second Chapter included in the present Thesis for a 
discussion of how spillovers might generate additionality effects on non beneficiaries. 
27As the interest is on the treatment effect on treated, the common support condition can be relaxed 
and written as Pr (D=1|X) <1. This guarantees the presence of suitable counterfactual firms for 
each treated (Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
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However, if the vector has a high dimension it can be difficult, if not impossible, to find 
appropriate matches for all the treated firms. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), in their 
seminal contribution, propose a device which helps to reduce the dimension of 
conditioning: the propensity score. Propensity score is the conditional probability of 
receiving the treatment given X:   
).|1Pr()( XDXP          (5) 
Drawing on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), when (2) holds, 
:)(|, 10 XPDYY          (6)  
when outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on X, they are also independent 
of treatment conditional on the propensity score. The aim of the propensity score 
matching is to reduce the dimension of conditioning by pairing treated and non treated 
firms which have the same (or very similar) values of P(X), though possible different 
values of the single X. In this sense: 
)]}(,0|[)](,1|[{ 011)|( XPDYEXPDYEEATT DXP   .    (7) 
To operationalise the propensity score matching estimation of the ATT, in the 
following empirical application a multi-step protocol is applied (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). At first, the propensity score is estimated with a probit model that includes as 
covariates all the variables that are expected to affect the outcome and the treatment 
status.  
Then, as a second step, a set of different matching algorithms is chosen. These 
basically differ in the way non treated firms to be used as matches are selected and 
weighted. In the following empirical application the use of more matching procedures 
provides information on the stability and reliability of the emerging evidences. In 
particular three types of algorithms developed in the literature (e.g. Becker and Ichino, 
2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) 
are implemented: 5 nearest neighbours (5NN), caliper and kernel. To provide a better 
explanation of the different algorithms it is useful to introduce the following general 
notation (Smith and Todd, 2005) for the propensity score matching estimator of the ATT:  
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with the counterfactual being defined as  



0
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Ij
jii YjiWPDYE           (9) 
I1 denotes the set of treated firms, I0 the set of non treated firms, Sp the region of common 
support28 and P(X) for simplicity is P. The match for each  
i  I1   Sp,  is constructed as a weighted average over the outcomes of non treated 
firms, where the weights W(i, j) depend on the distance between Pi and Pj. 5NN matching 
is a variant of the single nearest neighbour matching, where C(Pi), the set of controls j 
selected as matches for each treated i, is such that: 
ji
j
i PPPC  min)( .        (10) 
More precisely, in the 5NN matching, the counterfactual for each treated firm is 
calculated as the mean outcome of the five non treated firms with the closest propensity 
score. With respect to the single nearest neighbour procedure, 5NN implies a trade-off 
between lower variance (more information is used to create the counterfactual) and an 
increased bias in the estimation (some dissimilar non treated firms can be used as 
matches) (e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Caliper matching reduces this potential bias 
by imposing a maximum tolerance,  (i.e. 0.02 in the following application), to the 
distance in the propensity score values between treated and non treated firms:  
}|{)(  jiji PPPPC .           .    (11) 
To increase the possibility of finding good matches, in both the 5NN and caliper 
algorithms, the replacement is allowed: non treated firms can be matched with more than 
one treated firm. The last algorithm employed is the kernel matching:  
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where G(·) is a kernel function (i.e. Epanechnikov) and an a bandwith parameter (i.e. 
0.06). With respect to the other two procedures, which use a limited number of controls 
                                                            
28 See below for how this region is created by imposing the common support condition. 
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for each treated firm, kernel matching creates the counterfactual for each participant using 
the information from (nearly) the entire set of non treated, thus involving a trade-off 
between lower variance (more information is used) and higher bias (on average the 
similarity between treated and controls is expected to be lower) (e.g. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008).   
The third step of the estimation protocol consists of imposing the common 
support condition to the matching algorithms. In what follows a "minima-maxima 
comparison" is applied. Following the psmatch2 STATA procedure (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2003), treated observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less 
than the minimum propensity score of the controls are dropped. In addition to this, a 5% 
“trim” is also imposed to the 5NN algorithm; this results in dropping treated observations 
at which the propensity score density of the controls is the lowest. 
The last step consists of assessing the quality of the matching. The basic idea is to 
compare the situation after and before the matching to check that treated firms and 
matched controls are correctly aligned with respect to the vector of covariates X. To this 
purpose, four tests are employed. The first is a regression-based t-test on differences in 
the covariates means, for which it is expected that after the matching all the covariates are 
not able to significantly predict the treatment status. The second is a loglikelihood ratio 
test. In this case, after the matching, the covariates included in the specification of the 
probit model for the propensity score estimation are expected to be jointly non 
significant. The third is a pseudo R2 test. In this case, the goodness of fit of the probit 
model is expected to collapse after the matching. The fourth is a test on the standardised 
bias29, which is passed if after the matching the standardised bias is reduced below 3%-
5% (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008)30.  
Propensity score matching is also at the basis of the tentative analysis of the 
relation between the average impact of the policy and the dispersion of the effects on the 
                                                            
29 Standardised bias is calculated both after and before the matching as: 
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where X is the mean of the covariates, )(XV their variance, and M denotes the matched samples. 
30 The results of the tests, which are not reported in the following pages -but available upon 
request-, largely support the quality of all the employed matching procedures. The only slightly 
non satisfactory test is the one on the standardised bias. Through all the sixteen matching 
procedures only for five covariates the SBafter this is found to be slightly higher (6.1% at the most) 
than the threshold indicated by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
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individual beneficiaries. With this respect, the idea is to provide a preliminary 
investigation of whether the average additionality level of the policy is driven by the 
concentration of the effects around the mean impact or by the presence of individual 
effects which are located well below or above the average impact. More precisely, the 
aim is to measure the extent to which the ATT is correlated to the 
dispersion/concentration of the impact across the beneficiaries. To this purpose, at first, 
“i-th firm’s” effects are calculated by subtracting from the value of the outcome variable 
of each supported firm i the average outcome of its counterfactual, obtained with a 5NN 
procedure31. Then, for each additionality indicator (i.e. outcome variable) considered (see 
Section 3.3), a coefficient of variation of the i-th effects is calculated. Furthermore, to 
have comparable ATTs across the different additionality indicators, each ATT is divided 
by the overall average counterfactual outcome, estimated with the 5NN matching. 
Finally, a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is calculated between the (rescaled) 
ATTs and the corresponding coefficients of variation. This captures the extent to which 
the rank of the (rescaled) ATTs, calculated for each additionality indicator, is related to 
the rank of the corresponding coefficients of variation.       
 
3.2 The Community Innovation Survey     
The following empirical application is carried out by employing data coming from the 
fourth wave of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS4). As all the CIS waves, this is 
based on a harmonized questionnaire which is the same for all the European countries, 
thus allowing for comparable analyses. In addition to firm's characteristics, the CIS4 
dataset includes information on: (i) product and process innovations; (ii) innovative 
inputs and expenditures; (iii) public funding; (iv) sources of information; (v) cooperation 
agreements; (vi) effects of innovation; (vii) hampering factors; (viii) intellectual propriety 
rights; (ix) organisational and marketing innovation; (x) effects of organisational 
innovation. The information gathered through the harmonised questionnaire of the CIS4 
refers generally to the period 2002-2004, however some of the variables capture 
                                                            
31 A very similar approach to obtain the “i-th firm’s effect” is implemented by Czarnitzki and 
Licht (2006) and Cerulli and Potì (2010). 
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particular aspects in the last year of the reference period32 or both in the first and last 
year33.  
Eurostat offers the possibility to access to a CIS4 dataset containing anonymised 
microdata34. The anonymisation of the data eliminates formal identifiers such as the name 
or exact address of the enterprises. Furthermore, some firm's characteristics (i.e. country 
of the head-office, sector, size) are recoded into less punctual variables. In addition to 
this, Eurostat micro-aggregates the data. The resulting database consists of the same 
number of units as kept in the original database: artificial units are created by replacing 
original values by the mean (for quantitative variables) or mode value (for qualitative 
variables) within clusters of three observations35 formed of individuals of “maximum 
similarity” (i.e. with the nearest value). The variables in the original dataset are micro-
aggregated independently of each other (i.e. clusters are established separately for each 
specific variable). This process, as mentioned, does not reduce the number of 
observations, which is actually quite high.  More precisely, the two working datasets used 
in the following empirical application originally consisted of 18,946 observations for 
Spain and 21,854 for Italy. Nevertheless, in order to provide a proper additionality 
evaluation of the regional and national policy interventions the size of the working 
datasets is reduced36. That because of three main reasons. At first, the analysis is limited 
to manufacturing firms. Second, in order to have the complete range of variables for all 
the observations, firms with unexpected missing values and firms that had not to fill the 
entire questionnaire37 are dropped. Finally, to provide a proper additionality evaluation of 
the regional (national) policies, the working datasets are limited to have among treated 
units only firms that obtained a regional (national) funding, while among the control units 
only firms that did not receive any type of public support.  
 
 
                                                            
32 Turnover due to product innovations new to the firm or to the market; expenditure for intramural 
and extramural R&D; expenditure for machinery, equipment and software; expenditure for 
external knowledge and total expenditure for innovative activities. 
33 Turnover and size 
34 For 16 European countries (i.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
35 In some cases 4 if the number of observations is not a multiple of 3. 
36 See Section 4 for the actual number of observations used. 
37 Those companies that in the period 2002-2004 did not introduce any product or process 
innovation and did not carry out any innovation activities.  
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3.3 Variables 
To operationalise the econometric approach presented above, at first, dummy variables 
for the firm’s treatment status are needed. To this purpose four dummies are used. These 
reflect whether the firm received some funding by the regional or local (FUNLOC), the 
national (FUNGMT) or the European (FUNEU) levels of government and whether the 
European support was granted within the 5th or 6th European Framework Programme for 
Research and Technical Development (FUNRTD). These dummy variables allows for the 
identification of the firms supported by regional or national funding schemes, but also of 
the firms that were not funded by any type of policy. This, in turn, permits the 
identification of treated and control groups for the additionality evaluation of the regional 
and national policies through the propensity score matching estimation.  
In addition to the treatment variables, it is necessary to define suitable covariates 
X38. Drawing on recent studies that evaluate the additionality of innovation policy 
interventions by adopting a propensity score matching approach (e.g. Czarnitki and Licht, 
2006; Aerts and Shmidt, 2008; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008), a set of firm's 
characteristics are identified and included in the propensity score specification (See Tab. 
A1 in the Appendix) 39. First of all, firms' size is controlled for, by including three 
dummies (i.e. SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE) and the logarithm of the turnover 
(ln_TURN02). Participation and innovation strategies, however, could be affected also by 
the sector in which the firm operates. On the one hand, policy intervention might be 
targeted to specific and strategic industries. On the other hand, firms belonging to more 
advanced sectors could be more able and willing to apply for the public support with 
well-promising projects. A series of dummies (SEC_DA-SEC_DN) capturing the 
manufacturing sector in which the firm operates are thus included40. Furthermore, aspects 
                                                            
38 Considering the characteristics and the rationale of the econometric method here employed (see 
Section 3.1), the covariates used to estimate the propensity score essentially represent the 
observable characteristics we control for. Hence, these can be considered, in a sense, as analogous 
to the control variables included in the specification of a standard parametric regression model. 
39 Given the differences in the policies analysed, some of the  relations (assumed below) between 
the covariates and the propensity to participate in the policy support do not find an empirical 
support. As FUNLOC and FUNGMT refer to the 2002-2004 period, to avoid endogeneity 
problems, whenever possible, the propensity scores specification includes variables referred to the 
first year of the period (2002). This can be done for ln_TURN02, SMALL, MEDIUM and 
LARGE. 
40 Italian firms belonging to NACE rev. 1.1 19 (i.e. secDC in the CIS4 sectoral classification), 20 
(belonging to sec20-21) and 23 (belonging to secDF-DG) are dropped from the working sample: 
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pertaining to the governance and ownership of the firm are controlled for with the 
inclusion of two dummies. These indicates, respectively, whether the firm belongs to a 
group (GP) and whether the firm is an affiliate of a multinational (MNC) corporation 
(MNCGROUP). Through network channels, firms belonging to a group might have more 
information on existent policy schemes and, thus, a higher probability of participating in 
policy programmes. On the contrary, being a MNC-affiliate might reduce the 
participation in support schemes, as parent companies might be more willing to file 
subsidy applications in the home country. Another firm's characteristic that can be 
expected to affect the probability to participate in the policy programmes and the 
innovation strategy pertains to the engagement in foreign markets (EXPORT). Firms 
engaged in the international competition are supposed to be more aware of the need to 
innovate and, thus, probably more willing to apply for policy programmes that support 
their innovative activities. Another extremely important aspect that should be taken into 
account in the propensity score estimation concerns firm’s engagement in R&D. With 
this respect, two dummies are included: RDENG and RDCONT. The first captures 
whether the firm is engaged in R&D, the second whether this engagement is continuous. 
In principle, both of them should have a positive effect on the participation in support 
schemes: firms that are committed to formal R&D activities are expected to be more 
willing and able to apply, successfully, for the public funding. Another factor that might 
influence the innovation strategy and the participation status is the firm's financial 
constraint. Two set of dummy variables are thus included in the probit estimations of the 
propensity score. The first one (i.e. HFENT1, HFENT2, HFENT3) captures whether the 
firm faces a “nil or low”, “medium” or “high” lack of internal funding. Similarly 
HFOUT1, HFOUT2, HFOUT3, captures whether the firm faces a “nil or low”, “medium” 
or “high” problem in accessing to external funding. In this case, it is expected that, at 
least up to a certain point, the more the firm faces a lack of internal or external funding, 
the more it might wish to be supported by the policy in order to compensate for the 
financial constraint. Differently from previous studies, this research takes into 
consideration also some informational aspects for the estimation of the propensity score. 
Three dummies (SMGT1, SGMT2, SGMT3) indicate the relevance (“nil or low”, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for these sectors the anonymisation process, carried out by the Italian National Statistical Institute, 
resulted in the aggregation of medium and large firms into a unique dimensional class. Firms 
belonging to NACE rev. 1.1 30 (belonging to secDL) are drooped too, as for these the 
anonymisation process resulted in the aggregation of small, medium and large firms into a unique 
dimensional class. 
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“medium”, “high”) of the governmental sources of information for the firm's innovative 
activities. Obviously, this type of information is supposed to positively affect the 
knowledge about possible support schemes, the probability to participate in the policy 
programmes and to shape the innovation activities consistently with the desired policy 
objectives. Similarly, other three dummies indicate the relevance of the information 
coming from professionals and industry associations (SPRO1, SPRO2, SPRO3). Indeed, 
professionals and industry associations can play a crucial role in supporting firms to 
gather information about possible public interventions, to file applications for support 
schemes and to fulfil policy requirements in terms of objectives to be achieved41. 
Finally, by using the CIS4 database, it is possible to use and create a number of 
additionality indicators (i.e. outcome variables)42 that capture input, output and 
behavioural additionality. As for the input additionality these are: (i) the expenditure in 
intramural R&D, in year 2004 (RDEXP); (ii) the intensity of the intramural R&D 
investment (RDINT) on the turnover, in year 2004. As for the output dimension the 
considered outcome variables are: (i) a dummy for product innovation (PRODINNO); (ii) 
a dummy for process innovation (PROCINNO); (iii) the percentage of turnover in year 
2004 due to product innovations introduced in 2002-2004 that were new to the market 
(TURNMAR); (iv) the percentage of turnover in year 2004 due to product innovations 
introduced in 2002-2004 that were new to the firm (TURNIN); (v) the sum of TURNIN 
and TURNMAR (i.e. TURNINNO)43; (vi) a dummy for patent application (PROPAT). 
Concerning the behavioural dimension, two types of impact are considered: the effect of 
the policy interventions on the acquisition of competencies and on the interactions with 
external actors. To capture the former type of effect, the main outcome variable is a 
dummy for the engagement in formal training programmes (TRAINENG). This variable 
proxies a change that can be argued to be a possible complementary consequence of the 
public support. More precisely, whether, in order to carry the publicly funded innovation 
activities, firms are induced to upgrade employees’ competencies through formal training 
programmes. As for the effects on interactions and networking activities two types of 
outcome variables can be used. First, two dummies capture the cooperation with firms 
                                                            
41 LARGE, HFENT1, HFOUT1, SGMT1, SPRO1, SEC27 (i.e. NACE rev 1.1 sector 27) are used 
as reference terms in the probit estimation of the propensity score.  
42 Unless differently reported the variables defined below are referred to period 2002-2004. 
43  TURNMAR TURNIN and TURNINNO are rescaled from 0 to 1. 
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(COOPFIRM) and research organisations (COOPORG)44. Second, two dummies identify 
the acquisition of relevant information from other firms (INFOFIRM) and from 
universities or private research institutes (INFOORG)45. These outcome variables capture 
whether policy interventions, through an explicit support and/or by allowing firms to face 
the cost of collaborating with external actors, enhance beneficiaries' networking and 
effective interactions with both other firms and research organisations. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Italian regional policies 
The additionality evaluation of the Italian regional policies is carried out on a sample of 
2,006 manufacturing firms (599 supported and 1,407 potential controls). Considering a 
hypothetical benchmark situation in which the policy intervention is able to induce 
positive and significant effects with respect to all the additionality indicators considered, 
regional policies in Italy, during the analysed period, are characterised by a low level of 
effectiveness. Indeed, as it emerges from Tab. 1, Italian regional programmes have a 
number of non significant and also negative impacts.  
At first, it is possible to notice the absence of input additionality. An explanation 
for this result can be found in the low scale of the regional interventions and their focus 
on less formalised innovation activities (Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Barbieri et al. 
2010). The greater attention on small scale, less formalised, and neither particularly 
                                                            
44 COOPFIRM is “exploded” in different dummies, capturing cooperation agreements with 
national (COOPGPNAT) and foreign firms belonging to the same group (COOPGPFOR); national 
(COOPSUPNAT) and foreign suppliers (COOPSUPFOR); national (COOPCUSNAT) and foreign 
customers (COOPCUSFOR); national (COOPCOMNAT) and foreign competitors 
(COOPCOMFOR). Similarly COOPORG is further specified to capture the cooperation with: 
national (COOPINSNAT) and foreign private R&D institutes and commercial labs 
(COOPINSFOR); national (COOPUNINAT) and foreign universities (COOPUNIFOR); national 
(COOPPUBNAT) and foreign governmental agencies or public research institutes 
(COOPPUBFOR). ATT estimations for these specific types of cooperation are provided in the 
Appendix. 
45 These dummies are created from the four-point likert scales, included in the CIS4 dataset, that 
indicate the importance of different sources of  information for the firm’s innovation activities. 
The dummies take value 1 if the relevance of the information is “medium” or “high”. INFOFIRM 
captures information coming from suppliers (INFOSUP), customers (INFOCUS) and competitors 
(INFOCOM). INFOORG includes information sourcing from universities (INFOUNI) and private 
research institutes (INFOINS). ATT estimations for these specific types of information sourcing 
are provided in the Appendix. 
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disruptive nor exploratory innovation projects seems to affect the overall additionality 
profile of the Italian regional support schemes.  
 
Tab. 1 Additionality of the regional policies in Italy 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim  
   ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
Input add. 
RDEXP 42295.320 67483.270 43382.720 67180.760 23791.990 47706.630 45794.740 71086.020
RDINT 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Output add. 
PRODINNO -0.047 * 0.028 -0.058 ** 0.029 -0.050 ** 0.023 -0.063 ** 0.031 
PROCINNO 0.122 *** 0.031 0.118 *** 0.029 0.111 *** 0.023 0.133 *** 0.033 
TURNMAR 0.002 0.013 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.010 0.002 0.013 
TURNIN -0.021 ** 0.010 -0.025 ** 0.010 -0.016 * 0.009 -0.022 * 0.012 
TURNINO -0.019 0.017 -0.028 * 0.016 -0.017 0.013 -0.019 0.015 
PROPAT -0.023 0.026 -0.019 0.025 -0.007 0.020 -0.021 0.025 
Behavioural add. 
TRAINENG -0.046 * 0.025 -0.046 * 0.027 -0.043 * 0.022 -0.052 * 0.027 
COOPFIRM -0.028 0.020 -0.028 0.018 -0.015 0.013 -0.040 ** 0.019 
COOPORG -0.019 0.016 -0.019 0.016 -0.012 0.013 -0.028 * 0.017 
INFOFIRM -0.059 *** 0.022 -0.065 *** 0.024 -0.043 ** 0.020 -0.065 *** 0.023 
INFOORG 0.097 *** 0.029 0.101 *** 0.028 0.097 *** 0.027 0.095 *** 0.031 
N treat. on support 598 598 598 570 
N treated total 599 599 599 599 
N non treated 1407 1407 1407 1407 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
As for the output additionality, regional policies give the impression of inducing a 
sort of shift in the type of innovations introduced. With respect to similar non supported 
firms, funded companies are more likely (from +11.1% to +13.3%) to achieve a process 
innovation, but less likely to introduce a new or improved product (from -4.7% to -6.3%). 
This lower propensity is also reflected in the proportion of turnover due to incremental 
product innovations, which is found to be negatively affected by the public support (from 
-1.6% to -2.5%).  
The evidence emerging from the behavioural additionality evaluation confirms 
the general low performance of the regional innovation policies in Italy. Public 
interventions initiated by regional governments are unable to sustain firms’ formalised 
learning process. The likelihood of being engaged in training programmes is lower for 
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supported firms than for similar non funded companies (from -4.3% to -5.2%). Looking 
at the impact on the networking activities and considering the engagement in cooperation 
agreements, funded firms are generally not statistically different from non funded ones46. 
Coming to the capacity of the policy interventions to stimulate firms’ external knowledge 
sourcing it is possible to notice, on the one hand, a positive effect on the propensity to 
acquire relevant information from research organisations (from +9.5% to +10.1%). On 
the other hand, funded firms are less engaged in information sourcing from other 
companies (form -4.3% to -6.5%)47. 
As it emerges from Tab. A6 in the Appendix, Italian regional policies are not 
characterised by a significant correlation between the average impacts of the interventions 
and the dispersion of the effects. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, even if 
negative, is not significant. Hence, the magnitude of the ATTs is not related to the 
polarisation of the impacts across the beneficiaries.  
 
4.2 Italian national policies  
Tab. 2 reports the results concerning the impact of the interventions initiated by the 
central government in Italy. The evaluation, based on a sample of 1,845 firms (438 
supported and 1,407 potential controls), points to an additionality profile which is largely 
different from that of the regional policies.  
At first, it is possible to notice that, differently from the regional interventions, 
Italian national policies are characterised by input additionality effects. The larger public 
support devoted to formal innovation activities (Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Barbieri et 
al. 2010) stimulates an additional private investment in R&D. The effect on the single 
supported firms ranges from + 427,914.1 Euros to + 447,613.6 Euros; this is reflected in 
the increased intensity of firms’ R&D investment (from +0.6% to +0.7%).  
However, the higher investment in formal innovation activities does not result in 
an increased capacity to introduce product and patentable innovations. Even if funded 
firms, with respect to similar non supported ones, have a higher propensity to introduce 
                                                            
46 Funded companies are less likely to be engaged in collaboration with national competitors (see 
Tab. A2 in the Appendix).  
47 Looking at the different types of information sourcing (see Tab. A2 in the Appendix) it is 
possible to notice the higher propensity of funded firms to acquire relevant knowledge from 
private R&D institutes. On the contrary, supported companies are less likely to obtain relevant 
information from universities and suppliers. 
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new or improved processes (from +8.3% to + 9.6%), no significant effect is found for the 
other output additionality indicators.  
 
Tab. 2 Additionality of the national policies in Italy     
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
Some further effects on the capacity of funded firms’ to achieve more radical 
innovation outputs might emerge in a longer-term, especially considering the changes on 
firms’ innovation behaviour that are induced by the public interventions. In particular, 
Italian national policies are found to increase funded firms’ propensity to engage in R&D 
cooperation with both other firms (from +4.9% to +5.2%) and, to a larger extent, with 
research partners (from +10.3% to 11.6%)48. This positive effect is also reflected in an 
increased information sourcing from universities and private R&D institutes (from 
                                                            
48  As it emerges from Tab. A3 in the Appendix, Italian national policies enhances the propensity 
to cooperate with national and global suppliers, national private R&D institutes and national 
universities. 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim  
  ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
Input add. 
RDEXP 429066.1 * 238670.7 427914.1 * 228623.0 447613.6 ** 218544.8 313001 261069.2 
RDINT 0.007 ** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 
Output add. 
PRODINNO 0.004 0.034 0.005 0.034 0.006 0.025 0.000 0.033 
PROCINNO 0.086 ** 0.036 0.086 ** 0.035 0.096 *** 0.027 0.083 ** 0.037 
TURNMAR -0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.015 -0.005 0.010 -0.002 0.013 
TURNIN 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.012 
TURNINO 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.018 
PROPAT 0.047 0.030 0.048 0.031 0.061 *** 0.024 0.041 0.030 
Behavioural add. 
TRAINENG 0.007 0.032 0.005 0.033 0.010 0.029 -0.002 0.032 
COOPFIRM 0.051 ** 0.026 0.050 * 0.026 0.052 *** 0.019 0.049 ** 0.023 
COOPORG 0.104 *** 0.027 0.103 *** 0.025 0.116 *** 0.022 0.108 *** 0.024 
INFOFIRM -0.010 0.025 -0.009 0.027 -0.015 0.022 -0.014 0.026 
INFOORG 0.113 *** 0.035 0.112 *** 0.036 0.108 *** 0.027 0.111 *** 0.038 
N treat. on support 433 433 433 417 
N treated total 438 438 438 438 
N non treated 1407 1407 1407 1407 
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+10.8% to +11.3%)49. In general terms, with respect to the capacity to enhance funded 
firms’ interactions, national policies are found to be significantly more effective than the 
regional ones. This might be due to two possible factors. On the one hand, a higher 
support, which can also take the form of explicit requirement, to collaborate with research 
organisations or (also through temporary consortia) with other firms. On the other hand, 
the larger scale, scope and aim of the projects funded by the Italian national policies 
(Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Barbieri et al. 2010) might induce firms to look for 
necessary assets, both tangible and intangible, which are located outside their boundaries.  
All in all, the joint analysis of the additionality effects induced by the national 
and the regional interventions also allows for a general consideration about the 
consistency of the Italian multi-level system of policy. The emerging picture is that of a 
largely dissonant relation between the national policies, which appear as the only capable 
of inducing a broad set of significant positive effects, and the regional programmes, 
whose contribution is basically none and in some case a negative. 
Finally, the results emerging from the additionality evaluation of the Italian 
national policies are associated to an interesting relation between the average impacts and 
their dispersion. A Spearman’s rank’s correlation coefficient of -0.8462 (See Tab. A6 in 
the Appendix), reflects a situation in which the ATTs are negatively related to the 
corresponding coefficients of variation. In other terms, the highest average additionality 
effects are characterised by the lowest polarisations. 
 
4.3  Spanish regional policies 
Tab. 3 reports the results pertaining to the additionality evaluation of the regional policies 
implemented in Spain. This is carried out on a sample of 4,110 firms (879 supported and 
3,231 potential controls).  
As far as the input additionality is concerned, like in the case of the Italian 
policies initiated at the regional level, no significant effect is found to be in place. This is 
probably due to the low scale of the contributions granted by the regional governments 
and the greater focus on less formalised innovation activities (Garcia-Quevedo and 
Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Afcha-Chávez, 2011).  
However, considering the output and the behavioural additionality effects, the 
results point to a higher effectiveness of the Spanish regional interventions when 
                                                            
49 See Tab. A3 in the Appendix for a detail. 
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compared to the Italian ones. Despite the absence of impacts on the allocation of formal 
innovation inputs, Spanish regional support schemes enhance the probability to introduce 
product innovations (from +3.8% to +3.9%), in particular radical and commercially 
valuable ones. Indeed, supported firms, with respect to similar non funded companies, are 
characterised by a higher percentage of turnover due to radical product innovations (from 
+1.5% to +1.8%). This higher innovation performance is coupled with a higher 
propensity to file patent applications (from +6.0% to +7.2%).  
As for the behavioural additionality, Spanish regional policies are found to induce 
a large set of changes in the supported companies. On the one hand, regional policy 
schemes enhance beneficiaries’ learning process, increasing supported firms’ propensity 
to implement formal training programmes (from +4.8% to +6.1%). On the other hand, 
Spanish regional policies stimulate effective interactions with external sources of 
knowledge. In particular, policy programmes enhance firms’ attitude to cooperate with 
both other firms (from +7.3% to +7.5%) and research organisations (from +9.6% to 
+10.3%)50. Furthermore, it is noticeable an increase in the propensity of funded firms to 
acquire relevant knowledge from research partners (from +10.5% to 12.1%)51.  
The comparison between the results concerning the Spanish regional policies and 
the additionality profile of the regional interventions implemented in Italy points to an 
interesting difference. As said before, in both the countries regional interventions are 
characterised by a small scale and a greater support to less formalised innovation inputs. 
Due to this, both in Italy and Spain, regional policies are unable to stimulate an additional 
investment in R&D. Nevertheless, in Spain this does not affect the capacity to realise 
other forms of additionality. With this respect, it seems plausible that Spanish regional 
policies, by targeting (with success) the achievement of important behavioural changes, 
overcome the lack of input additionality and increase the capacity of funded firms to 
obtain more radical product innovations and patents. Hence, at least with respect to this 
specific case, it seems that the lack of input additionality, per se, does not completely 
hamper the effect of the public support on the outputs of the innovation process, 
especially when significant behavioural changes are stimulated by the policy. 
 
 
                                                            
50 In particular, Spanish regional interventions increase funded firms’ propensity to cooperate with 
a broad range of national partners (i.e. firms belonging to the same group, suppliers, competitors, 
private R&D institutes, universities and public research organisations) (See Tab. A4 in Appendix). 
51 From both private R&D institutes and universities (See Tab. A4 in the Appendix).   
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Tab. 3 Additionality of the regional policies in Spain 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim  
  ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
Input add. 
RDEXP -5305.556 34001.730 -5352.441 34923.640 17351.620 20613.090 -7059.569 35644.120
RDINT 0.154 0.151 0.154 0.147 0.156 0.139 0.161 0.147 
Output add. 
PRODINNO 0.038 * 0.022 0.039 * 0.023 0.039 * 0.021 0.038 0.025 
PROCINNO 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.042 ** 0.019 0.023 0.026 
TURNMAR 0.017 * 0.009 0.017 * 0.009 0.015 ** 0.007 0.018 ** 0.008 
TURNIN 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.013 
TURNINO 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.015 
PROPAT 0.068 *** 0.020 0.068 *** 0.020 0.060 *** 0.016 0.072 *** 0.021 
Behavioural add. 
TRAINENG 0.048 ** 0.023 0.048 ** 0.022 0.061 *** 0.018 0.048 ** 0.024 
COOPFIRM 0.073 *** 0.021 0.075 *** 0.020 0.073 *** 0.015 0.073 *** 0.019 
COOPORG 0.099 *** 0.018 0.099 *** 0.016 0.103 *** 0.013 0.096 *** 0.017 
INFOFIRM 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.020 
INFOORG 0.105 *** 0.021 0.105 *** 0.022 0.121 *** 0.019 0.115 *** 0.023 
N treat. on support 876 874 876 836 
N treated total 879 879 879 879 
N non treated 3231 3231 3231 3231 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
Finally, like in the case of the Italian national policies, also the Spanish regional 
programmes are characterised by a negative Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (i.e.  
-0.6593, see Tab. A6 in the Appendix). This denotes a negative relation between the 
ATTs and the dispersion of the effects. In other terms, the higher is the average 
additionality of the policy, the lower is the polarisation of the impact across the 
beneficiaries. 
 
 4.4 Spanish national policies 
The results of the additionality evaluation presented in Tab. 4 pertain to the policies 
implemented by the Spanish central government. In this case the sample is made of 3,795 
firms (564 treated and 3,231 potential controls).  
Like in the Italian case, input additionality effects are found to be in place only 
when the national interventions are considered. Also in Spain, national policies are 
characterised by a larger scale and a greater support to formal innovation activities, when 
71 
 
compared to regional interventions (Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Afcha-
Chávez, 2011). This results in the capacity of the national programmes to stimulate an 
additional investment in intramural R&D (from + 354,036.2 Euros to + 371,922.7 Euros). 
However, a similar positive effect is not found for the intensity of the R&D investment.  
 
Tab. 4 Additionality of the national policies in Spain 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim  
   ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
Input add. 
RDEXP 367677.1 ** 162523.3 371922.7 ** 164501.7 359347.8 *** 132797.8 354036.2 ** 156419.1
RDINT 0.071 0.049 0.072 0.046 0.075 0.054 0.074 0.050 
Output add. 
PRODINNO 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.028 0.014 0.022 0.015 0.030 
PROCINNO 0.022 0.030 0.026 0.028 0.037 0.023 0.012 0.029 
TURNMAR 0.037 *** 0.011 0.038 *** 0.012 0.040 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.011 
TURNIN -0.013 0.015 -0.012 0.016 -0.018 0.013 -0.009 0.015 
TURNINO 0.024 0.019 0.026 0.018 0.022 0.015 0.032 * 0.019 
PROPAT 0.059 ** 0.025 0.062 *** 0.023 0.064 *** 0.020 0.073 *** 0.025 
Behavioural add. 
TRAINENG 0.060 ** 0.030 0.061 ** 0.031 0.051 ** 0.026 0.060 * 0.032 
COOPFIRM 0.086 *** 0.026 0.086 *** 0.029 0.081 *** 0.020 0.081 *** 0.025 
COOPORG 0.111 *** 0.021 0.113 *** 0.023 0.110 *** 0.019 0.105 *** 0.023 
INFOFIRM 0.061 *** 0.024 0.061 *** 0.023 0.050 *** 0.018 0.070 *** 0.024 
INFOORG 0.100 *** 0.026 0.100 *** 0.028 0.116 *** 0.021 0.101 *** 0.028 
N treat. on support 564 564 564 536 
N treated total 564 564 564 564 
N non treated 3231 3231 3231 3231 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
In terms of output additionality effects, national policies are similar to the 
regional ones. With respect to similar non funded companies, supported firms are 
characterised by a higher percentage of turnover due to radical product innovations (from 
+3.7% to +4.0%) and a higher propensity to file patent applications (from + 5.9% to 
+7.3%).  
In addition to this, a number of behavioural changes seem to be induced by the 
public support. At first, funded firms are more likely to implement training programmes 
(from +5.1% to +6.0%). Looking at the impacts on the interactions of supported 
companies, national policies enhance the propensity to cooperate with both research 
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organisations (from +10.5% to +11.3%) and other firms (from +8.1% to +8.6%)52. This 
increased attitude to interact with business and research partners is associated to the 
higher propensity to acquire relevant information from both other firms (from +5.0% to 
+7.0%) and research organisations (from +10.0% to +11.6%)53. 
All in all, joining the results concerning the national policies to those pertaining 
to the regional interventions, there emerges the clear consistency of the Spanish multi-
level system of policy. The two levels of intervention here analysed are indeed inducing 
similar behavioural and output additionality effects on the beneficiaries.  
Finally, also in the case of the Spanish national policies, the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient is negative and significant (i.e. -0.6099, see Tab. A6, in the 
Appendix), meaning that the ATTs are negatively related to the corresponding 
coefficients of variation. Hence, the higher is the average additionality effect the lower is 
the dispersion of the policy impact. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
The paper, focusing on Italy and Spain, has analysed the additionality of the public 
support to firms’ innovation activities. To this purpose, a multi-dimensional approach and 
a multi-level perspective have been adopted. The former has allowed for the investigation 
of the three additionality dimensions. With this respect, the paper has demonstrated that 
public interventions can have different types of effects on firms’ innovation activities: 
policies can affect the allocation of innovation inputs, the achievement of innovation 
outputs and induce changes in the innovation behaviours. The multi-level perspective has 
allowed for analysing the impact of both the national and the regional interventions 
implemented in the two countries. With this respect, the evidence has pointed to two 
distinct pictures. Italian policies are found to be characterised by a largely dissonant 
relation between national interventions, which are capable of inducing a relatively large 
set of significant positive effects, and regional support schemes, whose impact is very 
low and in some case a negative. In Spain, on the contrary, the two levels of intervention 
                                                            
52 From Tab. A5 in the Appendix, it is possible to notice a positive effects on firms’ propensity to 
cooperate with national firms in the same group, national suppliers, national and foreign 
competitors. As for the cooperation with research organisations, national policies increase the 
propensity to cooperate with national public and private R&D institutes and national universities. 
53 In particular, from customers, private R&D institutes and universities (See Tab. A5 in the 
Appendix). 
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are found to be more consistent, stimulating similar output and behavioural additionality 
effects. 
Moving to the specific impacts of the different types of public support schemes 
analysed in the paper, some interesting results are worth mentioning in these concluding 
remarks. At first, both in Italy and in Spain, regional policies are not characterised by 
input additionality effects. Considering the characteristics of the interventions initiated at 
the sub-national level, it seems that input additionality cannot emerge when policies are 
characterised by a low amount of public contribution and a greater support to less 
formalised innovation activities. However, in Spain, the lack of input additionality of the 
regional policies is associated to a good performance in the other additionality 
dimensions. This evidence contrasts the standard linear innovation model, according to 
which higher innovation outputs can be achieved only by increasing the allocation of 
innovation inputs. In fact, at least in the case of Spanish regional policies, it seems 
plausible that the capacity to target (successfully) important behavioural changes might 
compensate for the lack of an additional investment in R&D and lead to obtain higher 
innovation outputs. This is not the case for the Italian regional interventions, which are 
characterised by a general weak effectiveness. The reason for such a result, however, 
deserves a deeper investigation, which has necessarily to consider two aspects. On the 
one hand, the heterogeneity of the regional policies, and thus of their effects. On the other 
hand, the fact that the period considered in this analysis (2002-2004) is only immediately 
subsequent to the 2001 reform of the Italian Constitution that gave to regions a substantial 
autonomy in terms of innovation policy.  
Another interesting aspect emerged in the analysis pertains to the substantial 
differences between the output additionality of Italian and Spanish policies. Whereas the 
former are characterised only by the capacity to stimulate process innovation, the latter 
are found to enhance the economic exploitation of the radical innovations introduced and 
patent applications. In this sense, the Italian multi-level system of policy, at least in the 
considered period, does not seem to be able to trigger a quality leap in the performances 
of the overall national innovation system.  
A third aspect emerged through the paper, which justifies the adoption of a multi-
dimensional approach that extends the analysis beyond the input and output additionality, 
is the spectrum of behavioural changes induced by the public support schemes. Italian 
national policies are found to stimulate funded firms to interact more with other 
companies and research organisations. In addition to this, Spanish policies, both regional 
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and national, are found to affect firms’ learning process by increasing their engagement in 
formal training programmes aimed at upgrading employees’ competencies.  
The paper has provided also a tentative analysis of the relation between the 
average impact of the public intervention and the dispersion of the effect across the 
beneficiaries. In so doing, the present work has tried to investigate whether the average 
level of additionality is associated to the presence of a large share of individual effects 
that are located well below or above the mean impact. From the analysis of the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, with the only exception of the Italian regional 
policy, the rank of the ATTs is found to be negatively related to rank of the coefficients 
of variation. In other terms, the higher is the average impact of the policy, the lower is the 
polarisation of the effect across the beneficiaries. Of course, this evidence cannot point to 
general policy implications in absence of other similar studies that extend the external 
validity of such a result.  
This work has not been free from limitations. A relevant one is due to the cross-
sectional nature of the data. On the one hand, this has hampered the possibility to capture 
long-term effects. On the other hand, this has limited the possibility to overcome 
(completely) the problems due to the potential endogeneity of the participation in the 
policy. Indeed, the availability of panel data, or at least of lagged variables for the public 
support, would have improved the additionality evaluation, by allowing for a more 
complete assessment of the causal relation between the public funding and the 
additionality effects. In particular, specific methods could have been employed to account 
also for the potential bias arising from the omission of unobservable characteristics (e.g. 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
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Appendix    
 
Tab. A1 Probit estimation of the propensity scores 
FUNLOC – Italy FUNGMT – Italy FUNLOC – Spain FUNGMT – Spain  
  Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E.  
SMALL 0.185 0.159 -0.234 0.164 0.535 *** 0.101 -0.325 *** 0.095 
MEDIUM 0.330 *** 0.123 -0.119 0.116 0.381 *** 0.096 -0.271 *** 0.086 
lnTURN02 -0.029 0.034 0.066 * 0.038 0.009 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.006 
GP -0.250 *** 0.085 -0.002 0.088 -0.008 0.064 0.288 *** 0.067 
MNC -0.295 ** 0.125 -0.346 *** 0.116 -0.203 ** 0.093 -0.419 *** 0.093 
EXPORT -0.005 0.075 -0.004 0.088 0.011 0.055 0.053 0.070 
RDENG 0.125 0.082 -0.035 0.096 0.215 *** 0.065 0.280 *** 0.086 
RDCONT 0.295 *** 0.077 0.397 *** 0.089 0.069 0.063 0.357 *** 0.076 
HFENT2 0.036 0.083 0.079 0.091 0.147 ** 0.063 -0.014 0.072 
HFENT3 0.083 0.100 -0.148 0.117 0.057 0.073 -0.079 0.087 
HFOUT2 0.104 0.085 0.196 ** 0.094 0.076 0.063 0.074 0.074 
HFOUT3 -0.311 *** 0.099 -0.059 0.111 -0.035 0.071 -0.037 0.086 
SPRO2 0.255 *** 0.085 0.106 0.093 0.116 0.060 -0.062 0.073 
SPRO3 0.551 *** 0.134 0.117 0.159 -0.069 0.116 0.077 0.126 
SGMT2 -0.056 0.192 0.667 *** 0.161 0.374 *** 0.093 0.496 *** 0.100 
SGMT3 0.294 0.249 0.148 0.271 0.702 *** 0.197 0.576 *** 0.218 
CONST. -0.346 0.640 -1.603 ** 0.715 -1.494 *** 0.194 -1.174 *** 0.219 
Sectoral 
dummies  Included Included Included  Included 
N 2006 1845 4110 3795 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.077 0.039 0.098 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. A VIF test leads to exclude the 
multicollinearity of the covariates (all the VIF values are lower than 10) 
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Tab. A2 Behavioural additionality effects on firms’ interactions. Italian regional policies 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim 
   ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
COOPGPNAT -0.010 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.009 0.006 -0.013 0.008 
COOPGPFOR 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005 
COOPSUPNAT -0.016 0.016 -0.016 0.015 -0.005 0.013 -0.024 0.017 
COOPSUPFOR 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 
COOPCUSNAT -0.021 0.014 -0.021 * 0.012 -0.011 0.009 -0.027 ** 0.011 
COOPCUSFOR -0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.010 0.008 
COOPCOMNAT -0.026 ** 0.012 -0.026 ** 0.010 -0.012 0.009 -0.031 *** 0.011 
COOPCOMFOR -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.006 
COOPINSNAT -0.010 0.014 -0.010 0.014 -0.005 0.012 -0.017 0.014 
COOPINSFOR 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
COOPUNINAT -0.013 0.012 -0.013 0.012 -0.012 0.010 -0.018 0.013 
COOPUNIFOR 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 
COOPPUBNAT -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
COOPPUBFOR 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 
INFOSUP -0.053 * 0.030 -0.059 * 0.030 -0.041 * 0.024 -0.053 * 0.030 
INFOCUS -0.005 0.031 0.000 0.034 0.008 0.027 -0.010 0.033 
INFOCOM -0.009 0.028 -0.004 0.031 0.008 0.025 -0.020 0.030 
INFOINS 0.114 *** 0.029 0.119 *** 0.030 0.116 *** 0.024 0.118 *** 0.029 
INFOUNI -0.039 ** 0.019 -0.038 ** 0.019 -0.033 ** 0.013 -0.040 ** 0.017 
N treat. on support 598 598 598 570 
N treated total 599 599 599 599 
N non treated 1407 1407 1407 1407 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Tab. A3 Behavioural additionality effects on firms’ interactions. Italian national policies 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim 
  ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
COOPGPNAT 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.015 
COOPGPFOR 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.009 -0.003 0.009 
COOPSUPNAT 0.046 ** 0.020 0.045 ** 0.023 0.049 *** 0.018 0.046 ** 0.023 
COOPSUPFOR 0.014 ** 0.007 0.014 ** 0.007 0.013 * 0.007 0.012 * 0.007 
COOPCUSNAT 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.022 0.014 0.015 0.016 
COOPCUSFOR 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.011 
COOPCOMNAT 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.014 
COOPCOMFOR -0.004 0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.006 -0.007 0.007 
COOPINSNAT 0.072 *** 0.024 0.070 *** 0.021 0.081 *** 0.020 0.076 *** 0.022 
COOPINSFOR 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 
COOPUNINAT 0.093 *** 0.025 0.093 *** 0.023 0.103 *** 0.021 0.096 *** 0.023 
COOPUNIFOR 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006 
COOPPUBNAT 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.017 * 0.010 0.020 * 0.011 
COOPPUBFOR 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
INFOSUP -0.005 0.034 -0.004 0.034 -0.007 0.027 -0.004 0.035 
INFOCUS 0.028 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.019 0.030 0.036 0.034 
INFOCOM 0.006 0.033 0.004 0.033 0.003 0.029 0.016 0.032 
INFOINS 0.100 *** 0.034 0.099 *** 0.033 0.094 *** 0.028 0.111 *** 0.037 
INFOUNI 0.063 ** 0.026 0.062 ** 0.027 0.070 *** 0.021 0.059 ** 0.027 
N treat. on support 433 433 433 417 
N treated total 438 438 438 438 
N non treated 1407 1407 1407 1407 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
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Tab. A4 Behavioural additionality effects on firms’interactions. Spanish regional policies 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim 
ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
COOPGPNAT 0.018 ** 0.009 0.019 ** 0.008 0.016 ** 0.007 0.018 ** 0.008 
COOPGPFOR -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.007 
COOPSUPNAT 0.039 *** 0.014 0.041 *** 0.015 0.041 *** 0.012 0.037 ** 0.015 
COOPSUPFOR 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.010 
COOPCUSNAT 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.011 
COOPCUSFOR 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.008 
COOPCOMNAT 0.016 * 0.009 0.018 * 0.010 0.018 ** 0.008 0.019 ** 0.009 
COOPCOMFOR 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 
COOPINSNAT 0.053 *** 0.012 0.053 *** 0.013 0.053 *** 0.011 0.052 *** 0.012 
COOPINSFOR 0.009 * 0.005 0.010 * 0.005 0.008 * 0.005 0.008 0.005 
COOPUNINAT 0.057 *** 0.013 0.058 *** 0.014 0.061 *** 0.012 0.055 *** 0.013 
COOPUNIFOR -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
COOPPUBNAT 0.016 ** 0.007 0.015 ** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.007 
COOPPUBFOR 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
INFOSUP 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.024 0.022 0.018 0.012 0.024 
INFOCUS 0.027 0.024 0.029 0.023 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.024 
INFOCOM 0.010 0.022 0.012 0.024 0.001 0.016 0.009 0.025 
INFOINS 0.052 ** 0.020 0.053 ** 0.021 0.065 *** 0.018 0.062 *** 0.020 
INFOUNI 0.055 *** 0.016 0.056 *** 0.017 0.065 *** 0.015 0.062 *** 0.017 
N treat. on support 876 874 876 836 
N treated total 879 879 879 879 
N non treated 3231 3231 3231 3231 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
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Tab. A5 Behavioural additionality effects on firms’interactions. Spanish national policies 
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim 
   ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
COOPGPNAT 0.029 ** 0.014 0.029 * 0.015 0.026 ** 0.012 0.023 0.014 
COOPGPFOR 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013 
COOPSUPNAT 0.059 *** 0.020 0.059 *** 0.019 0.052 ** 0.017 0.057 *** 0.018 
COOPSUPFOR 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.014 
COOPCUSNAT 0.025 0.016 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.028 0.017 
COOPCUSFOR 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.011 
COOPCOMNAT 0.029 ** 0.013 0.029 ** 0.012 0.026 ** 0.010 0.027 ** 0.011 
COOPCOMFOR 0.022 ** 0.009 0.022 ** 0.010 0.021 *** 0.007 0.022 ** 0.010 
COOPINSNAT 0.053 *** 0.017 0.053 *** 0.019 0.054 *** 0.015 0.048 *** 0.016 
COOPINSFOR 0.016 * 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.015 * 0.008 0.008 0.009 
COOPUNINAT 0.086 *** 0.021 0.088 *** 0.020 0.090 *** 0.017 0.082 *** 0.019 
COOPUNIFOR 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 
COOPPUBNAT 0.020 * 0.011 0.020 * 0.010 0.020 ** 0.010 0.015 0.010 
COOPPUBFOR 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
INFOSUP 0.054 * 0.028 0.057 0.029 0.035 0.022 0.056 * 0.030 
INFOCUS 0.058 ** 0.028 0.062 ** 0.027 0.054 ** 0.023 0.064 ** 0.034 
INFOCOM 0.041 0.027 0.036 0.030 0.025 0.023 0.035 0.029 
INFOINS 0.055 ** 0.024 0.055 ** 0.026 0.059 *** 0.022 0.059 ** 0.028 
INFOUNI 0.075 *** 0.024 0.079 *** 0.022 0.088 *** 0.020 0.068 *** 0.026 
N treat. on support 564 564 564 536 
N treated total 564 564 564 564 
N non treated 3231 3231 3231 3231 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
Tab. A6 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (on the main set of additionality indicators) 
Policy level and country Spearman's rho Prob>|t| N. additionality indicators 
Italian regional policies -0.2527 0.4048 13 
Italian national policies -0.8462*** 0.0003 13 
Spanish regional policies -0.6593** 0.0142 13 
Spanish national policies -0.6099** 0.0269 13 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% 
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Tab. A7 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (including specific types of cooperation and 
information sourcing) 
Policy level and country Spearman's rho Prob>|t| N. additionality indicators 
Italian regional policies 0.1373 0.4536 32 
Italian national policies -0.7232*** 0.0000 32 
Spanish regional policies -0.5876*** 0.0004 32 
Spanish national policies -0.3845** 0.0298 32 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% 
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4 
The effects of a R&D subsidy on firms’ innovation behaviour. 
The case of the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy * 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper aims at identifying the extent to which regional innovation policy affect firms’ 
innovation behaviour. Some research hypotheses are put forward. At first, the policy support is 
supposed to induce relevant changes in the beneficiaries' behaviour, which can help to solve 
potential regional system failures. Moreover, an increasing amount of regional subsidy is expected 
to enhance the geographical range of the cooperation with research organisations. These 
hypotheses are tested with respect to a sample of firms located in the Emilia-Romagna region of 
Italy, by making use of a unique dataset including information on pre-policy characteristics and 
post-policy behaviours. A set of propensity score matching procedures and a generalised 
propensity score method are applied. At first, the policy is found to enhance the competencies 
upgrading of the beneficiaries, as well as their interactions with both regional and extra-regional 
research organisations. Furthermore, the amount of subsidy is found to be important to extend 
beyond the regional borders the cooperation with research partners: over a minimum efficient scale 
of public funding, an increase in the subsidy enhances the propensity to cooperate with extra-
regional universities and research institutes. 
 
1 Introduction  
In the last decades, a large amount of academic research has analysed the impact of 
location and geographical aspects on innovation activities and performances (e.g. Asheim 
and Gertler, 2005). This has inspired a number of academic contributions that deal with 
regional innovation policy objectives and rationale, mainly adopting an evolutionary 
approach and/or a system-kind of perspective (e.g. Lambooy and Boschma, 2001; 
                                                            
* The author gratefully acknowledges Silvano Bertini (Head of the Economic Development 
Department of the Emilia-Romagna Region) and Davide Antonioli (Faculty of Economics, 
University of Ferrara) for their kind support in gathering information and data. The financial 
support of Emilia-Romagna Region for the survey data collection is also acknowledged. 
Preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at the 2011 EUNIP International Workshop 
on Evaluating Innovation Policies - Methods and Applications (Florence, Italy), 2011 Conference 
of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (Vienna, Austria) and INGENIO 
(CSIC-UPV) 2011 Seminar Series (Valencia, Spain). The author thanks the participants to these 
events for the comments and suggestions. The usual caveats apply. 
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Boschma, 2005b; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005; Laranja et al., 2008; Uyarra, 2010). This 
increased attention to the regional level of innovation policy is not confined to the 
academic research: it has also resulted in the definition of a number of support schemes 
and strategies (e.g. European Commision, 2001, 2011; Walendowski et al., 2010).  
Due to the upraising relevance of the regional innovation policy, the investigation 
of its impact is fundamentally important. First, to complement the academic literature that 
is concerned with the rationale and objectives of the regional support to innovation. 
Second, to contribute to the policy-learning process, thus allowing for a better 
implementation of future policy interventions. Although the evaluation of innovation 
policy is a diverse research field (e.g. Edler et al., 2010), the present paper is focused on a 
specific type of impact assessment. In particular, it analyses the additionality effects of a 
regional R&D subsidy. In providing this analysis, it does not consider the standard input 
and output additionality dimensions, which are concerned with the effect of the policy on 
the R&D investment and the innovation performances, respectively (Georghiou and 
Clarysse, 2006). This paper is rather focused on a third dimension of the additionality: the 
behavioural one. This latter, introduced by Buiesseret et al. (1995), is consistent with the 
evolutionary approach and the innovation system perspective and allows for the 
evaluation of the policy impact on both firms' internal organisation and interactions with 
external actors.  
In particular, the present work analyses, at first, whether the public support to 
R&D stimulates changes in the firms’ behaviours that can help to reduce potential system 
failures (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009). In this sense, three types of 
behavioural additionality effects are considered. These pertain to: the improvement of 
firms’ learning process; the enhancement of networking activities and interactions; the 
acquisition of diverse knowledge and the consequent possibility to reduce the risk of 
lock-ins.     
Furthermore, the paper addresses another aspect that is still under-investigated in 
the literature on the innovation policy additionality. Instead of focusing only on the 
impact of the participation in a support scheme, it also analyses whether and to what 
extent an increasing amount of public support affects the behaviour of the beneficiaries. 
In particular, this analysis is aimed at gauging whether an additional amount of subsidy 
enlarges the geographical range of the cooperation with research organisations, allowing 
firms to collaborate with distant (i.e. extra-regional) and, possibly more advanced, 
universities and research institutes. This research interest has a twofold motivation in a 
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regional innovation system perspective. First, the importance of the interactions between 
the actors involved in knowledge generation and diffusion (e.g. universities and research 
institutes), and the actors involved in knowledge application and exploitation (e.g. firms) 
(e.g. Autio, 1998; Cooke, 2002). Second, the relevance of the cooperation with extra-
regional partners for enriching and complementing the regional knowledge base (e.g. 
Uyarra, 2010).  
The empirical investigation provided in the paper is focused on the innovation 
policy of the NUTS 2 Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. Among the different measures 
included in the Emilia-Romagna Regional Programme for the Industrial Research, 
Innovation and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT) the paper specifically analyses the R&D 
subsidy scheme. This latter has been previously evaluated in terms of input additionality 
by Bronzini and Iachini (2011), who find a certain positive effect for small firms but not 
for large ones. In the present work, the econometric analysis, which is based on an 
original dataset made of firm-level data deriving from an ad hoc survey and companies’ 
balance sheets, is carried out with two approaches. As for the comprehensive analysis of 
the behavioural changes induced by the policy, a set of propensity score matching 
estimations is employed. The effect of an additional amount of subsidy on the firms' 
cooperation strategy is estimated with a very recent method, i.e. the generalised 
propensity score (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). For a set of subsidy levels, this estimates the 
effect of an extra amount of public support on three cooperation strategies: no 
cooperation, cooperation with a regional research organisation, cooperation with an extra-
regional research partner. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a 
review of the relevant literature, which helps to identify a set of hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 provides a brief description of the regional context and the policy scheme. 
Section 4 deals with the econometric strategy and describes the characteristics of data and 
variables. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical investigation. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Background literature and hypotheses     
Despite the large attention devoted to the analysis of the input and output additionality 
dimensions, these are affected by the same limitations of the standard neoclassical 
approach they originate from. Focusing only on the allocation of resources to innovation 
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activities, input additionality evaluation does not consider the impact of the policy on the 
organisation, the strategic behaviour of the beneficiaries and the acquisition of knowledge 
and capabilities. Similarly, output additionality evaluation, relying on the strict linear 
relation between inputs (allocated with the support of the policy funding) and outputs, 
fails to take into account the complexity of the innovation process and to provide a proper 
investigation of the effects that occur within the “black-box” of the beneficiaries 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). 
To overcome these limitations the behavioural dimension of the additionality 
concept has been recently developed in the literature54. A first group of works analyses 
the behavioural additionality to complement the linear and strict nature of input 
additionality (Gök and Edler, 2010) with questions related to the scale and the scope of 
the funded R&D projects (e.g. Lukkonen, 2000) or considering also the acceleration of 
the innovation activities (e.g. Falk, 2007). However, the analysis of the behavioural 
additionality can be focused on more relevant changes in the behaviours of the agents 
supported by the policy. As it emerges from the seminal contribution by Buisseret et al. 
(1995), the evaluation of the behavioural additionality has to analyse "the change in a 
company's way of undertaking R&D which can be attributed to policy actions" (p. 590). 
In so doing, it is possible to open the 'black-box' of the beneficiaries (Clarysse et al. 2006; 
Hall and Maffioli, 2008) to investigate the impacts occurring within their innovation 
process. This perspective allows for considering the likely presence of profound impacts 
generated by the policy intervention. These impacts affect companies’ behaviour and 
strategy and cannot be captured by the simple input and output additionality dimensions 
(Buisseret et al., 1995; Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). Indeed, public support to 
innovation activities, as R&D subsidies, can induce a wide range of behavioural effects. 
First, by carrying out publicly funded R&D activities, supported firms can upgrade or 
acquire new competencies, capabilities and organisational routines (e.g. Falk, 2006; 
Magro et al., 2010; Marino and Parrotta, 2010). Second, R&D subsidies, through an 
explicit support or by supporting firms to face the intrinsic cost of collaborating with 
external actors, might also enhance beneficiaries' networking and interactions with both 
other firms and research organisations (e.g. Fier et al. 2006; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 
2008; Hall and Maffioli, 2008; Magro et al., 2010; Afcha Chavez, 2011). Third, the 
participation in R&D support schemes might induce firms to acquire competencies in 
                                                            
54 A complete review of the theoretical and empirical contributions dealing with the behavioural 
additionality of innovation policy is provided in the second Chapter of the present Thesis. 
85 
 
new or extended areas and technologies, which enhance the capacity to adapt to future 
unpredictable situations and thus the possibility to overcome potential lock-in positions 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). These behavioural additionality effects represent the 
capacity of the policy to overcome the system failures (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; 
Malerba, 2009) that occur (also) at the level of the beneficiaries: (i) problems in learning 
process and accumulation of capabilities, (ii) missing or inappropriate interactions, (iii) 
lock-ins due to unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs (between exploitation and exploration 
or between selection and variety).  
A comprehensive assessment of this capacity has not been provided yet in the 
literature. Existing empirical contributions are rather concentrated on a limited set of 
behavioural impacts, with the majority of them being focused on effects pertaining to the 
cooperation strategy of funded firms and to the upgrading of competencies, capabilities 
and human capital. That is not surprising though. Whereas it is quite straightforward to 
analyse these two types of effect with standard survey questions, it seems more 
complicated to assess whether the policy has helped to overcome eventual lock-ins. That 
because it is quite complex to provide a direct estimation of whether the policy has 
increased the capacity to explore new and less consolidated technological paths and to 
adapt to future unpredictable trajectories. Nevertheless, being focused on a regional 
innovation policy, a way out to capture, at least partly, this type of policy effect is that of 
adopting an Open Regional Innovation System (ORIS) perspective. This is focused on 
open innovation modes that overcome the boundaries of the organisation (Chesbrough, 
2003) but also the boundaries of the region (Belussi et al. 2010). In this viewpoint, the 
interactions with extra-regional actors, which are not subject to the same localised path-
dependencies, are expected to enhance knowledge generation and circulation (Bunnel and 
Coe, 2001; Bathelt et al., 2004), the renewal and the increasing diversity of the ideas 
within the local knowledge base (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Gertler and Levitte, 2005; 
Boschma and ter Wal, 2007; Uyarra, 2010). In this sense, by investigating whether the 
policy increases the cooperation with extra-regional partners, it is possible to analyse, at 
least partially, the impact of the public support on the possibility to explore diverse and 
less consolidated technological paths.  
All in all, given the likely presence of profound impacts on firms’ behaviour 
generated by the policy intervention, a first hypothesis can be tested through a proper and 
comprehensive operationalisation of the behavioural additionality evaluation.   
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HP 1: The public support to R&D stimulates changes in funded firms’ behaviour that 
might help to reduce potential system failures occurring at the level of the beneficiaries. 
As noted above, large part of the empirical contributions dealing with the 
behavioural additionality of R&D policies analyses the effect on the collaborations of the 
beneficiaries. This is actually an extremely relevant impact due to the beneficial effects of 
being engaged in R&D cooperation: the minimisation of transaction costs involving 
intangible assets and tacit knowledge; the possibility to share risks, costs and to exploit 
economies of scale and scope; the internalisation of knowledge spillovers; the  possibility 
to access to external complementary tangible and intangible resources; the opportunity to 
improve learning capabilities (e.g. Hagerdoorn et al. 2000; Caloghirou et al. 2003; Busom 
and Fernández-Ribas, 2008). In addition to this, collaborations with research 
organisations enhance the possibility to draw on new scientific knowledge that is 
particularly fundamental for qualitatively advanced and/or radical innovations (e.g. 
Tödling et al., 2009).  
However, when dealing in particular with regional innovation policies, the effect 
on the propensity of supported companies to cooperate with research organisations 
deserves a further analysis. This should be aimed at capturing whether the public 
intervention enhances the collaborations with regional or extra-regional universities and 
research institutes. Indeed, as it emerges from Belussi et al. (2010), who focus on the life-
science industry of the same Emilia-Romagna region, collaborations with distant research 
organisations are likely to characterise the strategy of firms looking for "global best" and 
diverse partners. In a sense, this conclusion is supported by Laursen et al. (2011). Their 
empirical evidence, on the university-industry relations in the UK, indicates that firms 
looking for high-quality scientific research are willing to establish a distant collaboration, 
when suitable partners are not available in their proximity. On a similar vein, D'Este and 
Iammarino (2010), who also analyse the interactions between firms and universities in the 
UK, point out that firms searching for cutting-edge and unique research are expected to 
look for the best partner regardless its location. That because, the more advanced and 
exploratory is the research the companies are looking for, the narrower is the choice of 
suitable partners in their proximity. However, in the case of a cooperation with a distant 
research organisation the advantages due to the geographical co-location (e.g. personnel 
interaction, knowledge exchange, face-to-face contacts) are obviously annulled, 
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aggravating also the drawbacks given by the lack of other forms of proximity55 (e.g. 
cognitive and institutional, Boschma, 2005a) between firms and research organisations. 
This might hamper the interactions with distant research partners, which not only are 
strategically relevant for the firms, but also –in a broader regional policy perspective- are 
crucial to renew the local knowledge base (e.g. Bathelt et al., 2004; Gertler and Levitte, 
2005; Uyarra, 2010). With this respect, the policy intervention may be particularly 
important. More precisely, the higher is the amount of public support, the higher is 
expected to be the possibility to counterbalance the intrinsic disadvantages due to the lack 
of proximity (-ies) that affects extra-regional collaborations, more than regional 
interactions. In this sense, an increasing amount of subsidy is expected to enhance a 
change in the cooperation strategy, allowing firms to look for a suitable research partner, 
regardless its location. Two parallel hypotheses can be advanced.  
HP 2a (2b): An additional amount of subsidy increases firms’ propensity to extend the 
geographical range of the cooperation with research institutes (universities).  
 
3 The regional context and the R&D subsidy 
The geographical context considered in the paper is the NUTS 2-level Emilia-Romagna 
region. This is located in the North-East of Italy, has a population of nearly 4.5 million 
(ISTATa, 2011), accounts for about the 9% of the national GDP (EUROSTAT, 2011) and 
for slightly more than the 10% of the national industrial production (ISTATb, 2011). The 
Emilia-Romagna regional innovation system (RIS) is characterised by some peculiar 
elements: a strong district-based industrial system; a deep rooted unionism, especially 
strong in most industrialised and productive provinces; active institutional and economic 
actors. All these elements, and others more, have created a successful milieu defined by 
several scholars in the past economic literature (e.g. Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 2001) as the 
“Emilian model”. Together with the Lombardia region, Emilia-Romagna is a leading 
innovator in the Italian context and is classified as medium-high innovator region, at the 
EU27 level, according to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (Hollanders et al., 2009). 
The top ranking position in the Italian context is occupied both in 2004 and in 2006. The 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard report highlights some relative weaknesses of the 
regional system, due to the lack of some strong enablers of innovation (population with 
                                                            
55 For a critique to the sometimes ambiguous classification of the different dimensions of the 
proximity see Knoben and Oerlemans (2006). 
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tertiary education; participation in life-long learning; public R&D expenditures as 
percentage of GDP; broadband access). However, a peculiar strength is given by the firms 
activity indicator, which captures the innovative effort undertaken by the business sector 
(business R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP; non-R&D innovation expenditures; 
SMEs innovating in-house; SMEs cooperation for innovation; EPO patents per million 
population). 
To support the innovation performances of the RIS, the policy-maker launched in 
2003 the Regional Programme for the Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology 
Transfer (PRRIITT)56. This conjugates the attempt to mitigate the weakness of the RIS 
with the exploitation of the peculiar strengths given by the firms dynamism in terms of 
innovation activities. In particular, the present paper is focused on the first two calls 
(February and September 2004) of the measure 3.1 A. This was aimed at sustaining 
industrial research and pre-competitive development through more detailed objectives. In 
addition to the direct support to R&D activities, these were: the creation of new R&D 
employment opportunities; the reinforcement of the collaboration among the components 
of the RIS; the development of new technologies and the adoption of intellectual property 
rights. Regional funds were allocated on the basis of the assessment of firms’ innovation 
projects. An independent committee of experts evaluated each project along several 
dimensions (each of those having a different potential score): technical-scientific aspects 
(45 points); economic-financial aspects (20 points); managerial aspects (20 points); 
regional impact (15 points). The threshold to be funded was fixed at 75 points. The 
eligible firms were then subsidised by grants covering up to 50% of the total cost of the 
industrial research activities and up to 25% (35% for SMEs) of the total cost of the pre-
competitive development activities. The overall number of projects subsidised through 
the two calls was 529, for a total of 557 recipient firms57. The total cost of the projects 
proposed by the beneficiaries was about 236 million Euros and the public funding about 
96 million, covering around the 40% of the total projects’ cost, with an average regional 
contribution of 175,000 Euros per-project. 
 
                                                            
56 The PRRIITT is a complex policy programme that includes a number of measures and funding 
schemes aimed to sustain the development of the RIS. All these actions are taken within the 
framework of the Regional Law 7/2002 for the “Promotion of a regional system for the industrial 
research, innovation and technological transfer” and under the “Triennial Regional Programme for 
the Production Activities 2003-2005”.   
57 Firms were allowed to create temporary association or consortia. 
89 
 
4 Empirical application  
4.1 Econometric strategy 
The econometric strategy is divided in two parts. The first concerns HP 1, while the 
second is for testing HP 2a and HP 2b.  
 As for the first part, it is widely recognised that the simple econometric application of 
an OLS regression to estimate the impact of the participation in a policy programme is 
likely to be affected by the selection bias (e.g. Heckman et al., 1998). As the Emilia-
Romagna regional subsidy is devised with a "picking the winner" strategy (Cerulli, 2010), 
the policy support cannot be considered as an exogenous element. The problem in such 
kind of situation essentially depends on the lack of a randomly assigned policy 
(treatment). This calls for specific econometric techniques to be adopted in order to 
mitigate the bias and obtain reliable estimates of the policy effects58. To provide a proper 
additionality evaluation the focus is basically on the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), which is the average difference between the actual outcome of the funded 
firms and the potential outcome in case they had not received the subsidy (i.e. the 
counterfactual). Denoting by Y1 and Y0, respectively, the outcome in presence and in 
absence of treatment and with D the treatment status (D=1: treated; D=0: untreated) - 
which indicates the receipt of the subsidy-, the ATT can be formalised as follows: 
).1|()1|()1|( 0101  DYEDYEDYYEATT   (1) 
While E(Y1 | D=1), can be estimated with a simple mean of the outcome in the 
group of funded firms, it is not possible to observe E(Y0 | D=1). In order to overcome this 
problem, it is necessary to create a suitable counterfactual and compare the outcomes of 
the treated firms with the outcome of their non treated “twins”. As in many recent 
econometric studies aimed at analysing the impact of R&D policy supports (e.g. Fier et 
al. 2006; Czarnitki and Licht, 2006; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Busom and Fernández-
Ribas, 2008), in this work a propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983) is employed to estimate the ATT of the Emilia-Romagna R&D subsidy59:  
)]}.(,0|[)](,1|[{ 011|)( XPDYEXPDYEEPSM DXP
ATT     (2) 
                                                            
58 For a review of suitable econometric methods see, among the others, Cerulli (2010). 
59 A complete description of the propensity score matching is provided in the Section 3.1 of the 
third Chapter of this Thesis. See also, among the others, Smith and Todd (2005), Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).  
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This method is aimed at estimating the treatment effect of the R&D subsidy by 
controlling for the selection bias on the observables. To this purpose, treated units are 
paired with similar non treated ones, so that the only difference in the outcome of the two 
groups is due to the policy intervention. To reduce the dimension of conditioning, treated 
and non treated firms are matched on the basis of their propensity score, Pr (D=1|X) (or 
P(X)). This latter, which is estimated with a probit model, is the probability of being 
funded given the set of pre-treatment characteristics X that are supposed to affect both the 
treatment and the outcome.  
In the following analysis, different matching procedures identified in the 
literature (e.g. Becker and Ichino, 2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Smith and Todd, 
2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) are implemented: 5 nearest-neighbours (5NN), 
caliper and kernel. These basically differ in the way non treated firms to be used as 
matches are selected and weighted, as well as in the capacity to trade bias reduction with 
efficiency (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Smith and Todd, 2005). A comparison of the 
results obtained with different algorithms provides information on the stability and, 
indirectly, on the reliability of the evidence. For all the implemented matching procedures 
the common support condition is imposed60. Furthermore, the quality of the matching is 
checked by controlling that beneficiaries and matched controls are correctly aligned with 
respect to the vector of covariates X61.  
To test HP 2a and HP 2b, building on Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Bia and 
Mattei (2008), a continuous treatment62 approach, namely the generalised propensity 
score method, is employed. This estimates the dose response function (i.e. the average 
potential outcome for each level of treatment) and the treatment effect due to an 
additional amount of regional subsidy. The generalised propensity score (GPS), R, can be 
seen as an extension of the propensity score introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
                                                            
60 In addition to the minima and maxima comparison, the 5NN matching is implemented imposing 
the common support condition also with a “trimming” procedure (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
61 Drawing on Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), three tests on the 
quality of the matching have been carried out. A first one has checked the reduction, after the 
matching, of the joint significance of probit model for the propensity score estimation. A second 
test has checked the reduction, after the matching, of the pseudo-R2 of the probit model. Third, a 
regression-based t-test on the differences in the covariates means has been run. The results of these 
tests, available upon request, largely support the quality of the matching procedures.  
62 Note that in this case the treatment is the amount of subsidy, rather than the participation in the 
subsidy scheme. 
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and it is defined by Hirano and Imbens (2004) as following. Let the propensity function 
r(t, x) be the conditional density of the actual treatment, t, given the observed covariates, 
x. Then the GPS is: 
).,( XTrR           (3) 
As the propensity score, the GPS score has a balancing propriety. Within strata with the 
same value of r(t, x), the probability that T=t does not depend on X. Hirano and Imbens 
(2004) demonstrate that when this balancing propriety is associated with a suitable 
unconfoundedness assumption, the treatment is unconfounded given the GPS. Hence, the 
GPS can be used to eliminate the bias, associated with differences in the covariates, in the 
estimation of the dose response function and of the treatment effect.  
Drawing on Bia and Mattei (2008), who propose a parametric operationalisation 
of the method introduced by Hirano and Imbens (2004), the estimation strategy here 
employed consists of three steps. The first one is the estimation of the conditional 
distribution of the treatment given the covariates. The treatment, or its transformation 
g(Ti) -which in our case is a logarithmic one-, is assumed to normally distributed 
conditional on the covariates:  
},),,({|)( 2 iii XhNXTg         (4) 
where h (γ , Xi) is a function of the covariates, which depends on a vector of parameters, 
γ. Once the parameters γ and σ2 are estimated by maximum likelihood, the GPS for each 
firm can be obtained as:  
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Once the GPS is estimated, the normality of g(Ti) and the fulfilment of the assumption on 
the balancing propriety are tested63.  
In the second step, the conditional expectation of the outcome Yi given Ti and Ri is 
modelled as follows64: 
                                                            
63 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the normality of g(Ti) and the test proposed by Hirano and 
Imbens (2004) for the balancing propriety of the GPS are implemented. Both of them largely 
support the quality of the estimation. Results are available upon request. 
64 The choice of this functional form (i.e. linear in Ri and quadratic in Ti) "maximises" the joint 
significance and the goodness of fit of the estimation of the conditional expectation of the 
outcome.     
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Given HP 2a and HP 2b, the conditional expectation of the outcome is estimated with an 
ordered probit model65. This latter turns out to be particularly suitable to estimate the 
effect of an additional amount of subsidy on three different decisions regarding the 
geographical distance of funded companies’ interactions: i.e. no-cooperation, cooperation 
with a regional partner and cooperation with an extra-regional partner66.  
The final step consists of estimating the dose-response function and the treatment 
effect of an additional amount of subsidy, getting the standard errors through a 
bootstrapping procedure. Given the parameters estimated in the previous stage, the 
average potential outcome at level t of treatment is:  
  
            (7) 
 
Doing this for each level of treatment t we are interested in, it is possible to obtain the 
overall dose-response function. The treatment effect is then calculated for each level of t, 
as a difference between (9) calculated at level t + Δt and (9) calculated at t. With this 
respect, considering the average regional contribution (€ 175,000), the chosen Δt value is 
€ 20,000. As a sort of robustness check a Δt of € 40,000 is also employed. 
 
4.2 Data  
The dataset used in the econometric analysis integrates information stemming from a 
unique survey of 555 manufacturing firms (with at least 20 employees) located in the 
Emilia-Romagna region (Antonioli et al., 2011) and balance sheets extracted from the 
AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk database. The data coming from the survey include information 
on firm’s structural and organisational characteristics and innovation strategies. The 
random sample of 555 firms is stratified by size, province (geographic location at NUTS 
3 level) and sector. The information collected mainly refers to the period (2006-2008). 
Balance sheets include other relevant pre-policy variables (year 2003). These are used, 
together with (supposed) time invariant firms’ characteristics drawn from the survey, for 
                                                            
65 The estimated GPS, iRˆ , is used. 
66 A test on the cut-points aimed at excluding the overlapping of their confidence intervals has 
been conducted. The possibility of collapsing the three ordinal values in two values, generating a 
simple probit, is rejected. Results are available upon request.  
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the estimation of the propensity score and the GPS. A main point should be stressed here. 
Considering that the information on the public support (i.e. both the binary participation 
status and the amount of subsidy) is referred to the year 2004 (when the policy was 
administrated), the overall structure of the dataset helps in reducing potential endogeneity 
problems. Indeed, the econometric analysis can rely on both pre-policy (and time 
invariant) information for the estimation of the propensity score and of the GPS, and on 
post-policy data for the definition of the outcome variables67. 
The merging procedure defined above and the cleaning of the dataset leads to a 
working sample of 408 observations: 99 subsidised and 309 non subsidised firms. What is 
important for the analysis is the representative capacity of the working sample of 
recipient firms. As it can be seen in Tab.1, the sample of 99 funded firms shows a 
distribution by size (SMEs and large firms) and sector (à la Pavitt/OECD) similar to that 
of all the manufacturing firms (with more than 20 employees) that received the regional 
R&D subsidy. 
 
Tab.1 Distribution of recipient manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees 
Recipient population distribution 
SMEs 
(< 250 employees) 
% 
Large 
(≥ 250 employees) 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
(a.v.) 
Sector     
PAVITT1 (Labour Intensive) 8.55 0.43 8.97 21 
PAVITT2 (Resource Intensive) 9.83 2.56 12.39 29 
PAVITT3 (Science Based) 11.11 1.28 12.39 29 
PAVITT4 (Scale Intensive) 14.96 4.70 19.66 46 
PAVITT5 (Specialised Suppliers) 39.74 6.84 46.58 109 
Total 84.19 15.81   
Total (a.v.) 197 37  234 
Recipient sample distribution  SMEs  % 
Large 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
(a.v.) 
Sector     
PAVITT1 (Labour Intensive) 9.09 1.01 11.11 11 
PAVITT2 (Resource Intensive) 7.07 2.02 9.09 9 
PAVITT3 (Science Based) 15.16 1.01 16.16 16 
PAVITT4 (Scale Intensive) 14.15 7.07 21.21 21 
PAVITT5 (Specialised Suppliers) 34.34 8.08 42.42 42 
Total 80.81 19.19   
Total (a.v.) 80 19  99 
                                                            
67 When compared with this “lagged policy variable(s)” setting, panel data would have allowed for 
a more robust treatment of the potential bias arising from the omission of unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2009), but mainly for testing 
HP1. Whereas some methods for the estimation of the ATT employing longitudinal data are 
available (e.g. difference in differences), there is not an established approach that accommodates 
the analysis provided through the GPS technique (employed to test HP2a and HP2b) to panel data.  
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4.3 Variables 
To implement the econometric strategy defined above, two sets of variables are created: 
(i) a set of suitable covariates X to be included in the estimation of the propensity score 
and of the GPS (Tab. A2 - A3 in the Appendix); (ii) a set of outcome variables that 
capture the behavioural changes induced by the policy (HP 1) and the effects of an 
additional amount of subsidy on the cooperation strategy with research organisations (HP 
2a and HP 2b).   
As for the covariates68 we control, at first, for the fact that innovation strategies 
are sector specific and related to the firm’s dimension, as a vast literature has 
demonstrated (e.g. Malerba, 2002; Cohen, 2010). More precisely, dummy variables 
(PAVITT1-PAVITT5) capturing the à la Pavitt/OECD sector and the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees (lnEMP_2003) are included. Second, a set of dummies (GEO1-
GEO10) that capture the firm's location in terms of province (NUTS 3-level)69 is also 
employed. Since a RIS should not be understood as a homogeneous system due to the 
likely presence of many clusters and industrial districts (Tödling and Trippl, 2005), the 
inclusion of these dummies controls for the intra-RIS heterogeneity in the innovation 
strategies. This is particularly relevant in the case of the present analysis, given the 
existence of different local production systems in the Emilia-Romagna region (e.g. 
Montresor et al., 2009; Mazzanti et al., 2009). Another relevant variable captures the pre-
policy expenditure (per capita) in intramural R&D and advertising. Even if with the 
available data it was impossible to clean the variable from the share of the advertising 
expenditure, RDADV_2003 is used as a proxy of the firm R&D capabilities that may act 
as a driver for subsequent intense innovation activities. More precisely, previous 
expenditure in R&D might influence the willingness and ability to apply for public 
subsidies and to do further steps on the innovation path. Finally, two opposite measures of 
innovative expenditure capacity are included. The cash flow per capita 
                                                            
68 Considering the characteristics and the rationales of the econometric methods here employed 
(see Section 4.1), the covariates used to estimate the propensity score and the generalized 
propensity score essentially represent the observable characteristics we control for. Hence, these 
can be considered, in a sense, as analogous to the control variables included in the specification of 
a standard parametric regression model. Descriptive statistics are provided in Tab. A1 in the 
Appendix. 
69 One of the dummies (GEO1) captures firms based outside the regional borders, but having at 
least a production unit in the region.  
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(CASHFLOW_2003)70 proxies the possibility of the firm to invest in innovation activities 
without recurring to external source of financing. The higher the cash flow per capita, the 
higher is expected to be the possibility for the firm to plan an investment in R&D. On the 
contrary, firm’s financial constraint, here proxied with the short-term debt index 
(FINCONST_2003), is expected to act as an obstacle to R&D investment. The short-term 
debt is here considered to be probably more relevant than the long- term one. The former 
is indeed expected to influence more heavily a contingent decision to plan a R&D project 
and thus the participation in the policy.  
All the considered covariates are thus conceptually relevant and several of them 
have a continuous nature, which guarantees a better determination of the propensity score 
and of the GPS71. Also in absence of contrasting empirical evidences, the intention was to 
include the aforementioned variables in the specification of both the propensity score and 
the GPS. However, to respect the balancing propriety of this latter some covariates are 
excluded from its estimation: i.e. the provincial dummies (GEO1-GEO10) and the 
expenditure in R&D and advertising in year 2003 (RDADV_2003). 
The second set of variables created for the empirical analysis consists of proxies 
for the behavioural changes induced by the policy (to test HP 1) and variables capturing 
the effects aimed to be tested with HP 2a HP 2b (Tab. 2). As mentioned above, the 
possibility to carry out an ad hoc survey has allowed for an extremely relevant advantage: 
all the outcome variables used in the econometric analysis are referred to the period 2006-
2008, hence reducing the risk of endogeneity with the policy support, which was 
adjudicated in 2004.  
                                                            
70 Both CASHFLOW_2003 and RDADV_2003 are expressed in "per capita" terms (i.e. divided by 
the number of employees) to avoid multicollinearity with firm size. 
71 Unfortunately, due to the lack of available data, it was impossible to include in the estimation of 
the propensity score and of the GPS covariates that are more directly related to, and likely to 
influence, the behavioural changes induced by the policy. A sign of the possible bias arising from 
this exclusion is difficult to hypothesise. According to the regional policy-maker, SMEs in 
particular were willing to introduce behavioural changes, included among the policy objectives, 
that did not characterise their innovation strategy before the funding. On the other hand, some 
large firms were reluctant to introduce strategic improvements in line with the policy objectives. 
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Tab.2 Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables  
  
Overall 
mean  
(408 obs) 
Mean 
subsidised 
(99 obs) 
Mean non 
subsidised 
(309 obs) 
Min. Max. 
HP 1           
Learning process and 
accumulation of 
competencies 
          
COMPUP 0.740 0.869 0.699 0 1 
TRAIN 0.819 0.879 0.799 0 1 
TECHTRAIN 0.718 0.818 0.686 0 1 
Networking Intra-RIS           
COOPCUS_REG 0.172 0.162 0.175 0 1 
COOPSUP_REG 0.184 0.152 0.194 0 1 
COOPCOM_REG 0.074 0.040 0.084 0 1 
COOPGP_REG 0.100 0.131 0.091 0 1 
COOPUNI_REG 0.370 0.717 0.259 0 1 
COOPRESINS_REG 0.311 0.566 0.229 0 1 
Networking Extra-RIS           
COOPCUS_EXTRA 0.275 0.263 0.278 0 1 
COOPSUP_EXTRA 0.331 0.364 0.320 0 1 
COOPCOM_EXTRA 0.076 0.121 0.061 0 1 
COOPGP_EXTRA 0.113 0.172 0.094 0 1 
COOPUNI_EXTRA 0.145 0.343 0.081 0 1 
COOPRESINST_EXTRA 0.199 0.394 0.136 0 1 
HP2a - HP2b           
COOPRESINS_ORD 0.654 1.19 0.482 0 2 
COOPUNI_ORD 0.596 1.21 0.398 0 2 
 
As for the outcome variables used to capture the behavioural additionality of the 
intervention (HP 1), three types of effect induced by the R&D subsidy are considered. 
First, the impact of the policy on firms’ learning process and accumulation of 
competencies. To capture this type of effect three outcome variables are used: (i) a 
dummy indicating whether the workers' competencies have been improved or upgraded 
(COMPUP), (ii) a dummy capturing whether undifferentiated training programmes have 
been implemented (TRAIN) (iii) a dummy indicating whether the firm has implemented 
training programmes to improve technical/specialised competencies (TECHTRAIN). 
Differently from the first one, the second and the third variables capture changes that can 
be argued to be a complementary, indirect consequence of firms’ engagement in publicly 
funded R&D activities. The second type of behavioural changes here considered concerns 
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the cooperation agreements of funded firms with other components of the RIS. This 
allows for analysing the effectiveness of policy in strengthening the networking activities 
within the RIS, and, in turn, interactive learning processes. To this aim, two sets of 
dummies are employed. The first captures whether a firm has cooperated with other 
regional companies: i.e. customers (COOPCSUS_REG), suppliers (COOPSUP_REG), 
competitors (COOPCOM_REG), firms in the same group (COOPGP_REG). The second 
whether the firm has cooperated with regional research organisations: i.e. universities 
(COOPUNI_REG) and research institutes (COOPRESINS_REG). The last impact of the 
policy on firms' behaviours that is considered pertains to the cooperation with extra-
regional actors. That to assess the ability of the regional subsidy to open-up the RIS to 
external sources, which are considered as suitable channels for the acquisition of new 
competencies and for the renewal of the regional knowledge base. With this respect, a set 
of dummies captures cooperation agreements with extra-regional firms: i.e. customers 
(COOPCSUS_EXTRA), suppliers (COOPSUP_EXTRA), competitors 
(COOPCOM_EXTRA) and companies in the same group (COOPGP_EXTRA). Other 
two dummies capture the cooperation with extra-regional research organisations: i.e. 
universities (COOPUNI_EXTRA) and research institutes (COOPRESINS_EXTRA).  
Finally, to test HP 2a and HP 2b, two ordinal outcome variables reflect the 
geographical range of the interactions between funded firms and research organisations. 
COOPRESINS_ORD (COOPUNI_ORD) takes three values: 0 if the firm has not 
cooperated with any research institute (university), 1 in case of cooperation with a 
regional research institute (university), 2 in case the firm has cooperated with an extra-
regional research institute (university). 
 
5 Analysis and results    
This section presents the results concerning the behavioural changes induced by the R&D 
subsidy (HP 1,Tab. 3) and the effects of an additional amount of public support on the 
geographical range of the cooperation with research organisations (HP 2a - HP 2b, Tab. 4-
5).   
The results presented in Tab. 3 lead to a general support of HP 1: the policy is 
found to induce a set of behavioural changes that might be helpful in limiting possible 
system failures. The first type of behavioural changes that is taken into account pertains 
to the effects on firms' learning process. With this respect, funded firms are more likely 
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(from +16.6% to +20.0%) to report an upgrading in their competencies, when compared 
to similar non subsidised companies. Hence, carrying out funded R&D activities 
generates a relevant learning process. However, it seems that to carry out the same funded 
R&D activities, supported firms do not need to upgrade the skills of their employees 
through complementary training schemes. In fact, taking into account both general 
training programmes and programmes targeted to technical competencies, the effect of 
the policy is found to be generally not significant.  
The second type of behavioural changes considered pertains to the networking 
activities with other regional actors, both other firms and research organisations. As far as 
the cooperation with these latter is concerned, the results clearly depict a success of the 
policy in strengthening the connections between firms and regional actors involved in 
research activities. With all the four matching procedures employed, the regional subsidy 
is found to stimulate firms’ interactions with universities and research institutes. More 
precisely, with respect to similar non supported companies, funded firms are more likely 
to cooperate with regional universities (from + 37.4% to + 40.2%) and with regional 
research institutes (from +32.8% to + 33.5%). A similar positive effect is not found for 
the cooperation between funded firms and other regional companies. On the one hand, 
interactions with clients, suppliers and firms in the same group are generally not 
significantly affected by the regional policy intervention. On the other hand, the subsidy 
reduces (from – 7.4% to – 10.9%) the propensity of the supported firms to cooperate with 
companies operating in the same sector. A clear motivation for such a behavioural change 
should be investigated and tested more in depth. However, a reason could be found in the 
“not-invented-here (NIH)  syndrome”, that in this case could be strengthened by the 
willingness of the firms to assure their own distinctiveness with respect to very similar 
companies (i.e. operating in the same sector)  (Wastyn and Hussinger, 2011). In this case, 
it may be hypothesised that the policy has pushed firms to activate relationships with 
other partners rather than with very similar companies, possibly sharpening the NIH 
syndrome. 
99 
 
Tab. 3 Behavioural additionality effects of the regional R&D subsidy  
5NN Caliper Kernel 5NN Trim 
  ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. ATT S.E. 
Learning process 
and accumulation  
of competencies         
COMPUP 0.198 *** 0.072 0.166 ** 0.073 0.181 *** 0.067 0.200 *** 0.076 
TRAIN 0.026 0.055 0.026 0.061 0.052 0.047 0.025 0.059 
TRAINTECH 0.085 0.071 0.072 0.076 0.103* 0.062 0.082 0.081 
Networking  
Intra-RIS         
COOPCUS_REG -0.096 0.067 -0.056 0.067 -0.054 0.059 -0.105 0.071 
COOPSUP_REG -0.109 0.072 -0.089 0.070 -0.058 0.058 -0.112* 0.063 
COOPCOM_REG -0.109 ** 0.048 -0.089 * 0.048 -0.074 * 0.045 -0.101 * 0.057 
COOPGP_REG 0.000 0.056 0.022 0.052 0.037 0.048 -0.006 0.055 
COOPUNI_REG 0.374 *** 0.082 0.393 *** 0.082 0.402 *** 0.072 0.381 *** 0.077 
COOPRESINS_REG 0.335 *** 0.073 0.335 *** 0.076 0.330 *** 0.075 0.328 *** 0.075 
Networking  
Extra-RIS         
COOPCUS_EXTRA -0.028 0.077 -0.069 0.077 -0.067 0.071 -0.040 0.081 
COOPSUP_EXTRA 0.072 0.088 0.073 0.083 0.092 0.071 0.069 0.082 
COOPCOM_EXTRA 0.043 0.050 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.063 0.047 
COOPGP_EXTRA 0.096 * 0.056 0.098 * 0.057 0.099 ** 0.048 0.103 * 0.054 
COOPUNI_EXTRA 0.189 *** 0.060 0.130 * 0.071 0.138 ** 0.065 0.198 *** 0.069 
COOPRESINS_EXTRA 0.193 *** 0.074 0.218 *** 0.075 0.226 *** 0.075 0.202 *** 0.077 
N treated on support 92 92 92 95 
N treated total 99 99 99 99 
N non treated 309 309 309 309 
Methods: 5 nearest neighbours (5NN), 5 nearest neigbhours with a 0.05 caliper (Caliper), Epanechnikov 
kernel matching (Kernel), 5 nearest neighbours with 1% trim (5NN Trim). Standard errors are estimated with 
a 200-replication bootstrap procedure. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%.  
 
The last type of behavioural change induced by the policy here considered 
concerns the collaborations with extra-regional actors, both firms and research 
organisations. This type of effect captures whether the policy enhances the renewal of the 
regional knowledge base by opening-up the RIS. As it emerges from Tab.3, a positive and 
significant policy effect is found for the cooperation with extra-regional universities and 
research institutes. More precisely, with respect to similar non subsidised companies, 
funded firms are more likely to cooperate with an extra-regional university (from +13.0% 
to +19.8%) or a research institute located outside the Emilia-Romagna region (from + 
19.3% to + 22.6%). A similar positive effect cannot be observed for the interactions with 
extra-regional firms. Only the propensity to cooperate with extra-regional companies 
belonging to the same group is positively affected by the R&D support scheme (from 
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+9.6% to +10.3%). 
With respect to firms’ interactions with research institutes and universities, the 
evidence emerged above points to an interesting result. The simple participation in the 
policy scheme, irrespectively from the amount of public funding received, increases 
firms’ cooperation with research organisations, but more within rather than outside the 
region. However, the capacity to get across the boundaries with cooperation might 
actually depend on the amount of subsidy. 
 As for the effect of an additional amount of public support on the geographical 
range of the cooperation with research partners (HP 2a and HP 2b), the evidence 
emerging from the GPS estimations are reported in Tab. 4 and 572.  
The results concerning the impact on the interaction with research institutes (Tab. 
4 and Fig. A1 in Appendix) lead to a support of HP 2a, which is conditional to the level of 
subsidy. For levels of subsidy higher than € 200,000 (€ 180,000), an increase of € 20,000 
(€ 40,000) in the amount of public support reduces the likelihood of not being engaged in 
any cooperation with a research institute (Y=0)73, regardless the location of this latter. As 
a mirror image, for the same levels of subsidy, an additional amount of public support has 
a positive impact on the propensity of funded firms to cooperate with an extra-regional 
research institute (Y=2). More precisely, over a certain threshold of public support (€ 
200,000 for Δt= € 20,000 and €180,000 for Δt= € 40,000), the higher is the level of 
subsidy, the higher is the effect of receiving an additional amount of public monies. With 
Δt = € 20,000, the range of the treatment effects goes from +6.4% to +14%. With Δt = € 
40,000, from +9.7% to +30.1%. Two points should be stressed here. First, the fact that a 
financial incentive, as a higher amount of subsidy, triggers the engagement in extra-
regional collaborations implies that the difficulties due to the lack of proximity (-ies) also 
increases the pure economic cost of the interaction and coordination with extra-regional 
research institutes. Second, the existence of a minimum threshold of subsidy, over which 
an extra-amount of public monies significantly and increasingly affects the propensity to 
cooperate with an extra-regional research institute, leads to the following insight. Distant 
                                                            
72 It is worth stressing that the establishment of a distant (i.e. extra-regional) cooperation was 
neither a requirement nor an explicit criterion for the allocation of the policy incentives here 
investigated. This makes the results presented below even more robust to eventual problems of 
endogeneity.    
73 For a very low level of subsidy (€ 60,000 with Δt= € 20,000) an increase in the amount of 
support is found to reduce the likelihood of cooperating with a research institute. The significance 
of the treatment effect, however, is quite low.  
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collaborations are characterised by an indivisible fixed cost, which can be overcome with 
a minimum efficient scale of public funding.  
 
Tab. 4 Effects of an additional amount of subsidy on the cooperation with research institutes 
(Δt =20000) Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 
Treatement Level Treat. Eff.  SE    Treat. Eff.  SE    Treat. Eff. SE 
60000 0.141* 0.078  -0.003 0.064 -0.138 0.108 
80000 0.128 0.087  -0.040 0.045 -0.088 0.070 
100000 0.096 0.068  -0.034 0.034 -0.062 0.045 
120000 0.059 0.047  -0.012 0.017 -0.047 0.037 
140000 0.026 0.029  0.002 0.008 -0.028 0.032 
160000 0.000 0.017  0.000 0.008 0.000 0.023 
180000 -0.022 0.016  -0.010 0.009 0.032 0.020 
200000 -0.042* 0.023  -0.022 0.015 0.064** 0.031 
220000 -0.061** 0.030  -0.032 0.023 0.094** 0.044 
240000 -0.076** 0.037  -0.048 0.036 0.124** 0.057 
250000 -0.080** 0.039   -0.060 0.043   0.140** 0.063 
(Δt =40000) Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 
Treatement Level Treat. Eff.  SE    Treat. Eff.  SE    Treat. Eff.  SE  
60000 0.271 0.180  -0.050 0.089 -0.220 0.173 
80000 0.226 0.161  -0.090 0.088 -0.136 0.103 
100000 0.160 0.118  -0.065 0.065 -0.095 0.069 
120000 0.090 0.080  -0.021 0.033 -0.069 0.059 
140000 0.026 0.046  0.002 0.011 -0.028 0.050 
160000 -0.022 0.028  -0.009 0.014 0.031 0.040 
180000 -0.060* 0.034  -0.037 0.029 0.097* 0.056 
200000 -0.093** 0.046  -0.068 0.049 0.161* 0.083 
220000 -0.122** 0.058  -0.097 0.066 0.220** 0.106 
240000 -0.140** 0.067  -0.136 0.083 0.275** 0.123 
250000 -0.140** 0.069   -0.161* 0.089   0.301** 0.128 
Standard errors are estimated with a 200-replication bootstrap procedure. ***, **, * indicate a 
significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Critical values of the two sided t-test (df=100): 10% 1.660; 5% 
1.984; 1% 2.626 
 
Tab. 4 reports another interesting result. As a counterpart of the positive impact 
on the cooperation with extra-regional research institutes, an additional amount of 
subsidy has no significant effects on the cooperation with regional partners of the same 
type (Y=1)74. With this respect, it seems that funded firms do not perceive regional and 
extra-regional research institutes as substitutes. In this sense, it might be argued that an 
                                                            
74 The only exception is the treatment effect at € 250,000 with Δt= € 40,000, which is found to be 
slightly significant and negative.   
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increasing amount of subsidy allows firms to interact with extra-regional research 
institutes in which they can find distinctive and specific research capabilities, not 
available within the regional borders. Indeed, it is quite likely that the research institutes 
located in a given region follow some specialisations covering only a limited set of 
scientific and technological fields.  
The picture emerging from the results presented in Tab. 5 (Fig.A2 in Appendix) is 
a bit different, but leads to support HP 2b. Also in this case, this support is conditional to 
the level of subsidy. More precisely, similarly to what emerged before, for levels of 
subsidy higher than € 180,000 (€160,000), an extra amount of € 20,000 (€ 40,000) 
reduces firms’ probability of not being engaged in any cooperation with an academic 
partner (Y=0), whatever its location is75. For the same levels of subsidy, adding an extra 
€20,000 (€40,000) enhances firms’ propensity to cooperate with an extra-regional 
university (Y=2): from +5.6% (+7%) to + 20.4% (+39.1%). Thus, also considering the 
collaborations with academic partners, there is a minimum efficient scale of public 
funding that allows firms to overcome the economic cost of distant interactions. However, 
differently from what emerged for the collaborations with research institutes, the 
increasing attitude to cooperate with extra-regional academic partners is associated to a 
reducing propensity to collaborate with a regional university (Y=1). For levels higher than 
€180,000, an extra €20,000 (€40,000) induces firms to cooperate less with regional 
academic partners: from -2.4% (-8.6%) to -15.9% (-32.8%). Hence, an increasing amount 
of subsidy is inducing a sort of shift from an "inward-looking" to an "outward-looking" 
cooperation strategy. This result seems to suggest a sort of substitution effect: the broader 
geographical range of the interactions with academic partners is paid at the price of a 
reduced propensity to collaborate with the regional universities. A possible explanation 
can be found again in the relation between the research skills available within the region 
and those located outside the regional borders. In the case of cooperation with academic 
partners -whose research programmes are more homogeneous than in non academic 
                                                            
75 For a very low level of subsidy (€ 60,000 with Δt= € 20,000 and Δt= € 40,000) an increase in the 
amount of support is found to reduce the likelihood of cooperating with a university (the 
significance of the treatment effects however is quite low). It is worth mentioning also the non 
significant treatment effect at € 250,000 with Δt= € 40,000. For this high level of support, an extra 
amount of subsidy does not alter firms' propensity of not being engaged in any cooperation with a 
university.  
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research institutes-, those located in the region76 are likely to offer a range of research 
skills which is similar –in terms of breath- to that available outside the regional borders. 
As a consequence, when, due to the public support, firms have the possibility to deal with 
the higher cost of a distant cooperation, the collaborations with regional universities are 
substituted by interactions with extra-regional academic institutes, which probably offer 
alike but more qualitatively advanced and suitable research capabilities. 
 
Tab. 5 Effects of an additional amount of subsidy on the cooperation with universities 
(Δt =20000) Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 
Treatement Level Treat. Eff. SE   Treat. Eff. SE   Treat. Eff. SE 
60000 0.131* 0.070 0.029 0.118 -0.160 0.121 
80000 0.137 0.087 -0.049 0.070 -0.088 0.074 
100000 0.104 0.076 -0.049 0.054 -0.055 0.041 
120000 0.059 0.051 -0.020 0.028 -0.039 0.033 
140000 0.018 0.028 -0.001 0.009 -0.018 0.028 
160000 -0.011 0.014 -0.004 0.008 0.015 0.019 
180000 -0.032** 0.013 -0.024* 0.013 0.056*** 0.018 
200000 -0.048** 0.019 -0.052** 0.026 0.100*** 0.033 
220000 -0.056** 0.024 -0.088** 0.039 0.144*** 0.050 
240000 -0.053** 0.026 -0.134** 0.053 0.187*** 0.062 
250000 -0.045* 0.024  -0.159*** 0.057   0.204*** 0.064 
(Δt =40000) Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 
Treatement Level Treat. Eff. SE Treat. Eff. SE   Treat. Eff. SE 
60000 0.273* 0.142  -0.031 0.156 -0.242 0.194 
80000 0.250 0.160  -0.121 0.102 -0.129 0.104 
100000 0.172 0.129  -0.093 0.090 -0.080 0.060 
120000 0.082 0.083  -0.030 0.046 -0.052 0.051 
140000 0.005 0.042  0.000 0.014 -0.005 0.044 
160000 -0.045* 0.024  -0.024 0.019 0.070** 0.034 
180000 -0.075** 0.032  -0.086** 0.041 0.160*** 0.054 
200000 -0.091** 0.039  -0.159** 0.068 0.250*** 0.085 
220000 -0.094** 0.042  -0.235*** 0.088 0.328*** 0.106 
240000 -0.077* 0.041  -0.305*** 0.097 0.383*** 0.108 
250000 -0.063 0.038 -0.328*** 0.093   0.391*** 0.102 
Standard errors are estimated with a 200-replication bootstrap procedure. ***, **, * indicate a 
significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. Critical values of the two sided t-test (df=100): 10% 1.660; 5% 
1.984; 1% 2.626  
                                                            
76 Particularly considering that in Emilia-Romagna there are four regional universities (Parma, 
Modena and Reggio Emilia, Bologna, Ferrara) and two branches of extra-regional universities 
(Catholic University of Milan and Polytechnic University of Milan).  
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6 Conclusions  
The paper has provided an analysis of the R&D subsidy included in the Emilia-Romagna 
Regional Programme for the Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer 
(PRRIITT). Particular attention has been devoted to the behavioural dimension of the 
additionality and to the effect of an increasing amount of subsidy on the beneficiaries' 
cooperation strategy with research organisations.  
The paper, at first, has tested a hypothesis concerning the likely presence of 
behavioural changes induced by the R&D subsidy. In particular, through a proper 
operationalisation of the behavioural additionality evaluation, the paper has investigated 
the policy capacity to limit potential regional system failures pertaining to: problems in 
learning processes and accumulation of competencies, missing or inappropriate 
interactions and networking activities, lock-ins. With respect to the last point, it has been 
considered the effectiveness of the policy in stimulating funded firms' cooperation with 
extra-regional partners. As stressed in some recent contributions (e.g. Bathelt et al., 2004; 
Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Uyarra, 2010), interactions with extra-regional actors are 
indeed expected to enhance the renewal and the increasing diversity of the regional 
knowledge base. The main results, based on the econometric evaluation of the ATT with a 
propensity score matching approach, have pointed to the presence of a set of behavioural 
changes induced by the R&D subsidy. At first, the R&D support scheme is found to have 
a positive impact on firms' competencies upgrading, but not on the engagement in formal 
training programmes. Looking at the effects on firms' intra-RIS interactions and 
networking activities, the policy is found to be largely successful in stimulating  
beneficiaries’ cooperation agreements with regional research organisations, i.e. 
universities and research institutes. Notwithstanding, the impact on the collaborations 
with other regional firms is found to be generally not significant. For the negative effect 
on the cooperation with competitors an hypothetical explanation to be found in the NIH 
syndrome (Wastyn and Hussinger, 2011) has been advanced. Finally, the results 
concerning the interactions with extra-regional partners has shown that the public 
intervention succeeded in opening-up the RIS, inducing firms to cooperate with 
companies belonging to their same group and, in particular, with academic partners and 
research institutes.   
The positive effect of the policy on the cooperation with regional and extra-
regional research organisations (i.e. universities and research institutes) has been further 
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investigated. In particular, the paper has analysed the effect generated by an additional 
amount of public support on the geographical range of the cooperation with research 
partners. The results, emerged from a GPS method have provided a support to the 
advanced hypotheses that is conditional to the level of subsidy. In particular, over a 
minimum efficient scale of public funding, an extra-amount of subsidy increasingly 
enhances the propensity to cooperate with extra-regional research organisations. As for 
the cooperation with academic partners, this effect is associated to a change from an 
"inward-looking" to an "outward-looking" cooperation strategy: an higher amount of 
support induces firms to cooperate less with regional universities and more with extra-
regional ones.   
A main policy implication can be drawn from this analysis. The amount of 
subsidy granted to the firms is of fundamental importance. It allows firms to overcome 
the economic cost of a distant collaboration, deriving from the lack of proximity (-ies), 
and to establish interactions with "global-best" research partners. More generally, the 
amount of public support triggers the transition process towards an Open Regional 
Innovation System (Belussi et al. 2010), characterised by the presence of open modes of 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) that overcome not only the boundaries of the firm but also 
of the region. However, some further analyses on the issue are required to increase the 
generality of this conclusion. In fact, the results here presented might partially depend on 
the characteristics of the context and of the policy considered in the paper: in particular, 
the fact that SMEs were the main beneficiaries of the intervention and the low average 
public support.   
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Appendix  
Tab. A1 Description and statistics of the covariates used in the propensity score and GPS estimation  
Variables Description Mean 
(408 
obs.) 
Min Max Mean 
Subsidised 
(99 obs.) 
Min Max Mean 
Not Subsidised
(309 obs.)  
Min Max 
           
Time invariant survey 
data 
         
Geographical location* 
(10 dummies) 
Dummies of geographical location of 
the firm. Nine dummies corresponding 
to the regional provinces and one 
dummy for firms whose headquarter is 
located outside of regional borders 
(GEO1: Extra-Region, GEO2: Bologna 
GEO3: Forlì Cesena GEO4: Ferrara 
GEO5: Modena GEO6: Piacenza 
GEO7: Parma GEO8: Ravenna GEO9: 
Reggio Emilia GEO10: Rimini )  
\ 0 1 \ 0 1 \ 0 1 
Sector* (5 dummies) Five dummies to capture a là 
Pavitt/OECD sectors (PAVITT1: labour 
intensive; PAVITT2: resource 
intensive; PAVITT3: science based; 
PAVITT4: scale intensive; PAVITT5: 
specialised suppliers ).  
\ 0 1 \ 0 1 \ 0 1 
Balance sheets data            
lnEMP_2003 Log number of employees in year 2003 4.218 0.693 7.961 4.516 2.639 7.754 4.122 0.693 7.961 
FINCONST_2003 Short-term debt index in year 2003 0.871 0.320 1.000 0.838 0.33 1 0.882 0.320 1.000 
CASHFLOW_2003 Cash flow per capita in year 2003 
(thousands of Euros) 0.792 -1.105 185.222 0.183 -0.475 1.555 0.987 -1.105 185.222 
RDADV_2003 Expenditures per capita in research and 
advertisement in year 2003 (thousands 
of Euros) 
0.007 0.000 0.405 0.016 0 0.326 0.003 0.000 0.405 
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Tab.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity score                 
 
   Coeff.  S.E. 
lnEMP_2003 0.119 0.083 
GEO1 3.420 *** 1.146 
GEO2 1.755 * 1.053 
GEO3 0.789 1.155 
GEO5 1.839 * 1.057 
GEO6 2.639 ** 1.096 
GEO7 1.531 1.077 
GEO8 2.184 ** 1.083 
GEO9 1.849 * 1.064 
GEO10 1.187 1.122 
PAVITT1 0.148 0.290 
PAVITT3 1.361 *** 0.326 
PAVITT4 0.575 ** 0.279 
PAVITT5 0.726 *** 0.255 
FINCONST_2003 -0.881 * 0.525 
CASHFLOW_2003 -0.005 0.005 
RDADV_2003 0.162 *** 0.043 
_cons -2.671** 1.219 
N 408 
Pseudo R2 0.217 
Prob>χ2 0.000 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. A VIF test excludes the presence of 
multicollinearity among the covariates (all the VIF values are lower than 10). 
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Tab.A3 Maximum likelihood estimation of the generalised propensity score  
 
  Coeff.  S.E. 
lnEMP_2003 0.057 * 0.030 
PAVITT1 0.203 0.133 
PAVITT3 0.210 * 0.126 
PAVITT4 0.073 0.120 
PAVITT5 0.206 * 0.111 
FINCONST_2003 -0.525 *** 0.182 
CASHFLOW_2003 0.000 0.003 
_cons 12.100 *** 0.221 
N 99 
Pseudo R2  0.293 
Prob>χ2 0.009 
 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%. A VIF test excludes the presence of 
multicollinearity among the covariates (all the VIF values are lower than 10). Critical values of the 
two sided t-test (df=100): 10% 1.660; 5% 1.984; 1% 2.626 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
E
[
c
o
o
p
i
s
t
_
t
o
t
_
2
(
t
+
4
0
0
0
0
)
]
-
E
[
c
o
o
p
i
s
t
_
t
o
t
_
2
(
t
)
]
50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Treatment Effect Function
-
.
5
0
.
5
E
[
c
o
o
p
i
s
t
_
t
o
t
_
3
(
t
+
4
0
0
0
0
)
]
-
E
[
c
o
o
p
i
s
t
_
t
o
t
_
3
(
t
)
]
50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Treatment Effect Function
Fig.A1 Effects of an additional amount of subsidy on the cooperation with research institutes (Left: No cooperation  Y=0, Centre: Cooperation with regional partner Y=1, Right: Cooperation with 
extra-regional partner Y=2 . Top: Δt= 20,000; Bottom: Δt= 40,000. Confidence bounds at 95 % level)  
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Fig.A2 Effects of an additional amount of subsidy on the cooperation with universities (Left: No cooperation  Y=0, Centre: Cooperation with regional partner Y=1, Right: Cooperation with 
extra-regional partner Y=2.  Top: Δt= 20,000; Bottom: Δt= 40,000. Confidence bounds at 95 % level)  
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5   
Conclusions  
 
 
 
 
 
This Thesis has provided an investigation of the additionality of the innovation policy: it 
has analysed the way in which public support “supplements” beneficiaries’ innovation 
activities, performances and behaviours. This research has been motivated by the 
increasing relevance of the innovation policy as a mean to enhance the growth and the 
competitiveness of economic systems. In Europe, for instance, the definition of the 
Lisbon agenda (European Council, 2000) and the recent Europe 2020 strategy (European 
Commission, 2010) have put public support to innovation activities at the core of the 
economic policy-making, from the regional to the EU level. However, the ongoing 
economic crisis calls for a particularly efficient and effective use of the scarce public 
resources available. This implies the need for a proper evaluation of the public 
interventions not only for an assessment purpose. Evaluation is also fundamental for a 
better implementation of future support schemes, due to its contribution to the policy-
learning process (e.g. Arnold, 2004). With this respect, the present Thesis has been 
inspired by the idea that the necessity and the possibility to contribute, in a scientific and 
rigorous way, to a better understanding of the policy effects is far from being exhausted.  
The evaluation of innovation policy is nowadays a large and diverse research 
field characterised by different purposes, methods employed, impacts and stage of the 
funded projects considered (e.g. Capron and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997; Piric 
and Reeve, 1997; Edler et al., 2010). In this framework, as said, this Thesis has been 
focused on a specific specific type of ex-post (techno-)economic impact assessment: the 
analysis of the additionality of the public support to innovation activities. The main 
advantage of this type of evaluation is that of providing an analysis of the net effect of the 
policy intervention, comparing the actual situation after the implementation of the policy 
with an hypothetical counterfactual which captures what would have happened in absence 
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of public support (or in case of a lower support). More precisely, the Thesis has 
considered the additionality as a multi-dimensional concept and has devoted particular 
attention to the behavioural dimension (e.g. Buisseret et al. 1995), which is focused on 
the way in which the public support re-shapes the characteristics of the beneficiaries’ 
innovation process, their behaviour and strategy.  
The Thesis, in each of the three essays, has contributed to the existing literature 
on the additionality of innovation policy addressing specific theoretical, methodological, 
empirical issues and research questions. From a theoretical point of view, the Thesis has 
stressed the consistency of the behavioural additionality evaluation with the evolutionary 
and system perspectives, and its usefulness, especially when integrated with other 
evaluation tools, in providing an assessment of the policy capacity to deal with the system 
failures. From a methodological point of view, the Thesis has extended the analysis 
beyond the simple effect due to the participation in the policy. It has investigated in 
particular the effect due to an additional amount of subsidy and the relation between the 
average additionality level and the dispersion of the policy effect across the beneficiaries. 
The Thesis, through its empirical applications, has obtained a number of interesting 
results. On the one hand, it has provided a systematic analysis of the additionality of the 
public support schemes implemented in the two EU countries characterised by a relevant 
regional level of policy-making (i.e. Italy and Spain). In this sense, the Thesis has also 
offered a complement to the intense reporting activities carried out at the EU level to 
monitor and assess innovation policy interventions (e.g. INNO-Policy TrendChart, 
INNO-Appraisal). On the other hand, the Thesis has analysed the way in which a regional 
R&D subsidy (i.e. the one implemented in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy) affects 
firms’ innovation behaviour and, in particular, the cooperation attitude with distant 
sources of knowledge.  
The first paper (Chapter 2) has provided an updated review of the theoretical and 
empirical contributions dealing with the additionality of the innovation policy, devoting 
particular attention to its behavioural dimension. This latter, which is focused on the 
behavioural and strategic changes induced by the policy intervention, can complement the 
more standard input and output additionality evaluations. In particular, the evaluation of 
the behavioural additionality allows for the analysis of the effects that occur within the 
“black-box” of the beneficiaries’ innovation process, considering the impacts on 
beneficiaries’ competencies, capabilities and interactions with external sources of 
knowledge. To reduce the potential vagueness of the behavioural additionality notion, the 
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paper has stressed the importance of a theoretically-guided use of the concept. In 
particular, the evaluation of the behavioural additionality should be aimed at capturing the 
capacity of the policy to mitigate the system failures that occur (also) at the level of the 
beneficiaries: problems in learning processes, missing or inappropriate connections, lock-
ins due to unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 
2009). The paper has also presented some key aspects that should be taken into account 
when evaluating the behavioural additionality of a policy intervention: the problems in 
isolating the effects of the single funded projects and the consequent need to focus on the 
overall innovation strategy of the beneficiaries; the possible presence of spillovers and 
indirect effects on the non funded organisations; the heterogeneous nature of the 
additionality effects. Particular attention has been devoted to the likely presences of 
synergies, implying mutual causations, between the behavioural, the input and the output 
additionality dimensions. As for the review of the empirical contributions, this has led to 
support the need to evaluate the behavioural changes induced by the policy intervention. 
Indeed, almost all the reviewed works report the presence of relevant policy effects that 
cannot be captured with the simple input and output additionality assessments. In 
particular, previous contributions point to the presence of significant behavioural effects 
that pertains to the increased cooperation with external actors (i.e. firms and research 
organisations) and to the upgrading of internal innovation capabilities. The paper has also 
considered some criticalities in the quantitative analysis of the behavioural additionality. 
On the one hand, the usual methodological issues in the (ex-post) impact assessment (e.g. 
selection bias). On the other hand, the blurriness that characterise the conceptualisation of 
the behavioural additionality is found to be reflected also in the definition of the outcome 
variables. In the reviewed empirical contributions, different proxies for different 
behavioural changes are used, even if the majority of the studies are focused on the 
cooperation with both firms and research organisations. To improve the 
comprehensiveness of the analysis, preserving its parsimony, in the conclusion of the first 
paper an idea has been advanced. That of collecting information on the various indicators 
of behavioural change and then applying multivariate statistical techniques, such as factor 
analysis, to reduce the number of potential outcome variables. Another conclusion 
reached by the paper concerns the usefulness of the social network analysis as a 
methodological approach that, taking the system rather than the single beneficiary as the 
unit of analysis, can complement the more “traditional” econometric techniques for 
impact assessment. The last concluding remark arising from the first paper concerns a 
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methodological device that can be employed in investigating the likely synergies that 
might be in place between the behavioural and the other two dimensions of the 
additionality. The use of a system of simultaneous equations is probably a promising tool 
of analysis that might help to shed some light on this issue.   
The framework provided in the first paper has guided the two empirical 
investigations included in the Thesis. More precisely, the first one, considering the three 
additionality dimensions identified in the review, has provided a comprehensive analysis 
of the policy effects on the firms’ innovation activities, performances and behaviours. 
The second empirical application has been particularly focused on the behavioural 
additionality and, drawing on the first paper of the Thesis, it has investigated those 
changes in the beneficiaries’ behaviour that might help to reduce potential system 
failures.    
The empirical investigation provided in the second paper (Chapter 3) has 
analysed the extent to which policy effects can differ in contexts in which innovation 
policy is administrated with relatively similar governance systems. To this purpose, the 
paper has focused on the impacts of the public support to firms’ innovation activities 
implemented in two EU countries, namely Italy and Spain. To provide a multi-
dimensional investigation of the additionality, the paper has considered the input, output 
and behavioural additionality effects. The additionality evaluation has been carried out 
with a multi-level perspective to analyse the impact of the regional and national policies 
and the consistency in the effects generated by the two levels of public support. The 
analysis of the addtionality effects has been carried out on the basis of propensity score 
matching estimations implemented over CIS 4 microdata. Considering in general terms 
the two multi-level systems of policy, in Italy national and regional interventions are 
found to be largely dissonant, with the latter having many not significant and in some 
cases negative impacts. In Spain, on the contrary, central and sub-national policies are 
found to be more consistent, inducing a similar broad range of output and behavioural 
additionality effects. Coming to the specific additionality effects, in both the countries, 
regional interventions are found to be unable to affect the private investment in R&D. 
This evidence, considering the characteristics of the policies implemented (Cefis and 
Evangelista, 2007; Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Barbieri et al., 2010; 
Afcha-Chávez, 2011), has led to argue that input additionality cannot emerge when the 
interventions are characterised by a low average amount of public contribution and a 
support to less formalised innovation activities. The multi-dimensional analysis of the 
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additionality has led to specific conclusions on the output and behavioural additionality 
effects too. As for the former, Italian national and regional policies, increasing only the 
propensity to introduce process innovations, are found to be unable to sustain a quality 
leap in firms’ innovation performances.  This is not the case of the Spanish public support 
schemes, which are found to increase firms’ capacity to introduce marketable, radical and 
patentable product innovations. Concerning the behavioural additionality, Italian national 
policies are found to stimulate funded firms to interact more with other companies and 
research organisations. In addition to this, Spanish regional and national interventions are 
found to affect firms’ learning process, by increasing the engagement in formal training 
programmes. The possibility to investigate the three dimensions of the additionality is a 
first step towards a clearer understanding of how the policy support affects the entire 
innovation process of the beneficiaries. As emerged in the first paper included in the 
Thesis, more effort should be devoted to analyse the possible relations between the three 
additionality dimensions. With this respect, an insight has emerged in the second paper. 
Differently from the Italian regional policies, in Spain the lack of input additionality of 
the regional interventions is associated to a good performance in the other two 
additionality dimensions. In particular, Spanish regional policies are found to enhance the 
introduction of patentable and radical product innovations even in the absence of a 
positive effect on the R&D investment. With this respect, it has been argued that the 
policy capacity to target (successfully) important behavioural changes might compensate 
for the lack of an additional investment in R&D and lead to higher innovation outputs. 
All in all, the multi-dimensional analysis of the additionality has allowed for a 
comprehensive investigation of the innovation policy interventions. This has shown that 
the public support to innovation activities not only can affect the amount of R&D 
investment, but also the innovation performances, the accumulation of competencies and 
the cooperation with external sources of knowledge. Furthermore, this type of multi-
dimensional investigation, when comparing policy interventions, can also lead to 
conclude that public support schemes characterised by similar effects on the R&D 
investment can have quite dissimilar impacts, when the output and the behavioural 
additionality are considered too. The second paper has addressed another issue that is 
largely under-investigated in the literature: the relation between the average impact of the 
policy and the dispersion of the effect across the beneficiaries. In other terms, the paper 
has provided a tentative analysis of the extent to which the average level of additionality 
is generated by the concentration or by the polarisation of the effects on the beneficiaries. 
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The analysis of the Spearman’s rank correlation between the average treatment effects on 
the treated (i.e. ATTs) and the coefficients of variation of the “i-th firm’s” effects has 
pointed to an interesting result. With the exception of the Italian regional policies, the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are found to be negative and significant. This 
means that the highest average impacts are characterised by the lowest dispersions. In 
other terms, high average levels of additionality are generated by the concentration of the 
effects around the mean impact.  
The third paper included in the Thesis (Chapter 4) has been focused on a specific 
regional intervention: the R&D subsidy of the Regional Programme for the Industrial 
Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT) implemented in the NUTS2 
Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. The paper has mainly analysed the way in which a 
regional public support to R&D affects the innovation behaviour of the funded firms. 
Particular attention has been devoted to the role of the policy in enhancing the 
cooperation with distant and diverse sources of knowledge. Exploiting an original dataset 
created upon data coming from an ad hoc survey and companies’ balance sheets, the 
paper has tested three main hypotheses. The first one has concerned the expected capacity 
of the policy to induce a set of behavioural changes that can help to reduce potential 
system failures due to problems in learning processes, missing or inappropriate 
connections and unbalanced evolutionary trade-offs (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; 
Malerba, 2009). The results, emerging from a set of propensity score matching 
estimations, have pointed to a general support of the hypothesis. More precisely, the 
R&D subsidy is found to be successful in upgrading firms’ competencies. The effect on 
the intra-RIS interactions between funded firms and research organisations is found to be 
positive and significant too. The regional R&D subsidy is also found to increase funded 
firms’ cooperation with extra-regional sources of knowledge, which are expected to 
enhance the renewal and the diversity of the regional knowledge base (e.g. Bathelt et al., 
2004; Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Uyarra, 2010). Similarly to the case of the intra-RIS 
cooperation, the policy mainly increased the propensity of funded firms to cooperate with 
research organisations. All in all, these findings point to a general success of the 
investigated policy. This contrasts with the evidence, emerged from the second paper 
(Chapter 3) included in the Thesis, indicating a general weak impact of the regional 
policies implemented in Italy. Even if the results arising from the two papers are not 
directly comparable, given the different data and reference periods considered, the better 
performance of the Emilia-Romagna policy was somehow expected. This latter represents 
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indeed a unique case in the Italian context and a notable example in Europe too77. The 
current Emilia-Romagna innovation policy is the result of a successful and long lasting 
experience of public interventions, which dates back to the 70s and has led to the 
definition, in 2002, of the Regional Programme for the Industrial Research, Innovation 
and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT), the investigated R&D subsidy is part of (Bianchi 
and Giordani, 1993; Marzocchi, 2009).  Not only the third paper included in the Thesis 
has focused on the evaluation of the behavioural additionality effects induced by the 
participation in the policy. As an additional contribution, the effect of the subsidy on the 
collaborations with research organisations has been further investigated. In particular, the 
paper has analysed whether an increase in the amount of public support stimulates the 
cooperation with distant (extra-regional) and possibly “global-best” universities and 
research institutes. To this aim, two parallel hypotheses have been tested: these have 
concerned the impact of an additional amount of subsidy on the geographical range of the 
cooperation with universities and research institutes. The results, emerging from a 
generalised propensity score estimation, have shown that, over a minimum efficient scale 
of public support, an additional amount of subsidy increasingly boosts firms’ propensity 
to cooperate with distant research partners. In sum, the amount of subsidy is found to be 
fundamentally important to overcome the cost of a distant collaboration and to trigger the 
transition towards an Open Regional Innovation System (Belussi et al. 2010), 
characterised by the presence of open modes of innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) and 
interactions that cross not only the boundaries of the firm but also of the region. Some 
further analyses are required to increase the generality of these conclusions: the results 
obtained in the paper might depend on to the characteristics of the context and of the 
policy considered, such as the fact that SMEs were the main beneficiaries of the 
intervention. 
Of course, the present Thesis does not pretend to have addressed all the 
unanswered questions and issues. Many research lines are still open. 
The first of these is related to the necessity to improve the analysis of the way in 
which innovation policy affects beneficiaries’ innovation process. On this first point the 
Thesis has tried to advance a step ahead of the previous contributions, considering the 
additionality of the innovation policy as multi-dimensional in its nature. In particular, the 
Thesis has demonstrated that the public support to innovation activities not only can 
                                                            
77 See for instance http://www.rim-europa.eu/index.cfm?q=p.baseline&r=ITD5. 
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affect the allocation of innovation inputs, but also the innovation performances and the 
beneficiaries’ behaviour. Nevertheless, this is only a first step in the right direction. To 
have a full understanding of how the policy affects the innovation process of the 
supported organisations, as stressed in the first paper of the Thesis, some further research 
should be devoted to analyse the likely synergies between the additionality dimensions. 
This is a very complex task from a methodological point of view given the likely 
simultaneity and reverse causality in almost all the possible relation between the three 
additionality dimensions. The very recent work by Garcia (2011), which has been 
produced just at the time of the present writing, employs a system of simultaneous 
equations for this kind of analysis and represents an important methodological starting 
point.  
The second open research line concerns the important contribution to the analysis 
of the policy effects that can come from the investigation of the capacity of the public 
support to reduce innovation barriers. This implies a change in the prospective, with 
respect to the additionality evaluation. Whereas this latter is generally concerned with the 
spurring effects of the public support, the analysis of the policy impact on the innovation 
barriers would be focused on the capacity to reduce the factors that hamper innovation. In 
providing this type of analysis, some points emerging from recent contributions (e.g. 
D’Este et al., 2012) have to be necessarily considered. At first, the different nature of the 
deterring and revealed barriers. The former prevent firms from engaging in innovation, 
the latter obstruct firms’ achievements in innovation activities. A further issue, which 
creates serious problems when moving to the econometric operationalisation, is the 
possible reverse causality between firms’ barriers assessment and engagement in 
innovation. This has a serious implication when it comes to the estimation of the policy 
effect: firms that are heavily engaged in innovation activities might be more willing (and 
able) to participate in the policy and have, at the same time, a higher perception of the 
barriers that hamper their innovation activities. If not properly controlled for, this would 
obviously create a bias when estimating the impact of the policy. Unfortunately, as some 
preliminary investigations have shown, the commonly used Community Innovation 
Survey data seem to exacerbate this problem. The questions concerning the barriers are 
indeed intimately related to firms’ perception rather than to the actual effect of the 
barriers on the innovation performance. This necessarily implies the need to collect data 
on purpose.    
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Another main point that deserves a rigorous and deep investigation is the analysis 
of the characteristics of policy impact which are not captured by the simple average effect 
of the participation in the policy. With this respect, the present Thesis has provided an 
important contribution, investigating, with its third paper, the effect due an additional 
amount of subsidy. Another partially neglected aspect in the literature that requires a 
further investigation is the analysis of the distribution of the policy effects. This is a 
crucial issue for its relevant policy implications: two policies characterised by the same 
average impact, but different distributions of the effects on the single beneficiaries, 
cannot be considered to have had the same result. A tentative analysis of the relation 
between the average level of additionality and the dispersions of the policy effect has 
been provided in the second paper included in the present Thesis. However, further steps 
should be done in this direction. Some recent developments in the econometric literature, 
as the recently proposed methods to estimate the quantile treatment effects, would allow 
for a more rigorous analysis of the distribution of the impacts (e.g. Battistin and Fort, 
2008; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). However, these methodologies have necessarily to be 
operationalised with continuous outcome variables. Unfortunately, in this Thesis, the lack 
of proper data has impeded the creation of continuous outcome variables for the 
behavioural additionality in particular, and, to some extent, for the output additionality 
too.    
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